Starting from Husserl’s somewhat controversial claim about the immortality of the constituting subjectivity, this thesis uses the limit-case of death in order to present a phenomenological... Show moreStarting from Husserl’s somewhat controversial claim about the immortality of the constituting subjectivity, this thesis uses the limit-case of death in order to present a phenomenological exploration of the notion of subjectivity and its relationship to nature. It also offers a second-order discussion about the method and nature of phenomenology in the face of naturalism. The main conclusion of the research is that, in order to make sense of death while abiding by Husserlian methodological rules, it is necessary to reconsider the notion of subjectivity Show less
This thesis investigates Nietzsche's reception of Stoicism, and whether there is evidence for Stoicism influencing Nietzsche's conception of amor fati. Although secondary literature has made it... Show moreThis thesis investigates Nietzsche's reception of Stoicism, and whether there is evidence for Stoicism influencing Nietzsche's conception of amor fati. Although secondary literature has made it seem plausible that amor fati carries traces of Stoicism, pointing to the conceptual parallels between the love of fate and the Stoic therapy of a life ‘in accordance with nature’, this historical study shows that this claim is unlikely. In the first and last chapters a thorough textual analysis is presented of amor fati, showing that the concept undergoes a significant development from 1881/1882 to 1888. The amor fati of 1881/1882 should be situated in the context of Nietzsche's growing interest in physiology, I claim. The middle chapters uncover Nietzsche's engagements with Stoicism, based on a study of all explicit (and implicit) references to Stoicism. I conclude that Nietzsche's focus is restricted mostly to the context of the scientific quest for knowledge, thereby putting in perspective the assumption that Nietzsche's interest is mainly therapeutic. Although Nietzsche seems sympathetic to a Stoic attitude in 1870, he unequivocally rejects it in 1881/1882, in the same Book of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft in which, not coincidentally, amor fati for the first time occurs in the published works. Show less
The purpose of this thesis is to articulate a theological metaethic which accepts the nature of ethics as understood under the rubric of evolutionary theory. It will be argued that such a... Show moreThe purpose of this thesis is to articulate a theological metaethic which accepts the nature of ethics as understood under the rubric of evolutionary theory. It will be argued that such a theological methaethic can be interpreted as hopeful and optimistic given the apparent evolution of the moral from the amoral. The relationship between theology and evolutionary theory is presented here not as dichotomic but as dialectic – this is not to suggest that the two fields are mutually communicative, but rather that both can contribute to a cohesive, overarching worldview. In this respect, this thesis threads together the theological presupposition of a God of values with the naturalistic and material presuppositions of the modern scientific worldview (being cognizant of the fact that science may not necessarily be presented with these presuppositions). This dialectic occurs between two different but intertwined levels. One is the level of ethical systems; in this work, a particular understanding of Western Christian ethics. This level is framed by another, broader level of metaethics; in this thesis, an overarching understanding of the character of ethics will emerge from reflections on evolutionary theory and its naturalistic context. This will be a naturalistic view, though one which is understood to fit within a theological framework. Show less
The main question that I address in my thesis is how we can best conceive the contrast between a priori and empirical truths. My response is realist and naturalist in character: I suggest that the... Show moreThe main question that I address in my thesis is how we can best conceive the contrast between a priori and empirical truths. My response is realist and naturalist in character: I suggest that the essential feature of a priori truths is that they consist in the obtaining of some realistically understood conditions in the domain of representations within human heads, rather than in the obtaining of those conditions that they typically purport to be about. This representationist constual cannot be reconciled with the received referentialist understanding of truth. Accordingly, my thesis can be seen as a case against standard referentialism about truth. After a detailed exposition and appropriate generalisation of Benacerraf__s dilemma about mathematical truth, I argue for two major claims. First, I demonstrate that among the most striking characteristics of our paradigm a priori beliefs about causally inert entities there are some, which cannot be suitably explained from a referentialist perspective, so that perspective must be wrong. Second, I argue that if we adopt an alternative, use-theoretic notion of truth, then the suggested representationist construal of apriority can meet all major explanatory adequacy conditions, and thus qualifies as a viable characterisation of the subject. Show less
