Matsuo Bashō (1644-1694) is een van de bekendste Japanse haiku-dichters. Hij werd omringd door een school van volgelingen met wie hij meerdere dichtbundels publiceerde. Een hoogtepunt in de reeks... Show moreMatsuo Bashō (1644-1694) is een van de bekendste Japanse haiku-dichters. Hij werd omringd door een school van volgelingen met wie hij meerdere dichtbundels publiceerde. Een hoogtepunt in de reeks is Sarumino (1691), welke bundel in dit boek voor het eerst integraal is vertaald. Het boek bevat de haiku van Bashō zelf, die van velen van zijn discipelen, de kettinggedichten (renga) die zij gezamenlijk hebben gemaakt en Bashō’s prozabeschrijving van zijn bosverblijf Genjūan. In de annotatie wordt bij elk gedicht de Japanse tekst gegeven in Japans schrift en in transcriptie, en een korte toelichting. Show less
The various lineages of Esoteric Buddhism in Japan all have their identity based on tradition, history, and selected preferences in doctrine and ritual. This article describes how identity... Show moreThe various lineages of Esoteric Buddhism in Japan all have their identity based on tradition, history, and selected preferences in doctrine and ritual. This article describes how identity-definition may take place in the instrcution courses of the priests called koden. As example, the mention of the title of the Dainichikyo as the first line of the influential Hizoki is presented with a number of possible explanations. The range of the subjects that are touched upon warrants further research into the actual training of the priests and into the way they shape their ritual work which is supportive of set notions in Japanese society. Show less
At the time of the first missed opportunity under Gorbachev in 1986-88, the Cold War rigidity in relations still deeply affected how Japan and the Soviet Union dealt with one another. The relations... Show moreAt the time of the first missed opportunity under Gorbachev in 1986-88, the Cold War rigidity in relations still deeply affected how Japan and the Soviet Union dealt with one another. The relations may been manipulated by Russian political forces not desiring an improvement, but there was corresponding structural weakness on the Japanese side as well. At the second missed opportunity under Gorbachev in 1989, some structural rigidity on the part of Japanese policy makers hampered faster development of the relationship. At the time, the author felt that he made the right decision, but retrospectively he questions whether, had he or the Japanese leadership been more emancipated from Cold War thinking, they might not have been able to produce a different outcome: a more content-rich Gorbachev visit earlier 1991. Concerning the third missed opportunity under Yeltsin in 1992, the author, who did not take part in it, contends very seriously that there was a failure in policy choices on the Japanese side, and that policy makers did not fulfill their responsibility at that point. There is no evidence that other policy makers learned from the experience under Gorbachev and tried to adopt a more realistic policy for Japan to achieve its goal. At the fourth missed opportunity under Yeltsin in 1997-98, the Japanese side learned lessons from past mistakes and did not hesitate to propose a courageous proposal to break the impasse. President Yeltsin was impressed by this proposal, but the Russian side as a whole did not accept it as a basis for negotiations. Nevertheless, recognition on both sides of the need for some mutual concession soared in those years. Before the fifth missed opportunity, awareness of past failures was very much at the forefront of the author__s mind. The negotiations with President Putin began, and the author very consciously tried to fulfill the responsibility of grasping the opportunity as it opened out in front of him in 2000-01. The negotiations proceeded unexpectedly fast and effectively, and then were suddenly crushed because of Japan__s domestic issue. The author did not expect the fifth window of opportunity to close in this way. Individual responsibility was fulfilled in negotiating with the Russians, but it failed to overcome domestic constraint. Show less
