The European Council and the European Commission have a similar role in agenda setting. Both place issues on the EU agenda. However, these institutions have distinct designs. They have... Show moreThe European Council and the European Commission have a similar role in agenda setting. Both place issues on the EU agenda. However, these institutions have distinct designs. They have different political attributes (the European Council has considerably more political authority) and information-processing capacities (the Commission can handle many more issues simultaneously). In domestic political systems, organizations often differ on what issues to attend and how to do it, circumstances induced in part by their designs. But we know little about how this happens in the EU system. Do the European Council and the Commission set the agenda differently, according to their distinct architectures? Or do they do it similarly, according to their similar roles? Further, while the function of each institution is formalized, their relationship is not. We do not know how their designs affect their interaction. Who follows whom? Or do the institutions influence each other? The study reveals and explains underlying dynamics in EU agenda setting. It looks into the processes of each agenda (intra-agenda dynamics) and between them (inter-agenda dynamics) across decades. The field of organized crime is examined over time. The study shows that to better understand their interplay, we need to observe their individual behaviors. Show less
In this PhD study the interface between legal governments and corporations on the one hand, and transnational criminals at the other hand, is analysed in depth. In the first part of the book, a... Show moreIn this PhD study the interface between legal governments and corporations on the one hand, and transnational criminals at the other hand, is analysed in depth. In the first part of the book, a typology of interfaces is developed that can be used to describe interfaces between legal and illegal actors. Furthermore, an analytical model, the so-called lockmodel, is developed with which the 'laundering' of all kinds of transnational crime can be understood. The analysis is based on the literature on transnational crime as well as a range of case-studies. The case studies include e.g. individual arms traffickers, commercial banks, intelligence agencies, charities, bank secrecy jurisdictions etc. The second part of the book discusses the results of an empirical study of the illicit art and antiquities trade that was part of the PhD project and which has hardly been studied before by criminologists. With the collected data, the use of the typology and lockmodel is looked at. It shows that the laundering of stolen art and antiquities can be understood by the lockmodel that was developed on the basis of other crimes. Finally, an extensive overview of the illicit art and antiquities trade is provided. Show less
