This paper addresses the constitutional entrenchment of foreign policy preferences, or “world views”, from the vantage point of International Relations theory. Empirically, norms that sketch out... Show moreThis paper addresses the constitutional entrenchment of foreign policy preferences, or “world views”, from the vantage point of International Relations theory. Empirically, norms that sketch out certain visions of global governance have become a popular feature of constitutional design. The paper expounds both their potential, as well as pitfalls to avoid, with a particular focus on Constructivist scholarship. In terms of their merits, they can serve as evidence of a “normative basis” for foreign policy and as parameters for legitimacy. Furthermore, they represent both evidence of, and fuel for, processes of socialization in foreign policy. However, Constructivists tempted to draw on such constitutional worldviews should heed three main caveats. Firstly, while the constitution is supreme in the legal realm, it is only one of many possible expressions of normative preferences from a political science perspective. Secondly, they should avoid confusion between domestic constitutional standards and universal ones. Thirdly, they should be aware of the problematic of the “dead hand of the past”, i.e., while constitutional entrenchment may lend norms particular gravitas, it also makes them prone to become out-dated. By staying clear of these pitfalls, Constructivist theorists can embrace contemporary constitutions in their quest to elucidate which principles and ideas shape the international order and its maturing legal framework. Show less
Diverse assessments of the EU's role in global governance suggest a great need for dependable and justifiable benchmarks. This chapter argues that constitutional foreign policy objectives are an... Show moreDiverse assessments of the EU's role in global governance suggest a great need for dependable and justifiable benchmarks. This chapter argues that constitutional foreign policy objectives are an important source for such benchmarks — for conceptual, empirical, and normative reasons. Conceptually speaking, global governance is an inherently rule-oriented as well as goal-oriented concept. Empirically, such substantive global governance goals can be found today in many constitutions, including those of the rising powers of the emerging multipolar world. EU primary law post-Lisbon is part of this trend, but also goes further. Next to an extensive collection of substantive objectives, it also puts a distinctive emphasis on law as an essential ingredient of its foreign policy and consequently of its vision for global governance. From a normative point of view, the peculiar features pertaining to constitutional law as a source for global governance guidance, as opposed to policy documents or other law, appear at first sight as problematic. In particular for the EU, facing the challenge of ‘relative decline’ in a multi-polar world, entrenching such an ambitious agenda in its highest laws may appear as audacious wishful thinking. On closer inspection, however, these particular features reveal the true value of the constitutional codification of a global governance agenda. Show less
