Guinée was the only French colony that, bravely or foolishly, refused a close collaboration with France at the time of its independence. This choice was a political shock on an international scale.... Show moreGuinée was the only French colony that, bravely or foolishly, refused a close collaboration with France at the time of its independence. This choice was a political shock on an international scale. The famous “Non!” by Guinée’s leader Sékou Touré marked the beginning of a socialist era in which the regime slowly developed into a dictatorship on the one hand, but on the other hand became an internationally regarded leading voice in the global struggle for decolonization. Stamps from the first years after Guinée’s independence in 1958 do not strongly attest to any political fervor inspired by the “Non!” It is argued that Guinée’s stamps of the years after independence feature the country’s first steps in the international world order and illustrate the country’s search for a respected position in international politics. A comparison with neighboring state Mali shows, however, that Guinée’s stamps do actively attest to the governments’ national and international political concerns. Show less
This PhD investigates the development of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, with a particular focus on the distinction between terrorism and insurgency. The findings have been published in five peer... Show moreThis PhD investigates the development of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, with a particular focus on the distinction between terrorism and insurgency. The findings have been published in five peer-reviewed articles, and are joined by an introductory framework and a concluding chapter. The scene-setter contextualizes the problem of terrorism in Mali, describes the fragmented landscape of jihadist groups, analyzes how Tuareg separatism led to AQIM's control of northern Mali, and illustrates how shortcomings in national and local governance fueled insecurity. The second conceptual article analyzed whether AQIM should be regarded as terrorism, insurgency or organized crime, and concluded that - at the time of writing (2016) - most indicators pointed to the group following a strategy of terrorism. A treatise on methodology investigated the discrepancy between the international community's perception of Mali pre-2012 as a stable 'posterboy for democracy', while it was Mali that suffered a near-complete collapse in 2012. It concluded that a quantitative risk approach, rather than a qualitative threat approach, contributed to this misperception. The fourth article applied the first trinity from Clausewitz’s opus On War to Operation Serval, the French military operation to oust AQIM from northern Mali in 2013. Clear political goals, contingency planning, an audacious military operation combined with luck all helped France secure an initial victory against AQIM. The final article focused on potential pathways for AQIM to end, and concluded that in 2021 AQIM followed a strategy of insurgency, while much of the international response remained rooted in the paradigm of counterterrorism. Show less
In the past years, Mali has experienced an unprecedented rise in terrorism. After twenty years of relative peace, the country was shaken to its core in 2012 when a Tuareg-led rebellion overthrew... Show moreIn the past years, Mali has experienced an unprecedented rise in terrorism. After twenty years of relative peace, the country was shaken to its core in 2012 when a Tuareg-led rebellion overthrew the government and the northern parts of the country quickly turned into a safe haven for terrorist groups including Al Qaeda and - in later years - the Islamic State. From 2012 to 2022, a country that was once considered a prime example of African democracy, has been faced with a rapidly downward cycle in terms of stability and security. In the past three years alone, the military staged two coups and Mali is now ruled by a military regime. Two major military and political interventions by the French, operations Serval and Barkhane, the multiple efforts of ECOWAS, and a large UN-mission to the country, MINUSMA, were not able to turn the tide. In a country where it is already a challenge to draw clear lines between the multitude of terrorist, separatist, guerilla and auto-defense groups, it is even more difficult to understand how individuals become involved in terrorist groups. Seeking the answer to that question is the central aim of this study. Based on extensive research among policymakers, prison staff, the international community and those accused and/or sentenced for terrorism, this thesis conducts a multilevel analysis of the process of involvement in terrorism in Mali. The findings suggest that group-level factors including peer pressure, group think, societal tensions and fusion of values were best able to shed light on how individuals become involved with terrorist groups. Especially the relationship between citizens and the state turned out to be an important factor, with prisoners arguing they do not recognize the ruling elite, foreign actors or the borders of the country as they are drawn. With the combination of access to and analysis of unique primary source material, this study offers a nuanced and empirically grounded contribution to the academic and societal debate on terrorism involvement in Mali - with wider implications for the West-African context. While taking into account the inherently subjective nature of narratives, this thesis provides us with a better understanding of why individuals become terrorists given the specific cultural, historical and geographical context within which they have shared their stories. Show less
