This document presents the findings from quantitative and qualitative data generation and analysisconducted as part of the project “Financial decision-making, gender and social normsin Zambia”.... Show moreThis document presents the findings from quantitative and qualitative data generation and analysisconducted as part of the project “Financial decision-making, gender and social normsin Zambia”. Using a series of specially designed behavioural experiments and focus groupdiscussions, we generated an extensive set of insights into the normative environment withinwhich spouses in Eastern Province, Zambia, decide on individual money holding and saving.Here are some of those insights. Spouses in Eastern Province, Zambia, are willing to compromise household-level income to maintain individual control over money. Wives, but not husbands, are more likely to compromise household-level earnings to maintain individual control over money when theycan keep that money and their actions hidden from their spouses. Individually-held behaviouralprescriptions, i.e., the “shoulds” and “oughts” that individuals have in mind and reference asguides for their behaviour and benchmarks against which to evaluate others’ behaviour, informdecision-making about maintaining individual control over money at a cost to the household.Further, when individuals know that their spouses will find out about their decisions regardingmaintaining individual control over money (or not) at a cost to the household, the individualstake their spouses’ opinions about what they should do into account, i.e., they compromise. Inthe Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), wastefulness on the part of spouses was consistentlygiven as a reason for endeavouring to maintain individual control over money.There is strong but not unequivocal evidence pointing to the existence of a social norm, i.e., a“should” or “ought” that is collectively held and enforced by members of a community,forbidding saving in secret from one’s spouse, with the secrecy, not the saving being theproblem. Assuming it exists, this social norm forbidding saving in secret from one’s spouseapplies to both husbands and wives, and both husbands and wives acknowledge this. However,the extent to which violations of this norm are tolerated depends on who is doing the violatingand evaluating. In patrilineal communities (as compared to matrilineal communities), bothhusbands and wives are especially intolerant of secret saving by husbands, and in bothpatrilineal and matrilineal communities, wives are less tolerant than husbands of secret savingby husbands and more tolerant than husbands of secret saving by wives. This relative toleranceof secret saving by wives notwithstanding, just under one in three wives and one in sixhusbands think that a man is justified in beating his wife if he discovers that she is saving in ane-wallet or has joined a savings group without his knowledge and, as grounds for wife-beating,saving in secret is on a par with neglecting the children, visiting friends or family in secret andrefusing to have sex. When exploring the reasons for this strong norm against saving in secretin the FGDs, women express fear about the money going missing if the secret saver diesunexpectedly. Both men and women strongly believe that if a wife saves in secret, it raisessuspicions about where she is getting the money and that saving in secret can lead to maritaltension. Show less
We use three years of household panel data to analyze the effects of ill-health on household economic outcomes in rural Ethiopia. We examine the immediate effects of various ill-health measures on... Show moreWe use three years of household panel data to analyze the effects of ill-health on household economic outcomes in rural Ethiopia. We examine the immediate effects of various ill-health measures on health expenditure and labor supply, the subsequent coping responses, and finally the effect on income and consumption. We find evidence of substantial economic risk in terms of increased health expenditure and reduced agricultural productivity. Households are able to smooth consumption by resorting to intra-household labor substitution, borrowing and depleting assets. However, maintaining current consumption through borrowing and depletion of assets is unlikely to be sustainable and displays the need for health financing reforms and safety nets that reduce the financial consequences of ill-health. Show less
This document presents the preliminary findings from the quantitative data generation and analysis conducted as part of the project “Financial decision-making, gender and social norms in Zambia”.... Show moreThis document presents the preliminary findings from the quantitative data generation and analysis conducted as part of the project “Financial decision-making, gender and social norms in Zambia”. Using a series of specially designed behavioural experiments, we generated an extensive set of insights into the normative environment within which spouses in Eastern Province, Zambia, make decisions about individual money holding and saving. Here are some of those insights. Spouses in Eastern Province, Zambia, are willing to compromise household-level earnings in order to maintain individual control over money. Wives, but not husbands, are more likely to compromise household-level earnings in order to maintain individual control over money, when they can keep that money and their actions hidden from their spouses. Individually-held behavioural prescriptions, i.e., the “shoulds” and “oughts” that individuals have in mind and reference as guides for their own behaviour and as benchmarks against which to evaluate others’ behaviour, inform decision-making about maintaining individual control over money at a cost to the household. Further, when individuals know that their spouses will find out about their descisions regarding maintaining individual control over money (or not) at a cost to the household, the individuals take their spouses’ opinions about what they should do into account, i.e., they compromise. There is strong but not unequivocal evidence pointing to the existence of a social norm, i.e., a “should” or “ought” that is collectively held and enforced by members of a community, forbidding saving in secret from one’s spouse, with the secrecy not the saving being the problem. Assuming it exists, this social norm forbidding saving in secret from one’s spouse applies to both husbands and wives, and this is acknowledged by both husbands and wives. However, the extent to which violations of this norm are tolerated depends on who is doing the violating and who the evaluating. In patrilineal communities (as compared to matrilineal communities), both husbands and wives are especially intolerant of secret saving by husbands and in both patrilineal and matrilineal communities, wives are less tolerant than husbands of secret saving by husbands and more tolerant than husbands of secret saving by wives. This relative tolerance of secret saving by wives notwithstanding, just under one in three wives and one in six husbands think that a man is justified in beating his wife if he discovers that she is saving in an e-wallet or has joined a savings group without his knowledge and, as grounds for wife beating, saving in secret is on a par with neglecting the children, visiting friends or family in secret and refusing to have sex. For further insights, see the main text of the report. Show less
Barr, A.; Dekker, M.; Janssens, W.; Kebede, B.; Kramer, B. 2019
Using a carefully designed series of public goods games, we compare, across monogamous and polygynous households, the willingness of husbands and wives to cooperate to maximize household gains.... Show moreUsing a carefully designed series of public goods games, we compare, across monogamous and polygynous households, the willingness of husbands and wives to cooperate to maximize household gains. Compared to monogamous husbands and wives, polygynous husbands and wives are less cooperative, one with another, and co-wives are least cooperative, one with another. The husbands' and wives' behavior in a corresponding series of inter-household games indicates that these differences cannot be attributed to selection of less cooperative people into polygyny. Finally, behavior in polygynous households is more reciprocal and less apparently altruistic. Show less
This paper examines strategies used by rural households in Ntcheu District, Malawi, to cope with a decreasing fuelwood availability. Fieldwork was carried out in 1990 and 1991. With increasing... Show moreThis paper examines strategies used by rural households in Ntcheu District, Malawi, to cope with a decreasing fuelwood availability. Fieldwork was carried out in 1990 and 1991. With increasing distance to woodlands, households initially collected further away, spending more time on collection. But when distance to woodlands increased further, households returned to nearby places using less time for collection and switching to lower quality woods. Results indicate that distance to collection place and collection time are not reliable indicators of fuelwood shortages. Households within the same village differed in collection strategies particularly as regards collection distance and collection frequency. Households that tended to collect further away and more frequently were large in size with more female adults. These households also collected more wood, even per capita, compared to smaller households, suggesting that smaller households economized on fuelwood use. This paper supports the idea that level of fuelwood used is not only determined by fuelwood availability, but more by labour availability. Show less
This monograph reports on the seasonal fluctuations in food and nutrition that occur in Coast Province, Kenya, on the basis of data gathered during five survey rounds held in selected locations in... Show moreThis monograph reports on the seasonal fluctuations in food and nutrition that occur in Coast Province, Kenya, on the basis of data gathered during five survey rounds held in selected locations in Kwale and Kilifi districts between mid 1985 and late 1986. The study population seems to have developed fairly successful strategies to cope with diminishing food stocks at the end of the agricultural year, despite the fact that household income levels are generally low, a large number of households fall below poverty levels, household energy intake is not more than that of peasant smallholders elsewhere in Kenya and the nutritional status of children is below that in other districts. The implications of the findings are reviewed against the background of the changes in livelihood that have occurred in rural Africa; in respect of resource management and diversification strategies; and in relation to existing theories of child growth. The contribution of climate, productive organization, household income and individual characteristics in determining the extent to which the adverse effects of seasonality are felt and the types of coping mechanisms that are used is considered. Finally, the implications for development and policy are discussed. Show less
This paper examines how the labour migration of Swazi homestead members to South Africa affects the homestead as a solidarity group. After an introduction in which he discusses the conditions... Show moreThis paper examines how the labour migration of Swazi homestead members to South Africa affects the homestead as a solidarity group. After an introduction in which he discusses the conditions which make a group a solidarity group and their applicability to the Swazi homestead, the author analyses the impact of migrant labour on the size and composition of the Swazi homestead, its durability and stability, its economic position, and on the principle of reciprocity, particularly with respect to the distribution of remittances. The study is based on data derived from a survey carried out in 1990 among 195 homesteads in Swaziland. On balance, the impact of labour migration on the Swazi homestead as a solidarity group seems to be negative. Show less
