Collective violence offenders usually do not have a criminal record. In earlier research, the emphasis in explaining collective violence has been on the relationships between the groups involved in... Show moreCollective violence offenders usually do not have a criminal record. In earlier research, the emphasis in explaining collective violence has been on the relationships between the groups involved in collective. This thesis argues that individual characteristics cannot be ignored. A part of collective violence offenders (approximately 10 percent) appear to have come into contact with the police from an early age on due to violence, committed both alone and in groups. Moreover, certain psychological characteristics - such as problems with impulse control, ADHD and aggression regulation problems - are more common in this group than among other collective violence offenders. In short: for some of involved in collective violence, taking part seems to be prompted not only by the situation but also by individual characteristics which manifest themselves in such situations. To date, the role of individual characteristics has only been examined to a limited extent, based on the idea that this does not do justice to the context in which collective violence manifests itself. The findings of this research argue for nuance in the scientific debate. When explaining collective violence, attention should be paid to the mutual relationships between the groups involved, the applicable "values" within specific offender groups (such as hooligans) and individual characteristics. Show less
This article analyses the role of religious leaders in collective violence in Kano, the major urban centre in northern Nigeria. It compares two episodes of collective action in the city—the violent... Show moreThis article analyses the role of religious leaders in collective violence in Kano, the major urban centre in northern Nigeria. It compares two episodes of collective action in the city—the violent ‘Plateau riots’ in 2004 and the non-violent ‘cartoon protests’ in 2006—to explore the role of religious leaders in the variation in violence between the two events. The core argument is that the ways in which Islamic and Christian preachers framed the triggering events for these cases facilitated different forms of mobilisation and enemy identification in response. In 2004, the interpretation of violence in Plateau State through the ‘Christians-versus-Muslims’ frame allowed for mobilisation within Kano’s Christian and Muslim communities as well as for the identification of local Christians as enemies. In 2006, in contrast, the infamous Danish cartoons were actively framed as part of the global struggle between faithful Nigerians and nonreligious Westerners, facilitating non-violent mobilisation across Christian-Muslim boundaries. Thus, the divergent discursive strategies employed by religious leaders are likely to have contributed to violent escalation in 2004 and to peaceful mobilisation in 2006. At the same time, however, the article emphasises the interaction of discursive framing with other factors, such as the role of security forces and the inextricable connections between religious and political authorities in Kano. The article is based on mixed-methods data collected in Kano between 2006 and 2012, including perceptions survey data, semi-structured interviews, and newspaper articles. Show less
