This article addresses the question of how the EU’s legal constraints can be overcome in the governance of Global Spaces. It shows, first, that EU law is part of a trend of including language... Show moreThis article addresses the question of how the EU’s legal constraints can be overcome in the governance of Global Spaces. It shows, first, that EU law is part of a trend of including language relating to Global Spaces in constitutional documents. The article subsequently highlights a tension specific to the EU as a non-state entity. While the EU Treaties enshrine grand foreign policy ambitions, which are impossible to achieve without a proactive role across the Global Spaces, EU law imposes several obstacles that complicate the pursuit of these ambitions. These concern particularly the need to base EU actions on powers conferred by the member states, the parallel international presence of the Union and the member states, and difficulties for the EU to join relevant international agreements and institutions. The article argues that through legal creativity, these constraints can be largely overcome, enabling the EU to pursue its ambitions nonetheless. Show less
The Eurocrisis forcefully exposed the Euro’s structural deficiencies, which are back in the limelight due to COVID-19. It is widely acknowledged that EU fiscal integration is required to adequately... Show moreThe Eurocrisis forcefully exposed the Euro’s structural deficiencies, which are back in the limelight due to COVID-19. It is widely acknowledged that EU fiscal integration is required to adequately remedy the remaining deficiencies. However, national constitutional authorities limit the scope for EU fiscal integration based on national sovereignty, democracy and parliamentary prerogatives. The result is a fundamental dilemma: effective EU fiscal integration appears necessary to stabilize the Euro and legally impossible due to national constitutional limits.Confronted with this dilemma, this thesis determines the national constitutional space available for EU fiscal integration. Part I includes a comparative assessment of national constitutional limits to determine how constitutional systems react or could react to EU fiscal integration. Part II tests current EMU reform proposals against the charted national constitutional to evaluate their attainability. Overall, the thesis demonstrates that even rigid national constitutional limits can accommodate EU fiscal integration. To rebut the outlined dilemma the thesis proposes: First, to comprehensively include EU fiscal integration benefits into the national constitutional appraisal thereby replacing the prevailing competence-centric interpretation of national sovereignty and democracy. And second, to design EU fiscal integration in light of national constitutional concerns. Both propositions facilitate the attainment of EU fiscal integration by equally respecting national constitutional concerns. Show less
Constitutionalism is the permanent quest to control state power, of which the judicial review of legislation is a prime example. Although the judicial review of legislation is increasingly common... Show moreConstitutionalism is the permanent quest to control state power, of which the judicial review of legislation is a prime example. Although the judicial review of legislation is increasingly common in modern societies, it is not a finished project. This device still raises questions as to whether judicial review is justified, and how it may be structured. Yet, judicial review’s justification and its scope are seldom addressed in the same study, thereby making for an inconvenient divorce of these two related avenues of study. To narrow the divide, the object of this work is quite straightforward. Namely, is the idea of judicial review defensible, and what influences its design and scope? This work addresses these matters by comparing the judicial review of legislation in the United Kingdom (the Human Rights Act of 1998), the Netherlands (the Halsema Proposal of 2002) and the Constitution of South Africa of 1996. Show less
