The EU has imposed financial sanctions on Poland for problems with judicial independence. The sanctions amount to more than €300 mill., and the sum continues to grow. How are the sanctions... Show moreThe EU has imposed financial sanctions on Poland for problems with judicial independence. The sanctions amount to more than €300 mill., and the sum continues to grow. How are the sanctions perceived by the Polish population? Are they considered justified and acceptable, and by whom? Show less
The United Nations (UN) sanctions against North Korea are weakened by structural evasion techniques and weak enforcement. The African continent is a crucial node in the global illicit networks of... Show moreThe United Nations (UN) sanctions against North Korea are weakened by structural evasion techniques and weak enforcement. The African continent is a crucial node in the global illicit networks of North Korea. This paper examines three motives for African states to cooperate with North Korea, with a particular focus on the context of southern Africa: historical affinity (reciprocity), the practical issue of maintenance dependency (necessity), and the presence of weak enforcement regimes (opportunity). Based on a deep reading of UN Panel of Experts reports, academic literature and policy papers, novel archival material, and an interview with a defected North Korean diplomat, this paper argues that solutions to strengthen the sanctions regime can be successful only if they are grounded in African initiatives. Show less
The current article aims to assess proportionality within the context of the Security Council’s practice, focusing specifically on how the Council balances various interests in the design of... Show moreThe current article aims to assess proportionality within the context of the Security Council’s practice, focusing specifically on how the Council balances various interests in the design of sanctions regimes adopted pursuant to Article 41 of the UN Charter. It argues that proportionality in this context plays a role in the Security Council’s targeting decisions on the one hand and in the determination of whose interests are affected by the sanctions on the other. This implies that the Security Council should distinguish, first, between those who should be subjected to sanctions (the targets) and those would should be shielded (third parties) and, second, that it carefully delineates the targets of the sanctions. This article assesses this balancing exercise within the context of the Council’s measures to curb the illegal exploitation of natural resources financing armed conflict on the one hand and with respect to countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the other. Show less
The central theme of this dissertation is the (un)willingness to reward cooperation and punish non-cooperation. Whereas rewards and punishments can be effective means to enhance cooperation in... Show moreThe central theme of this dissertation is the (un)willingness to reward cooperation and punish non-cooperation. Whereas rewards and punishments can be effective means to enhance cooperation in social dilemmas, a prerequisite for any effect of sanctions is that people are willing to administer them. In the present work, I shed more light on this important – yet long neglected – topic. The aim is twofold: (1) identifying determinants of the use of sanctions in social dilemmas, and (2) testing the central proposition that people are not as willing to punish non-cooperative choice behavior as they are willing to reward cooperative choice behavior. The results of this dissertation show that the type of sanction people have at their disposal (Reward versus Punishment), the type of social dilemma people face (Public good dilemma versus Common resource dilemma), the extent of personal responsibility people have for the sanction (Individual responsibility versus Joint responsibility), and the timing of the sanctioning decision (Beforehand versus Afterwards) are important determinants of the (un)willingness to sanction in social dilemmas. These findings reveal that there are not only psychological processes at play that foster sanctioning, but also psychological processes that hamper sanctioning. Show less
This paper argues that the ECJ in its seminal Kadi judgment made the right decision and foreshadowed numerous reforms in the EU’s external action introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. It rightly... Show moreThis paper argues that the ECJ in its seminal Kadi judgment made the right decision and foreshadowed numerous reforms in the EU’s external action introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. It rightly rejected the approach presented by the Court of First Instance, which ultimately turned out to be a false friend of international law. By largely following the Advocate General’s Opinion, the Court maintained the superior human rights standard of the EU legal order. Without, however, jeopardizing the compliance of the Member States with their UN obligations right away, it sent a clear warning signal to the UN Security Council to exhaust the potential for reform of the targeted sanction regime. The Court showed that in the face of such global threats as terrorism as well as the undermining of basic human rights, we are all in the same boat together after all. Show less
As part of the international presence in the Western Balkans, the European Union has adopted sanctions, brokered political agreements, launched its first-ever police and military missions and... Show moreAs part of the international presence in the Western Balkans, the European Union has adopted sanctions, brokered political agreements, launched its first-ever police and military missions and directed economic, legal and administrative reforms to eradicate the root causes of instability. Yet, despite the comprehensive nature of its involvement, the EU__s strategies have been marked by confusion, its actions by concurrent or competing mandates of other international organisations. As a result, the returns on its investments are dwindling, at a time when nation-building in the region has entered its final stages with the separation of Serbia and Montenegro, the search for bringing an end to the international governance of Bosnia-Herzegovina and a final status for Kosovo. As the Western Balkans still contain a genuine security threat, there is a real imperative now to move the region as a whole from the stage of international protectorates and weak states to the stage of accession to the euro-atlantic organisations to which they aspire. This book presents legal and political ways and means to restructure the international effort to see the defining processes through. Under the leadership of the EU, only a __tough love__ strategy based on a firm but fair application of the conditionality principle can lead to the integration of the Western Balkans into the European mainstream. Show less
