Why did a conflict between a majority of settlers (Konkomba), claiming equal citizenship, and a minority of autochtons (Nanumba) produce both Ghana's largest incidents of ethnic cleansing and a... Show moreWhy did a conflict between a majority of settlers (Konkomba), claiming equal citizenship, and a minority of autochtons (Nanumba) produce both Ghana's largest incidents of ethnic cleansing and a subsequent ominous calm? Analysing the post-1996 peace accord Konkomba/Nanumba coexistence against their violent past and in Ghana's political context as one of Africa's promising nations, this ethnography shows that the conflict has two forms. One is sovereign violence and another is a persistent silence in relation to legalistic speeches. Breaking out of these forms may not so much require a reconciliation, as peace brokers proposed, but a political compromise. Martijn Wienia studied Cultural Anthropology, Development Sociology and African Studies at Leiden University. Currently, he works as policy officer with the WOTRO Science for Global Development division of the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) in The Hague. Show less
This volume contains a range of original studies on the controversial role of youth in politics, conflicts and rebellious movements in Africa. A common aim of the studies is to try and explain why... Show moreThis volume contains a range of original studies on the controversial role of youth in politics, conflicts and rebellious movements in Africa. A common aim of the studies is to try and explain why patterns of generational conflict and violent response among younger age groups in Africa are showing such a remarkably uneven spread across the continent. An introduction by Jon Abbink (Being young in Africa: the politics of despair and renewal) is follwed by three parts: 1. Historical perspectives on youth as agents of change (Murray Last on youth in Muslim northern Nigeria, 1750-2000; G. Thomas Burgess on youth in revolutionary Zanzibar); 2. State, crisis and the mobilization of youth (Peter Mwangi Kagwanja on youth identity and the politics of transition in Kenya, 1997-2002; Karel Arnaut on youth and the politics of history in C“te d'Ivoire; Jok Madut Jok on the position of youth in South Sudan; Piet Konings on anglophone university students and anglophone nationalist struggles in Cameroon; and Sara Rich Dorman on youth and politics in Eritrea); 3. Interventions: dealing with youth in crisis (Yves Marguerat on street children in Lom‚, Togo; Angela McIntyre on the phenomenon of child soldiers in Africa; Simon Simonse on failed Statehood and the violence of young male pastoralists in the Horn of Africa; and Krijn Peters on the reintegration of young ex-combatants in Sierra Leone). [ASC Leiden abstract] Show less
The papers in this volume were earlier presented at the conference 'Globalization and new questions of ownership', which was held in Leiden, The Netherlands, from 26-27 April 2002. The volume... Show moreThe papers in this volume were earlier presented at the conference 'Globalization and new questions of ownership', which was held in Leiden, The Netherlands, from 26-27 April 2002. The volume challenges the dominant view that globalization is a primary threat to African societies. Instead, it emphasizes African agency in situating globality, that is, in selectively and creatively appropriating elements of the emerging global culture. Contributions: Situating globality: African agency in the appropriation of global culture (Wim van Binsbergen, Rijk van DijkandJan-Bart Gewald); Global and local trends in media ownership and control: implications for cultural creativity in Africa (Francis B. Nyamnjoh); Global media and violence in Africa: the case of Somalia (Jan-Bart Gewald); Can ICT belong in Africa, or is ICT owned by the North Atlantic region? (Wim van Binsbergen); 'Man will live well': on the poetics of corruption in a global age (Sanya Osha); 'Beyond the rivers of Ethiopia': Pentecostal Pan-Africanism and Ghanaian identities in the transnational domain (Rijk van Dijk); Global connections, local ruptures: the case of Islam in Senegal (Roy Dilley); How is a girl to marry without a bed? : weddings, wealth and women's value in an Islamic town of Niger (Adeline Masquelier); The social life of secrets (Senegal, Ferdinand de Jong); The persistence of female initiation rites: reflexivity and resilience of women in Zambia (Thera Rasing). [ASC Leiden abstract] Show less
This collective volume reinterprets the genre of resistance studies, introduces recent conceptual perspectives and considers examples of African (civil) wars and insurgent movements. Contributions... Show moreThis collective volume reinterprets the genre of resistance studies, introduces recent conceptual perspectives and considers examples of African (civil) wars and insurgent movements. Contributions: Rethinking resistance in African history, an introduction, by Klaas van Walraven and Jon Abbink. Part I (Historical perspectives): Resistance to Fulbe hegemony in nineteenth-century West Africa, by Mirjam de Bruijn and Han van Dijk; Colonial conquest in central Madagascar: who resisted what?, by Stephen Ellis; Revisiting resistance in Italian-occupied Ethiopia: the Patriots' Movement (1936-1941) and the redefinition of post-war Ethiopia, by Aregawi Berhe. Part 2 (Social inequalities and colonial hierarchies): Ambiguities of resistance and collaboration on the Eastern Cape Frontier: the Kat River Settlement 1829-1856, by Robert Ross; African mutinies in the Netherlands East Indies: a nineteenth-century colonial paradox, by Ineke van Kessel; Absence of evidence is no proof: slave resistance under German colonial rule in East Africa, by Jan-Georg Deutsch. Part 3 (Violence, meaning and ideology in resistance): The Kawousan War reconsidered, by Kimba Idrissa; 'Sawaba''s rebellion in Niger (1964-1965): narrative and meaning, by Klaas van Walraven; The vagaries of violence and power in post-colonial Mozambique, by Gerhard Seibert. Part 4 (Resistance as heritage and memory): Herero genocide in the twentieth century: politics and memory, by Jan-Bart Gewald; 'Namibia, land of the brave': selective memories on war and violence within nation building, by Henning Melber; Dervishes, 'moryaan' and freedom fighters: cycles of rebellion and the fragmentation of Somali society, 1900-2000, by Jon Abbink Show less
This article is a repsonse to Thandika Mkandawire's article on violence against the African peasantry in Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 40, no. 2 (2002). In this article, Mkandawire takes... Show moreThis article is a repsonse to Thandika Mkandawire's article on violence against the African peasantry in Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 40, no. 2 (2002). In this article, Mkandawire takes exception to suggestions by the author concerning the antecedents of the 1990s civil war in Liberia, describing his views as 'essentialist' and 'poorly veiled racist'. The author argues that these tags are inaccurate. He suggests that the method he has used to analyse the violence of the Liberian civil war could be usefully applied to any violent situation in any part of the world. Accordingly, he first considers Mkandawire's suggestion as to why particular forms of violence occur in African wars, explaining why it is generally unsatisfactory, after which he considers an alternative method for examining the question of large-scale violence in Africa. Bibliogr., notes. (Rejoinder by Mkandawire, p. 477-483.) [ASC Leiden abstract] Show less
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the extent to which violence can be said to underlie any form of Stae formation in precolonial Africa. This is done by examining the role of violence in... Show moreThe purpose of this chapter is to explore the extent to which violence can be said to underlie any form of Stae formation in precolonial Africa. This is done by examining the role of violence in State formation in west central Zambia from the 17th century onwards. The chapter shows that State formation in west central Zambia entailed the imposition upon local village communities of a more or less centralized sociopolitical structure, representing a departure from the social organization and ideology prevailing in pre-State times. In the specific context of the expansion of Lunda political culture over much of south central Africa, the typical form of Statehood that emerged had two salient features: perpetual kinship and positional succession, neither of which corresponded with structural themes in local village society. The chapter compares the cultural logic of the village and that of the royal court in more detail, arguing that the latter completely ignored the former. This is illustrated by the particular cases of the Nkoya and the Lozi. Notes, ref. [ASC Leiden abstract] Show less
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the extent to which violence can be said to underlie any form of Stae formation in precolonial Africa. This is done by examining the role of violence in... Show moreThe purpose of this chapter is to explore the extent to which violence can be said to underlie any form of Stae formation in precolonial Africa. This is done by examining the role of violence in State formation in west central Zambia from the 17th century onwards. The chapter shows that State formation in west central Zambia entailed the imposition upon local village communities of a more or less centralized sociopolitical structure, representing a departure from the social organization and ideology prevailing in pre-State times. In the specific context of the expansion of Lunda political culture over much of south central Africa, the typical form of Statehood that emerged had two salient features: perpetual kinship and positional succession, neither of which corresponded with structural themes in local village society. The chapter compares the cultural logic of the village and that of the royal court in more detail, arguing that the latter completely ignored the former. This is illustrated by the particular cases of the Nkoya and the Lozi. Notes, ref. [ASC Leiden abstract] Show less
Renamo fought a bloody war from 1976 to 1992 against the socialist Frelimo government that devastated the country, but since Renamo had been created by Rhodesia and subsequently supported by South... Show moreRenamo fought a bloody war from 1976 to 1992 against the socialist Frelimo government that devastated the country, but since Renamo had been created by Rhodesia and subsequently supported by South Africa, the internal dimensions of the conflict were played down. However, the resistance of large sections of Mozambican society against the authoritarian politics of the Frelimo regime explains why Renamo did not remain a small guerrilla force but finally controlled entire regions of the country. The excessive violence against civilians by Renamo obscured the fact that in certain regions the movement enjoyed popular support. The conflict in Mozambique was both a modern war with sophisticated weapons and an armed conflict where ritual powers played a role. After the war, collective and individual rituals contributed to the reconciliation of the warring parties and the reintegration of individuals into their local communities. Notes, ref., sum. [Book abstract] Show less
In this chapter, the limits to the memory of liberation are investigated with regard to the factors affecting a liberation movement in the process of achieving legitimate power in a postcolonial... Show moreIn this chapter, the limits to the memory of liberation are investigated with regard to the factors affecting a liberation movement in the process of achieving legitimate power in a postcolonial society. The case of Namibia is explored in the transition from anticolonial resistance to comprehensive control by the former liberation movement over the State. The concepts of political rule, the State and democracy are tested against the impact of a liberation struggle in terms of the applied understanding of political dominance, once access to power has been achieved. The political culture under a government with a record of liberation struggle suggests limitations to the implementation of democracy. Notes, ref., sum. [Book abstract] Show less
A rising against French colonial rule in central Madagascar (1895-1898) appeared in the 1970s as a good example of resistance to colonialism, sparked by France's occupation of Madagascar. Like... Show moreA rising against French colonial rule in central Madagascar (1895-1898) appeared in the 1970s as a good example of resistance to colonialism, sparked by France's occupation of Madagascar. Like many similar episodes in other parts of Africa, it was a history that appeared, in the light of later African nationalist movements, to be a precursor to the more sophisticated anticolonial movements that eventually led to independence, in Madagascar and elsewhere. In the light of the later history of nationalism, however, it is instructive to revisit the rising of the 'menalamba' (red shawls) in Madagascar and to reconsider the episode. Notes, ref., sum. [Book abstract] Show less
Cet article s'efforce de souligner des dynamiques en cours en Afrique actuellement et de les replacer sur le long terme, et de remettre en question les mythes (comme le concept européen de "société... Show moreCet article s'efforce de souligner des dynamiques en cours en Afrique actuellement et de les replacer sur le long terme, et de remettre en question les mythes (comme le concept européen de "société civile") et explications couramment acceptés sur la causalité de l'histoire récente. Le regain de violence à la fin du vingtième siècle peut être vu comme une conséquence d'un affaiblissement politique. Les années 1970 apparaissent comme la vraie période de rupture, avec les deux crises pétrolières de 1973-74 et 1979, la déconnexion entre le dollar et le prix de l'or, le changement dans les méthodes de production. La crise financière amène beaucoup de gouvernements africains à se présenter à la Banque mondiale et au Fonds monétaire international pour demander des financements. Les institutions de Bretton Woods théorisent l'"ajustement structurel", imposent des réformes libérales des économies, puis demandent des réformes politiques, la "démocratisation". Or, selon l'auteur, ni le libéralisme ni la démocratie n'ont mené les pays africains à plus de prospérité ou de stabilité, du fait d'un décalage entre l'État juridique, qui a perdu sa structure et ne fonctionne plus, et le pouvoir réel. Certaines formes caractéristiques de l'époque pré-coloniale reprennent actuellement de l'importance. On constate un renouveau religieux, la religion devenant un moyen de mobilisation politique et militaire, ou un moyen de s'intégrer à la globalisation. [Résumé ASC Leiden] Show less
In 1987 and 1991 Martin Bernal published two volumes on the Afroasiatic roots of classical civilization. His theory that ancient Greek culture derived from Egypt and Phoenicia opened a discussion... Show moreIn 1987 and 1991 Martin Bernal published two volumes on the Afroasiatic roots of classical civilization. His theory that ancient Greek culture derived from Egypt and Phoenicia opened a discussion known as the debate on 'Black Athena'. This article sorts out whatever lasting contribution Bernal has made to classical archaeology. In 'Black Athena' Bernal described how one particular view of ancient Greek history has served Eurocentric interests. But his own alternative serves other ideological interests, viz. the rapprochement to Afrocentrism. According to Bernal, the name of the Greek goddess Athena derived from the ancient Egyptian Ht Nt, "temple of Neith". Even though Bernal's etymology has been effectively refuted on the grounds of historical linguistics, the iconographic and semantic details which Bernal adduces make it quite conceivable that the link between Athena and Neith was more than superficial. The present author suggests, however, that Neith and Athena both derive from a common prototype which, throughout the ancient eastern Mediterranean, has produced Great Goddesses with connotations of underworld, death, violence and rebirth. Such a view - although inspired by Bernal - effectively explodes the Black Athena thesis, since it dissolves the very contradiction between Indo-European and Afroasiatic as the source of Aegean civilization, and draws on a common substratum which cannot readily be relegated to an African provenance. In conclusion, the present author advocates continued research in the spirit of Martin Bernal, with vastly increased personal, disciplinary, financial and temporal resources. (A shorter French version of this article is published in: Afrocentrismes : l'histoire des Africains entre Égypte et Amérique / sous la dir. de François-Xavier Fauvelle-Aymar, Jean-Pierre Chrétien et Claude-Hélène Perrot. - Paris : Karthala, 2000, p. 127-150.) Show less
Accounts of South Africa's transition from apartheid differ markedly in the role they attribute to violence. The most influential narratives of negotiations tend to portray the violence of the... Show moreAccounts of South Africa's transition from apartheid differ markedly in the role they attribute to violence. The most influential narratives of negotiations tend to portray the violence of the transition period, including that perpetrated by those networks within and without the security forces which have become known collectively as the Third Force, as a reaction to events, doomed to failure and rather disconnected from the main narrative of history. Newly available evidence shows the degree to which the Third Force was integrated into the policy of the National Party (NP) over a long period (from the 1960s onwards), and played a crucial role in determining the nature and outcome of constitutional negotiations in the period 1990-1994. Concentration on the narrative of negotiations, or any account which fails to give due weight to the perpetrators of organized violence including those who constituted the Third Force, implicitly assigns the violence of 1990-1994 to a position somewhat divorced from, or even antithetical to, the pursuit of negotiations. This has deflected attention from the important question of ascertaining the extent to which the agenda and pace of negotiations, and thus the shape of the eventual political and constitutional outcome, were actually driven by proponents of violence who were able to make their influence felt from outside the conference chamber. Ref., sum Show less
