This article provides a novel systematic exploration of ways and extents that institutional characteristics shape legitimacy beliefs toward multistakeholder global governance. Multistakeholderism... Show moreThis article provides a novel systematic exploration of ways and extents that institutional characteristics shape legitimacy beliefs toward multistakeholder global governance. Multistakeholderism is often argued to offer institutional advantages over intergovernmental multilateralism in handling global problems. This study examines whether, in practice, perceptions of institutional purpose, procedure, and performance affect legitimacy assessments regarding this form of global governance. The analysis focuses on the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), one of the largest and most institutionally developed global multistakeholder arrangements. Evidence comes from a mixed-methods survey of 467 participants in ICANN. We find that this representative sample accords high importance in principle to many institutional features, and also rates the actual institutional operations of ICANN quite highly on various counts. Moreover, many institutional characteristics associate significantly with participants' legitimacy beliefs toward ICANN. However, not all institutional qualities have this significance, and the relevance of individual- and societal-level circumstances indicates that institutional sources do not provide a full explanation of legitimacy. The article contributes refinements to theory of legitimacy in global governance; demonstrates the value of mixed-methods survey work in this field; supplies unique original data and analysis; and identifies implications for the politics of (de)legitimation around multistakeholderism. Show less
Chapter 3 examines the decisions that inform the BRI’s institution building.It explores the tension between strategic and effficiency-oriented concerns, tracing these tensions across three issue... Show moreChapter 3 examines the decisions that inform the BRI’s institution building.It explores the tension between strategic and effficiency-oriented concerns, tracing these tensions across three issue areas: tax, trade, and development finance. The chapter shows that, in dealing with challenges, the Chinese government lacks an integral governance framework that systemically coordinates all relevant institutions. Instead, it takes varied institutional approaches to overseeing BRI projects, ranging from bilateral trade agreements to multilateral fijinancial institutions. This raises the question of what is driving China’s development of agreements and institutions for the BRI. The chapter argues that China’s development of BRI tax initiatives is mostly motivated by efficiency drivers, its trade agreements with key BRI partners by strategic drivers, and its efforts to establish multilateral financial institutions by both drivers. Show less
When it comes to voting in parliament, party group unity is the rule rather than the exception in most (European) parliamentary democracies. But how do individual MPs come to their decision to vote... Show moreWhen it comes to voting in parliament, party group unity is the rule rather than the exception in most (European) parliamentary democracies. But how do individual MPs come to their decision to vote according to the party group line? This book introduces a theoretical model of MP decision making in which the main decision-making mechanisms, derived from the existing literature on the pathways to party group unity __ cue-taking, agreement, loyalty and obedience __, are placed in a particular sequential order. The three empirical studies in this book assess the relative role of each of the mechanisms, both independent and when possible as a part of the sequential model, in getting MPs to toe the party group line and contribute to party group unity, and explore whether this varies not only between parliaments (chapter 4), but also by levels of government (chapter 5), and through time (chapter 6). Show less
Since the end of the twentieth century a broad and persistent movement away from centralized patterns of governance has become one of the defining trends in politics. In many new democracies the... Show moreSince the end of the twentieth century a broad and persistent movement away from centralized patterns of governance has become one of the defining trends in politics. In many new democracies the return to electoral politics has coincided with institutional reforms to promote decentralization. In Latin America, with its long and well-documented history of centralism, decentralization constitutes a departure from previous patterns of governance. This study seeks to shed light on the relationship between decentralization and political organization in Latin America, and aims to contribute to our understanding of how decentralization influences the way that conflicts in society are expressed, structured and managed through parties and party systems. Drawing on an in-depth study of Mexico as well as a comparative analysis of Latin American countries, it develops the argument that decentralization challenges political organization at the levels of party systems and organizations. The central contention is that a high level of decentralization can undermine the formation of nationalized party systems and cohesive parties. Decentralization affects the distribution of political and financial resources in the state and makes more resources available locally, and thus reshapes the context within which parties organize. Show less
