Many inter-State and intra-State conflicts in Africa become more complex by being extended into 'proxy wars', i.e. secondary, often 'low intensity' armed conflicts, pursued in the context of a... Show moreMany inter-State and intra-State conflicts in Africa become more complex by being extended into 'proxy wars', i.e. secondary, often 'low intensity' armed conflicts, pursued in the context of a major power struggle, or outright wars between States carried out by subsidiary or co-opted insurgent movements, usually of an ethno-regional nature. In the Horn of Africa, the proxy war phenomenon is visible owing to alliances behind the scenes, the involvement of neighbouring countries, and frequent changes of allegiance. The proxy war strategy was pursued by both players in the 1998-2000 border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, not only in the enemy country but also in neighbouring States. Since the peace agreement of June 2000, the importance and impact of the proxy war factor has declined somewhat, but whether this decline will contribute to the building of a 'lasting peace' is not at all certain. The experience of tenuous negotiation during the past two years seems to indicate otherwise. The author argues that the threat of regional instability by proxy conflict remains, as long as the Ethiopian and Eritrean regimes are unwilling to make real peace with each other. App. (list of insurgent movements), bibliogr., notes, ref. [ASC Leiden abstract] Show less
Na ruim twee jaar oorlog verrasten Ethiopië en Eritrea de wereld met ondertekening van een vredesovereenkomst in Algiers, onder bemiddeling van de OAE. Hoewel er nu sprake is van een soort... Show moreNa ruim twee jaar oorlog verrasten Ethiopië en Eritrea de wereld met ondertekening van een vredesovereenkomst in Algiers, onder bemiddeling van de OAE. Hoewel er nu sprake is van een soort vredesproces - of beter 'onderhandelingsproces' - is verzoening nog ver weg. Daarbij komt nog dat de positie van beide regimes op de langere termijn ook door groeiende binnenlandse onvrede in het geheel niet zeker is. In beide landen is de erfenis van een 'geweldscultuur' alom aanwezig. De onderliggende politieke spanning tussen de beide landen staat normalisering, vrede en economische ontwikkeling in de weg. De oorlog mag dan wel afgelopen zijn, de autoritaire politieke structuren en het gebrekkig en arrogant leiderschap in beide landen blijven een groot struikelblok voor vooruitgang. Dit artikel gaat in op potentiële twistpunten in het akkoord van december 2000, zaken die niet geregeld kunnen worden met een vredesverdrag - wederzijds vertrouwen, herstel van normale betrekkingen - en het blijvende antagonisme tussen de twee regeringen. De conclusie is dat, aangezien de oorzaken van de grote spanning tussen Ethiopië en Eritrea nog dezelfde zijn als in mei 1998, de kans op duurzame vrede klein lijkt. Noten, samenv. in het Engels (p. 228) Show less
On 6 May 1998, a violent conflict erupted in the Ethiopian-Eritrean border area. This article contends that this border crisis is neither unexpected nor the result of a real border dispute. Rather... Show moreOn 6 May 1998, a violent conflict erupted in the Ethiopian-Eritrean border area. This article contends that this border crisis is neither unexpected nor the result of a real border dispute. Rather, it is due to three factors: the particular history and relationship of the two insurgent movements turned national governments (the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, EPLF, and the Tigray People's Liberation Front, TPLF) in the two countries; the nature and heritage of neopatrimonial elite rule and the lack of democratic restructuring in the two countries; and the economic problems of Eritrea. The author first gives an overview of the outbreak of the conflict, its economic effects, and international mediation efforts. Then he analyses the background to the border dispute, arguing that it is a direct result of the unresolved and ambiguous political relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the national leaders' policy of making deals without securing a broad national consensus or legally clear formulas. Finally, he considers the prospects for a solution of the conflict and future relations between the two countries. Notes, ref Show less
