Summary: Global media discussion and policy responses to the armed conflict in Tigray Region, Ethiopia, that started op 4 November 2020 by the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front) party-led... Show moreSummary: Global media discussion and policy responses to the armed conflict in Tigray Region, Ethiopia, that started op 4 November 2020 by the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front) party-led Tigray Regional government, are marked by bias, incompleteness, lack of context understanding, credulity and an anti-federal goverment attitude. The conflict, provoked by an unannounced and treacherous nightly attack by TPLF forces on federal army troups stationed in Tigray to protect the Region, was the result of misplaced power-mongering by the TPLF, and its building up of tension with the federal Ethiopian goverment. The 4 November attack led to a major federal army response. Five days after the attack by TPLF, on 9 November 2021, over 800 Amharic-speaking civilian inhabitants of the town of Mai Kadra in Western Tigray were killed by TPLF-affiliated forces and militias in a gruesome manner – a classic case of ‘ethnic cleansing’. Perpetrators mostly fled to Sudanese refugee camps. These two events - the 4 November attack and the ‘ethnic cleansing’ - were defining dramatic moments in the war. While the conflict unfolded, leading to defeat of the TPLF forces on 28 November 2020 with the taking over of the regional capital Meqele and the flight of the TPLF leadership, many leading Western media and news websites focused on the aftermath and the effects of the fighting in Tigray Region and its population, easily shifting sympathy twards the perceived ‘underdog’ (TPLF). This was followed by hastily written statements by foreign policy makers in EU, USA and UN circles, leading to an emerging policy narrative whereby essential details of the context, the nature of the adversaries, the reasons of the conflict were sidelined. These Atlantic community spokespersons shifted to ‘blaming’ the federal Ethiopian government and ‘demanding’ all kinds of measures from it. Notable was the international community clamouring for ‘unlimited and full access’ for humanitarian aid to ‘prevent famine’, and demand a halt to all hostilities. But meanwhile it did not deliver much aid itself and did as if making it conditional on the federal government following their orders. Part of the international media, several academic associates and researchers who saw acces to their research sites blocked, and diverse TPLF associates in various international organizations continued to fuel the flames of this approach, next to the ‘digital activism’and the production of fake news reports by pro-TPLF persons in Ethiopa and especially in the Tigrayan ‘diaspora’ in the West.All this led to serious misperceptions and unfair bias on the part of the Atlantic countries and the UN vis-à-vis Ethiopia, which endangered integrity, balance, and a proper perspective on causes and consequences, as well as to policies that seemed akin to ‘development aid blackmail’ and sanctimonious lecturing of a fragile, low-income African developing country. In the exercise, the detailed press statements, reports and explanations by Ethiopian parties, including the government and reformist Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, are routinely neglected or doubted. In contrast, the statements and international messages by TPLF remnants and advocates, marked by a high degree of unreliability, exaggeration and very often lacking truth content, are used uncritically. On the basis of a number of telling examples, this paper describes the above process, analyses the emerging Atlantic discourse and some of its mistakes and wrong assumptions. It thereby pleads for a more balanced, critical approach to the incomplete reporting and wilfull misinformation from questionable sources so as to have the media and Atlantic policy makers develop a more responsible approach.Résumé: parti TPLF (Tigray Peoples Liberation Front), sont marquées par des préjugés, des incomplétudes, un manque de compréhension du contexte, la crédulité et une attitude contre le gouvernement fédéral. Le conflit, provoqué par une attaque nocturne inopinée et perfide par les forces tigréennes contre les troupes de l'armée fédérale stationnées au Tigré pour protéger la région, était le résultat d'une politique de la force mal jugée par le TPLF et sa montée des tensions avec le gouvernement fédéral éthiopien. L'attaque du 4 novembre a évoquée à une réponse directe de l'armée fédérale. Cinq jours après l'attaque du TPLF, plus de 800 habitants civils de langue amharique de la ville de Mai Kadra dans le Tigray occidental ont été tués, le 9 novembre 2021, par des forces et des milices affiliées au TPLF d'une manière horrible - un cas classique de «nettoyage ethnique», et les auteurs ont pour la plupart fui vers les camps de réfugiés soudanais. Ces deux événements - l’attaque du 4 novembre et ce «nettoyage ethnique» - étaient des moments dramatiques cruciales de la guerre. Alors que le conflit se déroulait, conduisant à la défaite des forces du TPLF le 28 novembre 2020 avec la prise de contrôle de la capitale régionale Meqele et la fuite des dirigeants du TPL, de nombreux médias et sites Internet occidentaux de premier plan se sont concentrés sur les conséquences et les effets des combats dans la région du Tigray et sa population, la sympathie se déplaçant facilement vers le «perdant» perçu (TPLF). Cela a été suivi par des déclarations écrites à la hâte par des décideurs politiques étrangers aux cercles de l'UE, des États-Unis et de l'ONU, menant à un récit politique émergent dans lequel les détails essentiels du contexte, de la nature des adversaires et des raisons du conflit ont été mis de côté. Ces portes-parole de la communauté atlantique sont passés à toujours «blâmer» le gouvernement fédéral éthiopien et à «exiger» toutes sortes de mesures de sa part. Il convient de noter que la communauté internationale toujours réclamait un «accès illimité et complet pour l’aide humanitaire» pour «prévenir la famine» et exigeait «‘l’arrêt de toutes les hostilités, mais entre-temps, elle n'a pas fourni beaucoup d'aide et semble la conditionner à ce que le gouvernement fédéral suive ses ordres. Une partie de la presse mondiale, plusieurs universitaires qui ont vu l'accès à leurs sites de recherche bloqué, et divers associés du TPLF dans diverses organisations internationales ont continué à alimenter les flammes de cette approche, à côté de «l'activisme digitale» et de la production de «fake news» et rapports douteux de personnes pro-TPLF en Ethiopie et en particulier dans la «diaspora» tigréenne en Occident. Tout cela a conduit à de graves perceptions erronées et à des préjugés injustes de la part des pays atlantiques et de l'ONU vis-à-vis de l'Éthiopie qui ont mis en danger l'intégrité, l'équilibre et une bonne perspective des causes et des conséquences, ainsi qu’a des politiques qui semblent s'apparenter à une approche sur base de «development aid blackmail» et des discours moralisateurs envers un pays africain pauvre et en développement fragile. Dans l'exercice, les déclarations de presse détaillées et les explications de la part de l’Éthiopie, y compris le gouvernement et le Premier Ministre réformiste Abiy Ahmed, sont régulièrement négligés ou mis en doute. En revanche, les déclarations et les messages internationaux des défenseurs du TPLF, marqués par un degré élevé de manque de fiabilité, d'exagération et souvent dépourvus de contenu véridique, sont utilisés sans critique. Sur la base d'un certain nombre d'exemples révélateurs, cet article décrit le processus ci-dessus et analyse le discours atlantique émergent et certaines de ses erreurs et hypothèses erronées. Il plaide ainsi pour une approche plus équilibrée et critique du reportage incomplet et de la désinformation afin que les médias et la politique atlantique développent une politique plus responsable. Show less
Buitelaar, T.; Larik, J.E.; Matta, A.; Vos, B. de 2016
Executive Summary In June 2016, High Representative Mogherini presented the EU’s new Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) to the European Council. With the Strategy now... Show moreExecutive Summary In June 2016, High Representative Mogherini presented the EU’s new Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) to the European Council. With the Strategy now finalized, attention needs to turn to its implementation in an environment mired by crises both within Europe and the wider world. In September 2016, The Hague Institute for Global Justice and Europe House—the European Parliament Information Office and the Representation of the European Commission in The Netherlands—organized an expert meeting and a public panel discussion, which inform the present document as a first appraisal of the Global Strategy. Focusing on three areas of particular salience in EU foreign policy—the EU as a security actor, developing rules-based global governance in new areas, and the ‘joined-up’ approach in pursuing the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)— the following recommendations for the implementation of the EUGS can be made: The EU as a security actor The EU needs a pragmatic and flexible approach in order to solve the crises around Europe and to improve its credibility in the short and long term, for example by using ad hoc coalitions. Moreover, a possible withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU could open up political space for deepened defense cooperation. The EU would need to find ways to make use of this political space in order to generate political will in the capitals for deepening defense cooperation. More broadly speaking, the EU should devise plans to connect with its citizens as a security actor and communicate the message that EU defense cooperation tangibly benefits the security of all citizens. Developing rules-based global governance Using the area of cyber governance as an example given its cross-cutting importance, the EU should fully embrace the role of ‘agenda-shaper, connector, coordinator and facilitator within a networked web of players’ by investing in multistakeholder initiatives and, together with the Member States, showing coordinated political leadership in this area. The EU, furthermore, needs to take its internal normative innovations (such as the “right to be forgotten”) to the global stage, where they can serve as inspiration to other actors. It should also use regional approaches and coalitions of like-minded countries as building blocks for working towards a global consensus. In addition, the EU should bolster its credibility as a cyber power by capacity-building, both within the EU Member States and third countries, to fight criminal activities and strengthen cooperation between law enforcement agencies. Capacity-building as part of a ‘joined-up approach’ in the case of the SDGs For SDGs to be progressively realized through ‘joined-up’ EU action, they need to be translated and concretized into measurable goals, which should be pursued through already existing policies and strategies and be taken into account during the framing of new ones. Moreover, the EU should invest, in tandem with the Member States, in communicating to the public that the SDGs are a global commitment with implications, both positive and negative, in the daily lives of citizens. For the EU, the most important next step is to translate the EUGS into prioritized and coherent sub-strategies with a view to maintaining the SDGs as a central element of the follow-up of the EUGS. The Global Strategy will remain the core guidance for EU external action for years to come. However, the period until the first yearly progress report in June 2017 will be crucial for establishing the traction and first concrete results produced by the Strategy. As the calendars of the EU institutions and Member State policymakers are filling up with more milestones for its implementation, existing sectorspecific strategies will be updated and new ones developed. Implementing the Global Strategy will be a momentous endeavor by any standard, both for the EU and its Member States. How well they will work together, use their resources, build political momentum and voice their common message will ultimately determine the role of the EU in the world. Show less
