Security is something that people tend to care about. But is it also something that they should care about? To explore this question, this dissertation first develops a new conceptual framework of... Show moreSecurity is something that people tend to care about. But is it also something that they should care about? To explore this question, this dissertation first develops a new conceptual framework of security. Next, it analyses how security relates to some key values for liberal democratic societies. The first of these is well-being. It is argued that there are important ways in which security can contribute to somebody’s well-being – but there are also ways in which security may hamper a person’s flourishing. The second value is freedom. It is shown that in public decision-making freedom and security may come at each other’s cost – yet there are also ways in which the two can work to each other’s benefit. The third value is equality. It is demonstrated that in order for a society to meet the demands of equality it must provide its members with a particular set of securities – while at the same time the pursuit of equality puts another set of securities out of reach. Ultimately, this dissertation finds no reason for considering security to be good for its own sake, but it argues that security can be good for the sake of well-being, freedom, and equality. Show less
In the light of the fragility of current liberal democracies, this dissertation aims to contribute to rethinking political order by reconstructing Hegel’s account in the Philosophy of Right. His... Show moreIn the light of the fragility of current liberal democracies, this dissertation aims to contribute to rethinking political order by reconstructing Hegel’s account in the Philosophy of Right. His theory of political order has relevance as it explores how modern freedom, i.e. liberal rights and a market, can coexist with republican self-government. The reconstruction shows how a liberal order, i.e. based on the principle of individual autonomy and an instrumental account of government, must entail a loss of freedom and social and political pathologies: citizens for instance cannot acquire stable identities in the social whole and alienate themselves from the political realm. Moreover, it works out Hegel’s alternative account of political order in which freedom depends on the interplay of the opposed dynamics of the state and society: the state institutions pursuing the good of the community as a whole, while the members of civil society pursue their own good. Finally, the dissertation shows how Hegel offers a coherent and subtle account of republican citizenship and self-government, in which self-government does not depend primarily on the influence citizens exercise on political outcomes but on their ability to identify with the good of the community as a whole. Show less
The introduction to this volume explains the condition of slavery (including its definition and its place at the far end of a broad spectrum of coercion and unfreedom); illuminates conceptual and... Show moreThe introduction to this volume explains the condition of slavery (including its definition and its place at the far end of a broad spectrum of coercion and unfreedom); illuminates conceptual and methodological choices; and discusses the layout and main intentions of the handbook. In particular it discusses how scholars approach the study of slavery, as well as some common themes in global slavery scholarship. It also underscores the intention of this volume to both historicize and spatialize slavery—i.e., to historicize it by moving beyond linear stories that trace slavery from Graeco-Roman antiquity and end with transatlantic slavery and abolition; and to spatialize it by recentering the geography of slavery, illuminating regional contexts of slavery around the world. Show less
The making of sacrifices seems part and parcel of any elite sportsperson’s life. Remarkably, the insights that we find in the current literature in social sport studies are not able to make sense... Show moreThe making of sacrifices seems part and parcel of any elite sportsperson’s life. Remarkably, the insights that we find in the current literature in social sport studies are not able to make sense of the references to sacrifice in the data that emerged in the context of this study on the social significance of elite women’s football. The thesis that I put forward is that the existing Marxist, cultural studies and Foucauldian poststructuralist frameworks that we find in the field of social sport studies must be supplemented by the theory of play inherited from Johan Huizinga, Eugen Fink and Hans-Georg Gadamer for both conceptual and ethical reasons. I argue that the theory of play allows us first of all to make sense of the player’s experience of sacrifice. More precisely, understood as an independent, irreducible structure of experience, play allow us to make sense of the women’s football players’ experiences of sacrifice in a way that is compatible and complimentary to those insights of Marxism, cultural studies and Foucauldian poststructuralism, which remain indispensable. Secondly, the theory of play makes visible that the existing frameworks miss important insights in theorizing the subject, and, by extension, brings forth a notion of freedom and resistance that is currently lacking in the field of social sport studies. ‘Lacking’, as we cannot find these notions in the field of social sport studies, but also ‘lacking’ because the field of study is in need of alternative ways to think about freedom and resistance. This thesis thus contains a systematic point, namely our discovery that “players play”, that their experience cannot be understood without an account of play as such, alongside an analysis of what that means; and a methodological point, namely that in order to take into consideration that players play, we need a new method, which I describe as a feminist playology. The prefix feminist refers to the commitment of this method to understand sport as a gendered activity. Show less
While the literature on slave flight in nineteenth-century North America has commonly focused on fugitive slaves escaping to the northern states and Canada through the “Underground Railroad”,... Show moreWhile the literature on slave flight in nineteenth-century North America has commonly focused on fugitive slaves escaping to the northern states and Canada through the “Underground Railroad”, Conditional Freedom aims to provide new insights into the evolving social and political geography of freedom and slavery in nineteenth-century North America, particularly by exploring the development of southern routes of escape from slavery in the US South and the experiences of self-emancipated slaves in the US-Mexican borderlands. First, Conditional Freedom provides a social history of enslaved freedom-seekers. Second, it also provides a political history of the contest between Mexican free soil and the spread of slavery west of the Mississippi river valley between 1803 and 1861. Its main question is: what was the nature of slave flight in the Mexican borderlands, and how and why did Mexico develop into a site of “conditional freedom” for slave refugees from the American South? In order to reconstruct the entangled stories of slave refugees and free soil in the US-Mexico borderlands, this study draws mostly upon municipal, county and state archives, military and judicial records, diplomatic and personal correspondence, newspaper articles, “runaway slave” advertisements, petitions, memoirs and travel accounts. Show less
In the nineteenth century, tens of thousands of enslaved people escaped slavery in the US South. The bulk of historiography has hitherto focused on those who left the slaveholding states in their... Show moreIn the nineteenth century, tens of thousands of enslaved people escaped slavery in the US South. The bulk of historiography has hitherto focused on those who left the slaveholding states in their endeavors to reach freedom. In reality, however, the majority of slave refugees stayed within the South. Cities of Refuge: Slave Flight and Illegal Freedom in the American Urban South, 1800-1860 is the first study to put permanent southern-internal slave flight centerstage. It investigates how and why urban spaces of freedom arose, and how refugees from slavery navigated them. The freedom these people found was of an illegal nature because it had no basis in law. Based on four major cities as case studies, this dissertation analyzes social, cultural, political, and economic processes that made illegal freedom possible. Drawing from material from Baltimore (Maryland), Richmond (Virginia), Charleston (South Carolina), and New Orleans (Louisiana), the size of the urban free black populations, degrees of urbanization, and work opportunities receive particular attention. In a nutshell, Cities of Refuge paints a nuanced picture of slavery, slave control, and freedom within the changing social geography of the American South. Show less
This thesis is a comparative study in the History of Modern Philosophy focused on the recourse to physiology on the part of two key figures, Spinoza and Nietzsche. This involves comparative... Show moreThis thesis is a comparative study in the History of Modern Philosophy focused on the recourse to physiology on the part of two key figures, Spinoza and Nietzsche. This involves comparative research into their emphatic appeal to the body as the key to solving fundamental philosophical problems. Both Spinoza and Nietzsche are thinkers of immanence and for both the turn to the body, which is part of their projects of naturalisation, is motivated by theoretical and practical goals. I argue that we can best understand the similarities and differences between their respective philosophical physiologies, and their broader philosophical positions, starting from their shared interest in power ontologies and their commitment to immanence and naturalism. Show less
This inquiry seeks to determine to what extent equality and freedom are constituents of a liberal democratic state; part 1 deals with equality, part 2 with freedom. Since the concept of the liberal... Show moreThis inquiry seeks to determine to what extent equality and freedom are constituents of a liberal democratic state; part 1 deals with equality, part 2 with freedom. Since the concept of the liberal democratic state is the subject matter at hand, it seems obvious that freedom is not absent, but that does not answer the question to what extent it should be allowed to citizens, which is what is inquired in detail. As for equality: equal rights, such as the right for every (adult) citizen to vote, are generally accepted to be an integral part of a liberal democratic state, but this raises the question on what foundation such rights are based. Equal rights have widely been defended on the basis of various moral viewpoints. After dealing with some preliminary matters in chapter 1, the tenability of some important and representative theories are examined in chapters 2 to 5. Rawls’s theory focuses on rationality as the pivotal feature to consider beings as equals and to treat them equally, but fails to indicate the import of this feature in that it remains unclear whether rationality is a moral characteristic. The problem with Dworkin’s position, on the other hand, is its abstract nature: Dworkin does not base his account on rationality as a special characteristic, but instead speaks of some beings being ‘intrinsically valuable’. In Kateb’s account, ‘human dignity’ is the focal concept. When it comes to providing the basis for human dignity, this position appears to be difficult to uphold, primarily because it remains unclear precisely which characteristic of human beings is supposed to account for their alleged dignity. In Kant’s alternative, this problem is absent, as reason – in a special sense – is the crucial feature for him. The main problem in this case is that it is difficult to see how dignity should follow from being reasonable or acting on the basis of reason. Starting from a moral outlook is problematic for these reasons and others, so in chapter 6, a position that does not use such a basis is defended. ‘Basic equality’ is the crucial notion here. Simply put, the actual (approximate) equality, which I call factual equality, is the starting point, to be specified by basic equality. Factual equality is observed in many ways, and basic equality is the sort of factual equality between two or more beings that is considered relevant to them (and simultaneously by them, as they are, in a liberal democratic state, also the ones who establish this). Basic equality must in turn be specified. Rationality, I argue, is the most viable characteristic to realize this specification in a liberal democratic state; this has no moral connotation. The upshot of this stance is that a realistic alternative to the theories discussed above is offered, the benefits of which are twofold. On the one hand, vague and problematic terms are shunned, which adds to the position’s consistency and tenability, while it provides, on the other hand, a solid basis for a liberal democratic state to recognize one of its essential features. This means that formal equality, manifested in political equality (exhibited by political liberties, such as the right to vote and the freedom of speech) and legal equality, resulting in equal treatment (e.g. of employees by their employers), can be upheld without the need to resort to moral premises that not only fail to constitute a consistent account but are in addition not universally acknowledged. Part 2 of the inquiry deals with freedom. After some general remarks are made in chapter 7, the import of freedom is indicated in chapter 8. This makes it clear why granting citizens as much freedom as possible is beneficial for both the liberal democratic state as a whole and for citizens themselves. However, as the phrase ‘as much as possible’ indicates, it is important to define the limits (if any) of freedom carefully. Since part 1 of the inquiry emphasizes the importance of (basic) equality, it would seem appealing to connect it with freedom. The merits and difficulties of such a position – Dworkin’s ideas are examined here – are expounded in chapter 9. An alternative for it is offered in chapters 10 and 11, where a demarcation line to limit freedom is defended. Mill’s harm principle provides a useful frame of reference here; the ignore principle, as it is called, seeks to find the optimal outcome in balancing the various interests that are involved. The foregoing prompts the question of whether the liberal democratic state can adopt a neutral stance, and how it should respond to those who deny certain principles of a liberal democratic state, notably those defended in part 1 of this study. In other words: what should the state’s position be towards those who deny that people are equal, e.g. on the basis of racial differences? This is the central issue that is examined in chapters 12 to 15. I argue that it is not the task of a liberal democratic state to decide what people should think, but that, in line with what is maintained in chapters 10 and 11, only equal treatment should be guaranteed, meaning that the outward acts of citizens may legitimately be regulated but nothing else. In this light, Rawls’s and Habermas’s positions are examined critically. Finally, some attention is devoted to the subject matter of militant democracy. The question is pertinent whether the liberal democratic state might be undermined by its own principles. After all, a majority is able to radically change this form of government to one that is ultimately incompatible with those very principles. I try to approach this issue as consistently as the others that present themselves throughout this inquiry. Show less
This book deals with medical responses to explicitly expressed requests for assistance and support with regard to wishes for death by people, more precisely the relations from the viewpoint of... Show moreThis book deals with medical responses to explicitly expressed requests for assistance and support with regard to wishes for death by people, more precisely the relations from the viewpoint of patients and physicians as well as the state__s approach to the topic. The question regarding the extent to which this triad of physician, patient and state can be brought together when it concerns the matter of responding (or not responding) to a wish for death is covered. Furthermore, the question is clarified as to why the laws of the countries around the world prohibit by overwhelming majority the termination of a person__s life by another person, when in this connection it ostensibly involves the fulfilment of protective obligations. The existing situation with regard to active responses to wishes for death by patients is described by means of an international comparison between Germany, The Netherlands and Canada. The objective is to illustrate benefits as well as potential dangers which desired wishes for death entail. Show less
