This chapter explores the lawful contours of a growing phenomenon – the administration of criminal justice by non-state armed groups in territories under their control. It highlights a steadily... Show moreThis chapter explores the lawful contours of a growing phenomenon – the administration of criminal justice by non-state armed groups in territories under their control. It highlights a steadily mounting body of international practice recognizing the lawfulness of the ‘de facto’ processes as dependent on how – rather than by whom – justice is administered and considers the conditions that international law places on such justice. These include the core standards of independence and impartiality, fair trial guarantees, respect for the principle of legality and the nature of the crimes, which pose myriad challenges in practice in the context of de facto justice. Among others, the chapter flags the particular implications of increased resort by non-state actors (like states) to broad terrorism-related crimes as a basis for prosecution. Finally, as meeting the standards required of de facto justice will generally depend on external support, the chapter questions whether under international law states can – or in certain circumstances should – cooperate with or recognize such processes consistently with international law. In an area of dynamic legal and practical development, the chapter reveals a landscape that is evolving to meet the realities of the changing nature of non-state actors’ exercise of power and control, but where tensions, uncertainties and paradoxes remain. Show less
Why does one person radicalize to involvement in terrorist violence within a group-based context, while another engages in this form of violence alone? Existing research remains subject to... Show moreWhy does one person radicalize to involvement in terrorist violence within a group-based context, while another engages in this form of violence alone? Existing research remains subject to limitations related to sample size, ideological and geographical range, and contradictory findings. This article draws on a newly-developed dataset to compare group-based and loneactor terrorists across a range of predictors. Statistically significant bivariate associations and regression analyses suggest that lone actors have fewer criminal antecedents and lower exposure to social settings that enable groupbased participation in terrorism. Limited perceived social skills and high social isolation may inhibit their ability to join terrorist groups. Lone actors also have little experience with non-violent activism, and tend to radicalize at a later age. Show less
This chapter belongs to a co-authored book so not really an edited volume, but there was no option in the system for a co-authored book. Thus the editor’s names (Boletsi, Winkler) are thus the... Show moreThis chapter belongs to a co-authored book so not really an edited volume, but there was no option in the system for a co-authored book. Thus the editor’s names (Boletsi, Winkler) are thus the chief authors and project leaders, but there were more authors involved. Show less
Recent cases of terrorist violence by jihadist, far right, and male supremacist actors share a common, yet underexplored feature – the aim to impose extreme patriarchal political and social orders... Show moreRecent cases of terrorist violence by jihadist, far right, and male supremacist actors share a common, yet underexplored feature – the aim to impose extreme patriarchal political and social orders which are anti-feminist and even misogynistic. This exploratory article draws on several cases across these three groups to highlight two findings. First, we demonstrate that these narratives are increasingly utilized in justifications for violence, and women, and those promoting gender equality, are targeted. Second, that male supremacy is itself is increasingly a distinct anti-feminist ideological motivation for violence. We argue that this topic should be considered and assessed to a greater extent in terrorism scholarship, and in practical efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism. Show less
Van Dongen, T.; Veilleux-Lepage, Y.D.; Leidig, E.; Rigault Arkis, H. 2022
This research paper seeks to examine the nature of the nexus between right-wing extremism and the military by surveying five potential consequences (i.e., problem areas) arising from the presence... Show moreThis research paper seeks to examine the nature of the nexus between right-wing extremism and the military by surveying five potential consequences (i.e., problem areas) arising from the presence of right-wing extremists within the armed forces of twelve Western countries. The five problem areas identified are military personnel: 1) committing right-wing extremist violence; 2) facilitating right-wing extremist violence by organisations; 3) perpetuating ideologically motivated hate crimes or violation of procedures and rules of engagement while on deployment; 4) hampering military diversity and inclusion efforts with activities and behaviours; and 5) undermining civilian control over the military. Based on a systematic review of five years of news media articles and government reports from 2017-2021, we find that for most problem areas the worst conceivable manifestations have thus far not (yet) materialised. Further, activities of military personnel with right-wing extremist leanings were not more dangerous as a result of their military background. Overall, the nature of the nexus between right-wing extremism and the military was vastly different amongst the countries in our study, with Germany and the US appearing to be the most heavily affected. The mapping of this threat serves as a basis for informing policymakers of the various scenarios and appropriate responses to counter right-wing extremism within the military. Show less
Refugees’ effect on domestic terrorism is conditioned by host-country social perception (attitude about living next-door to foreigners) and economic competition. These hypotheses are tested cross... Show moreRefugees’ effect on domestic terrorism is conditioned by host-country social perception (attitude about living next-door to foreigners) and economic competition. These hypotheses are tested cross-nationally from 1995-2014 leveraging data from the World Values Survey. The results show social perception matters. When refugee flow to a country increases from the mean to 75th percentile, it does not statistically alter domestic terrorism risk. But when a host-country’s preference to not live next-door to foreigners is accounted for and changes from the mean (20.9%) to 75th percentile (30.3%), the change in refugee flow increases the risk of domestic terrorism by 40%. Show less
The causes of involvement in terrorism continue to be subject to a rich academic debate. In several recent contributions, Lorne Dawson, professor of new religious movements, has argued that... Show moreThe causes of involvement in terrorism continue to be subject to a rich academic debate. In several recent contributions, Lorne Dawson, professor of new religious movements, has argued that terrorism researchers too often downplay the role of religious convictions. In setting out his arguments, Dawson has repeatedly referred to some of my own work as an example of this practice. In this article, I respond to Dawson’s criticism in order to show that it does not accurately represent the views that my co-authors and I have put forward. Rather than dismiss the role of ideology, I have argued the need for its contextualization. Extremist beliefs certainly play an important role in motivating and justifying terrorist violence. But they are not sufficient as explanations for such violence because most people who hold extremist views will never act on them. Secondly, even fanatical adherents of extremist beliefs tend to be motivated by more than their convictions alone. Finally, the different degrees of ideological commitment found among terrorists further underline the need to remain critical of the explanatory power of extremist beliefs alone. Show less
Alberda, D.; Duits, N.; van den Bos, K.; Ayanian, A. H.; Zick, A.; Kempes, M. 2021
The European Database of Terrorist offenders (EDT) is based on comprehensive judicial information of convictedor deceased terrorist offenders, including social, psychological and psychiatric... Show moreThe European Database of Terrorist offenders (EDT) is based on comprehensive judicial information of convictedor deceased terrorist offenders, including social, psychological and psychiatric reports. This new empirical databaseis the result of a European cross-border collaboration between judicial organizations and scientists within theEuropean Union. The EDT dataset comprises developmental, individual, biographical and contextual factors,which are potentially related to engagement in violent extremism and terrorism. It supports research seeking toidentify critical risk and protective factors for violent extremism and terrorism. The EDT dataset could be usedto conduct studies aimed at the identification of significant personal and contextual risk and protective factorsfor terrorism and violent extremism, improving and validating risk assessments, as well as identifying pathwaysinto terrorism and radicalization. Moreover, this data can assist in the design of effective policy, prevention andintervention practices regarding potential violent extremist and terrorist offenders in Europe and elsewhere. The aimof this article is twofold: firstly, it seeks to present the EDT, along with discussing its development and methodology.To this end, the inclusion criteria and coding principles are discussed, alongside quality-, privacy- and securityissues associated with the gathering and processing of judicial data, together with some preliminary statistics.Secondly, it aims to discuss potentials for research based on EDT data. Accordingly, potential applications andfuture developments of the EDT are discussed as well as urgent needs to use and further develop this comprehensiveand unique database. Show less
Many European countries have been the target of jihadist terrorist attacks between 2015 and 2017. While the chance of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack is low, terrorism scholars have... Show moreMany European countries have been the target of jihadist terrorist attacks between 2015 and 2017. While the chance of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack is low, terrorism scholars have emphasized that terrorism does not revolve around statistics and casualty numbers. Terrorists use attacks to reach an audience and affect groups beyond the direct victims. To this date, little is known about how terrorist attacks might affect the salience of terrorism beyond national borders. This paper investigates possible convergence of issue salience of terrorism among citizens within the European Union for ten jihadist attacks in the period 2015–2017 using Eurobarometer survey data. The results indicate that it is not simply a question of convergence or divergence of salience of terrorism after a terrorist attack. The connection is multidirectional and depending upon a variety of factors. Most importantly, we observed convergence on the EU-level, but divergence on the national level. This raises important questions about the transnationality of the effects of terrorism. As this research does not test nor find a causal mechanism and is solely dependent on existing data, further research is necessary to test some of its findings. Show less
Lone attackers have attracted considerable attention from the media, policymakers and academics. This is partly due to the terrorist attacks Europefaced in the last couple of years executed by... Show moreLone attackers have attracted considerable attention from the media, policymakers and academics. This is partly due to the terrorist attacks Europefaced in the last couple of years executed by—seemingly—lone attackers.Academic research has explored topics like the demarcation between loneattackers and terrorist cells or networks, typologies of lone attackers, themotivation of lone attackers, and—lately—the attack patterns of lone actors.This chapter will analyse the changed understanding of lone actorviolence and discuss possible preventive approaches. Show less
Ever since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, counter-terrorism legislation has been argued to be globally focused on a so called ‘suspect community’: the ‘Muslim community’. The media, politicians and... Show moreEver since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, counter-terrorism legislation has been argued to be globally focused on a so called ‘suspect community’: the ‘Muslim community’. The media, politicians and scholars speak about a new wave of terrorism where ‘Islamic’ is a common key denominator. Critical research, so far predominantly focused on the United Kingdom, has pointed at unintended consequences arising from political discourse in which a ‘suspect community’ is constructed, for society as a whole and the ‘suspect community’ in particular. Building on this research, this study analyses if and how Muslims are also constructed as a ‘suspect community’ in Dutch political discourse on terrorism in the period 2004-2015. The analysis shows that political discourse in the Netherlands has shifted significantly in this period. Whereas until 2011, terrorism was framed as a problem that originates in society and that is to be solved for society as a whole, it is currently seen as a problem that originates in Islam and which needs to be addressed by the ‘Muslim community’. All members of that ‘Muslim community’ are now considered as potentially ‘suspect’ when they do not openly and explicitly adhere to Western values and take action to distance themselves from the ‘Jihadist enemy’. Further societal implications of this discourse, in which the ‘Muslim community’ is constructed as a ‘suspect community,’ are also discussed. Show less
Het is onduidelijk of en in hoeverre de aanslagen in nabijgelegen landen ook van invloed zijn op de risicobeleving van de Nederlandse bevolking Niet alleen aanslagen in buurlanden kunnen van... Show moreHet is onduidelijk of en in hoeverre de aanslagen in nabijgelegen landen ook van invloed zijn op de risicobeleving van de Nederlandse bevolking Niet alleen aanslagen in buurlanden kunnen van invloed zijn op de risicoperceptie in Nederland,1 maar ook het, door de overheid ingeschaalde, dreigingsniveau. De vraag rijst of en in hoeverre het relatief langdurig hoge dreigingsniveau (substantieel, niveau vier van vijf, sinds maart 2013) de risicoperceptie van de Nederlandse bevolking beïnvloedt. Show less
Wittendorp, S.; Bont, R. de; Bakker, E.; Roy van Zuijdewijn, J. de 2017
From the time when the problem of people travelling to areas of conflict in Syria and Iraq became a topical issue at the end of 2012, many European countries as well as the United States have taken... Show moreFrom the time when the problem of people travelling to areas of conflict in Syria and Iraq became a topical issue at the end of 2012, many European countries as well as the United States have taken measures to prevent actual or would-be travellers and to prosecute and/or monitor returnees. This report provides an overview of measures taken, and the instances in which they are being taken, focusing on "person-specific measures". The report shows that the reviewed countries generally take similar initiatives. Nonetheless, there are significant differences in terms of political organisation, powers and legal culture. In a broader sense, this report attempts to shed light on the changing toolbox states have at their disposal as they try to face up to potentially violent, internationally operating non-state actors. Show less
Wittendorp, S.; Bont, R. de; Roy van Zuijdewijn, J.H. de; Bakker, E. 2017
This report offers an understanding of counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies in the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Its... Show moreThis report offers an understanding of counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies in the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Its emphasis is on developments following the 11 September 2001 attacks, and addresses the phenomenon referred to as jihadism. The report identifies three developments: 1) the development of counterterrorism and counterradicalisation as actual policy domains, 2) increased coordination of policy and initiatives for information-sharing, 3) unclear demarcation of the policy domain. Show less
The term “Lone Actor” has been applied to a variety of violent individuals who are thought to act out of ideological motivations using terrorist tactics. So far, much of the research is U.S.-based.... Show moreThe term “Lone Actor” has been applied to a variety of violent individuals who are thought to act out of ideological motivations using terrorist tactics. So far, much of the research is U.S.-based. There is an empirical vacuum of Lone Actor violence in Europe and a conceptual gap in how these acts may be understood as a variation of homicidal behavior. We examine and compare characteristics of European Lone Actors to European “common” homicide offenders. Lone Actor terrorists constitute a heterogeneous group that is similar to homicide offenders but differs in terms of substance use, weapon use, and target. These findings may be understood in the context of instrumental versus expressive aims. Show less
In light of Islamic State’s decreasing military power and growing emphasis on a decentralised operational strategy, the threat posed by foreign fighters is shifting, with some aspects becoming... Show moreIn light of Islamic State’s decreasing military power and growing emphasis on a decentralised operational strategy, the threat posed by foreign fighters is shifting, with some aspects becoming less threatening as others become more salient. This Policy Brief provides a concise outline of four main threats related to the issue of foreign fighters with the aim of clarifying the parameters of the phenomenon in its current manifestation: the travel of foreign fighters, their return to their countries of residence, the threat posed by lone actors and sympathisers who carry out attacks at home, and finally, an increasing polarisation of society. It is argued that policymakers need to take into account the second and third order effects that targeting one of these aspects may have on the others in order to effectively counter a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Show less
The implication of Belgium-linked terrorists in the shootings and bombings on November 13, 2015 in Paris — around the Stade de France football stadium, in four pubs and restaurants and the Bataclan... Show moreThe implication of Belgium-linked terrorists in the shootings and bombings on November 13, 2015 in Paris — around the Stade de France football stadium, in four pubs and restaurants and the Bataclan concert hall — became more and more obvious during the police investigation that followed these events. Today we know that the bombings at Brussels Airport and the Maalbeek subway station on March 22, 2016 were committed by the same French-Belgian jihadi network. The consequence has been that many international observers focused on the Belgian police system, wondering why the Belgian police forces had not been able to prevent the radicalisation of these persons. In this paper we examine this question, explaining what happened during the period that preceded these assaults and decoding what the events mean for the Belgian police system today. In other words, this paper doesn’t go into the reaction to radicalisation and the subsequent violence itself, but into the preventive and pro-active actions that had been undertaken earlier to avoid the radicalisation of certain “at-risk” individuals and groups. The main argument we want to develop here is that a targeted prevention agenda was largely present in discourse, but to a great extent absent in practice. Further, we advocate that, if implemented, this kind of preventive approach would have been much more effective than the repressive criminal justice agenda now applied with respect to jihadi terrorism. Show less
