From about 1917 to 1967, Dutch politics closely resembled the model of consociational democracy (pacificatie-democratie'), characterized by a fragmented political culture, overarching... Show moreFrom about 1917 to 1967, Dutch politics closely resembled the model of consociational democracy (pacificatie-democratie'), characterized by a fragmented political culture, overarching cooperation among the subcultural elites, and a high degree of political stability. Dutch democracy is now in a period of transition from the consociational pattern to the depoliticized pattern of democracy (kartel-democratie), characterized by a homogeneous political culture and, like the consociational system, cooperation rather than competition among the elites. There are several reasons why this transition is not proceeding smoothly: (1) The homogenization of the political culture is a multidimensional process, in which the different variables (the decline of ideology and religion as politically relevant factors, the decrease of social segregation, and the declining cohesion of the organizations within each subculture) are developing unevenly. As a result, the party system tends toward fragmentation instead of the growth of large catchall parties. (2) A neo-democratic ideology is developing as a reaction against the insufficiently democratic quality of the depoliticized system. Because the ’undemocratic’ cartel of elites is also characteristic of consociational democracy, this neo-democratic opposition appears in an early stage of the political transition in the Netherlands. (3) The elites, accustomed to the relatively easy tasks of political accommodation and to the deference of their followers in consociational democracy, react indecisively to the sudden political unrest. (4) The extreme form of proportional representation in the Netherlands tends to reinforce disproportionately the effects of fragmentation and neo-democratic demands. The recent controversies over the royal house have also added to the political unrest, but this factor is a purely coincidental one. Dutch politics will probably keep moving toward the depoliticized pattern, and will remain relatively unstable because of the neo-democratic opposition inherent in this type of democracy. A deliberate decartellization and re-politicization by the ruling elites, which would mean a return to competitive politics and greater stability, is possible but not very probable. Show less
On the basis of governmental publications a mainly statistical analysis is given of changes in the Foreign Service of the Netherlands. The diplomatic organisation can be divided into the following... Show moreOn the basis of governmental publications a mainly statistical analysis is given of changes in the Foreign Service of the Netherlands. The diplomatic organisation can be divided into the following categories: ’consulary service’, ’foreign service officers, ’bilateral representation’ and multilateral representation’. The growth of the diplomatic organization in the postwar years can be traced back to the growth of representation, mainly multilateral representation (Figures 1, 2 and 3). Comparison with Norwegian data reveals that the same trend appears in the Norwegian diplomatic organization. In the third section an analysis is made of the effects of tensions in the formal hierarchy of the diplomacy. A Dutch diplomat can formally be forwarded with a ’personal title’ belonging to one rank higher in the hierarchy than he actually occupies. Table 4 shows that this practice was more and more applied in postwar years and that it centers around rank level III. There also are some formal possibilities to appoint foreign service officers in another than the officially prescribed way. These ’irregular’ appointments occured mainly during the first ten post-war years (table 5) and include about 1/3 of all appointments in the entire post-war period (table 6). The ’irregulars’ leave the diplomatic service sooner than the ’regulars’ (table 7), the ratio for the whole post-war period being 3 : 1 (table 8). In section 4 comparisons are made between formal and actual progress of the diplomatic career of the ’regulars’ (figure 6). Also the relation between career speed and preparatory training is analyzed (table 13). Show less
1 — It is assumed that it is the purpose of a theory to explain something. An explanation is an answer to a question of the linguistic form ’why?’; its logical structure is of the following form: E... Show more1 — It is assumed that it is the purpose of a theory to explain something. An explanation is an answer to a question of the linguistic form ’why?’; its logical structure is of the following form: E That is, on the basis of a certain set of postulates, or ’laws’, {Lj,........ Ln}, and a set of given, observed 'circumstances’, {Ci,.........Cn}, ’E’, the conclusion, is decuded. Accordingly, the character of an explanation and, consequently, of a theory, is deductive. 2 — As regards the structure of a theory several elements should be distiguished. (1) The logical mathematical, or probablistic system in which the theory is formulated. (2) The calculus which may be conceived as the axiomatic nucleus of the theory and which consists of a set of primitive concepts and postulates governing the use of the primitives. On the basis of primitives and postulates new concepts and theorems are deduced. It is to be noted, that the content of the primitives (their ’meaning’) consists of the way they are used within the relational structure of the calculus; that is, they are defined implicitly. (3) An interpretative system of rules connecting the ’abstract’ calculus with other structures of knowledge. In this way the calculus can be given different interpretations, which constitute models of the initial calculus. In order to explain empirical reality, there should at least be an empirical model of the calculus, that is, the calculus has to be connected with observable reality. In this case the interpretation is given by a set of ’operational definitions’ as they are commonly called. It is shown that these definitions can be conceived as ’quickly decidable sentences’ by means of which the empirical model can be falsified. 3 — The role which theory construction plays with regard to the formation of reality is indicated. Making explicit its logical structure and its empirical interpretation, theory formation leads to ’intersubjectively transmissible knowledge’. It results in the construction of a reality which transcends individual and parochial idiosyncracies and which is accessible to everybody. Of the conditions a theory should fulfill, two stand out: (a) it should be consistent, and (b) it should be falsifiable. Finally, it is shown that there is some ground to assume theory formation to be possible — even in the social sciences, difficult though it may be. Show less
Simulation studies in all areas are considered to be somewhat of a fad. Substantial reconstruction of a root and branch nature are required, especially with respect to simulations which utilize a... Show moreSimulation studies in all areas are considered to be somewhat of a fad. Substantial reconstruction of a root and branch nature are required, especially with respect to simulations which utilize a model-controlled environment for experimental purposes. It is suggested that validity criteria for model construction have been characterized by a pervasive error in the concern for ’isomorphic’ realism, which reproduced in sophisticated model form the simplism and cognitive rigidity of the war game umpire. Even as this error has been gradually recognized and partially corrected, the basic orientation and concern for environmental model aspects has remained and continues to divert interest away from the micro-political nexus. The author’s own suggestion, the Prisoner’s Dilemma Simulation, is an attempt to focus upon this core element in the larger system and to develop a technique for complex experimental research into conflict behavior. The author suggests that simulation can be seen in four ways: 1 As a means of macro-political analysis: in which the output is new research directions, i.e., ’the next most plausible model.’ It is a means of summarizing research and getting on with the business of further research instead of leaving locked rooms packed with data to be analyzed ’some day’. 2 Educationally: here one wants to ’tell how it is’ and make people aware of it in a way that sells history. 3 Complex experimentation: in which theories can be generated which are valid at least for some people, and which may therefore have an improved survival rate when tested in the real world. 4 As a fad: which can be used effectively for a while to get money from people who have not yet been told that it is passé until the next fad comes along Show less
The concept of ’negative sanctions’ has for many years been employed in political science. The author describes the way in which the concept has been operationalized by R. E. Agger, D. Goldrich and... Show moreThe concept of ’negative sanctions’ has for many years been employed in political science. The author describes the way in which the concept has been operationalized by R. E. Agger, D. Goldrich and B. E. Swanson in the Rulers and the Ruled and by J. F. Medler in Negative Sanctions: Their Perception and their Impact in the Political System. Since the author’s main interest centers on reasons for political apathy, special attention is paid to the subjective aspect of the problem: do citizens expect to be sanctioned for political activities? Some of the problems of adapting the questions used in American research to measure sanction-perceptions, to the Dutch situation, are discussed. Sanction expectations were, in the author’s research, tied to a special kind of political activity namely expressing one’s opinion in public on an issue salient at the time: Republic or Monarchy. Sanctions included reprisals expected from governmental authorities. One fourth of the Amsterdam respondents expected to be registered by the B.V.D. (the Dutch F.B.I.), if they openly expressed a preference for the Republic. Fifteen percent thought that a preference for the Republic would make it harder to get governmental financial support. Eight percent thought they would get trouble with the police. Other expectations with regard to economic and social sanctions, as well as with regard to positive sanctions, are presented. Show less
In a reaction to ’The Implications of Proportional Representation with Eighteen Districts’ by R. Verboom {Acta Politica III: 2 Jan. 1968, p. 118-131), the author defends his proposal to divide the... Show moreIn a reaction to ’The Implications of Proportional Representation with Eighteen Districts’ by R. Verboom {Acta Politica III: 2 Jan. 1968, p. 118-131), the author defends his proposal to divide the country into rather large districts, with a system of proportional representation and the possibility of combined party lists. This would facilitate the formation of two large political groups, which could offer real alternatives to the voters at the polls. The winning group would form the new cabinet, which would represent the will of the majority of the voters. Thus there would be no need for a directly elected prime minister as proposed by ’Democrats ’66’. Show less
It is argued that the forthcoming formation of a ’National Institute for Peace Problems’ in the Netherlands necessitates research which will undoubtedly be applied research since it has a clear... Show moreIt is argued that the forthcoming formation of a ’National Institute for Peace Problems’ in the Netherlands necessitates research which will undoubtedly be applied research since it has a clear relation to a particular value of worldwide significance; the value of peace. However, the author fears that the prevailing method of teaching international relations at Dutch universities concerns itself predominantly, if not exclusively, with the teaching of so-called pure science. In this context the recent public lecture of Dr. P. R. Baehr at the University of Amsterdam, on ’Teaching and Research in International Relations’ is discussed. The new institute will inevitably suffer from the above-mentioned contradictory situation, as it obviously needs the support of the universities. With a view to avoiding the isolation of the institute, the author makes a plea for the reconsideration of the present situation. In criticizing the position taken by Dr. Baehr the author emphasizes the need for the effectuation of research and teaching on an applied basis. In the opinion of the author, research and teaching on an applied basis would be of multiple utility as compared with the pure basis. Finally, the author advocates the convocation of a — preferably international — conference in the Netherlands in order to discuss certain items, some of which have already been put forward by the Norwegian peace-researcher, Dr. J. Galtung; 1) Is peace-research to be considered a value-oriented field of inquiry built around the value of peace? 2) Is this field of inquiry an applied field of research, and is its task then to present what will generally seem like ’policy implication’? 3) Will the science of international relations on the one hand, and peace-research on the other, converge into one science that could presumably best be called ’irenology’ ? 4) If the preceding question must be answered negatively, what will be the position allotted to these branches of science in research and teaching at the universities? In a rejoinder Dr. Baehr defends his earlier standpoint and rejects the proposed international conference, as he feels that there should be scope for both methods of scientific approach. Show less
The data on which this analysis is based were assembled by Dr. A. Hoogerwerf; I a random sample of 912 persons in Delft was used. The authors investigated the influence of several variables on the... Show moreThe data on which this analysis is based were assembled by Dr. A. Hoogerwerf; I a random sample of 912 persons in Delft was used. The authors investigated the influence of several variables on the independent i variable of social-political-progressiveness (spp). A matrix of correlations between fifteen items of the original questionnaire was computed; eight items which were highly related to each other were found. These items were used as indicators for social-political-progressiveness by summing the answers of each respondent on every item. On these scores an analysis of variance was carried out with five independent variables; religion, age, income, level of education, and sex. The following findings were obtained; — Religion had a significant influence on spp-scores; respondents who do not have any specific religion tend to be more progressive than others. Furthermore, Catholics tend to be more progressive than Protestants and Dutch-Reformed. — It was also shown that both the level of education and income had significant influences on spp-scores; the higher the income or the educational level, the lower the progressiveness-score. — The variables age and sex did not have significant influences on spp-scores. — The five variables included in the design explained 32% of the total variance in the spp-scores. Of the remaining 68% about 27% can be explained in terms 2 of error-variance. This means that about 41% of the total variance in spp-score.I has to be explained by factors which are not included in the design. Show less
