The European Council and the European Commission have a similar role in agenda setting. Both place issues on the EU agenda. However, these institutions have distinct designs. They have... Show moreThe European Council and the European Commission have a similar role in agenda setting. Both place issues on the EU agenda. However, these institutions have distinct designs. They have different political attributes (the European Council has considerably more political authority) and information-processing capacities (the Commission can handle many more issues simultaneously). In domestic political systems, organizations often differ on what issues to attend and how to do it, circumstances induced in part by their designs. But we know little about how this happens in the EU system. Do the European Council and the Commission set the agenda differently, according to their distinct architectures? Or do they do it similarly, according to their similar roles? Further, while the function of each institution is formalized, their relationship is not. We do not know how their designs affect their interaction. Who follows whom? Or do the institutions influence each other? The study reveals and explains underlying dynamics in EU agenda setting. It looks into the processes of each agenda (intra-agenda dynamics) and between them (inter-agenda dynamics) across decades. The field of organized crime is examined over time. The study shows that to better understand their interplay, we need to observe their individual behaviors. Show less
This article expresses a note of caution regarding the general enthusiasm surrounding the duty of sincere cooperation in the external relations of the European Union. It argues that according to... Show moreThis article expresses a note of caution regarding the general enthusiasm surrounding the duty of sincere cooperation in the external relations of the European Union. It argues that according to the recent case law of the European Court of Justice, the duty is in practise not only first and foremost incumbent upon the Member States, but manifests itself as a strict duty to refrain from acting – a duty to remain silent – rather than a duty of best endeavours. Tracing the Court’s key judgements in this regard (Inland Waterways, IMO and PFOS), the authors conclude that in the presence of Union competence, but in the absence of a (quasi)-authorisation by the Union institutions to act, the Member States are to remain idle. While arguably necessary to safeguard the Union’s unity of international representation, this development is prone to legally favour inaction and hinder the Union’s ambitions for actual “external action”. Show less
