The Eurocrisis forcefully exposed the Euro’s structural deficiencies, which are back in the limelight due to COVID-19. It is widely acknowledged that EU fiscal integration is required to adequately... Show moreThe Eurocrisis forcefully exposed the Euro’s structural deficiencies, which are back in the limelight due to COVID-19. It is widely acknowledged that EU fiscal integration is required to adequately remedy the remaining deficiencies. However, national constitutional authorities limit the scope for EU fiscal integration based on national sovereignty, democracy and parliamentary prerogatives. The result is a fundamental dilemma: effective EU fiscal integration appears necessary to stabilize the Euro and legally impossible due to national constitutional limits.Confronted with this dilemma, this thesis determines the national constitutional space available for EU fiscal integration. Part I includes a comparative assessment of national constitutional limits to determine how constitutional systems react or could react to EU fiscal integration. Part II tests current EMU reform proposals against the charted national constitutional to evaluate their attainability. Overall, the thesis demonstrates that even rigid national constitutional limits can accommodate EU fiscal integration. To rebut the outlined dilemma the thesis proposes: First, to comprehensively include EU fiscal integration benefits into the national constitutional appraisal thereby replacing the prevailing competence-centric interpretation of national sovereignty and democracy. And second, to design EU fiscal integration in light of national constitutional concerns. Both propositions facilitate the attainment of EU fiscal integration by equally respecting national constitutional concerns. Show less
South European labour markets have gone through a substantial level of downward adjustment in wages (internal devaluation) and liberalisation in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis. Yet, there... Show moreSouth European labour markets have gone through a substantial level of downward adjustment in wages (internal devaluation) and liberalisation in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis. Yet, there have been differences in the extent of change between Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy. These differences cannot be explained by the size of the economic crisis alone. While existing analyses focus on the extent of external pressure or party ideologies, this article focuses on the pre‐existing level of regulation by the state as opposed to regulation by social partners. It shows that devaluation and liberalisation were the most extensive in countries where governments possessed more tools to force down wages (statutory job protection, state regulations of collective bargaining, minimum wages), sometimes even against the will of employers. In contrast, countries with a higher level of autonomy for social partners (and fewer policy instruments available to governments to influence wages) devalued less. In some cases, the crisis led to more power to the state, rather than less. The article shows that state intervention can be a facilitator rather than a barrier to wage adjustment. Show less
