A quarter of a century of wars ending in military triumphs - by the Mujahideen against the Red Army and the Communist regimes; by the Taliban and al-Qaeda against the Mujahideen-Northern Alliance... Show moreA quarter of a century of wars ending in military triumphs - by the Mujahideen against the Red Army and the Communist regimes; by the Taliban and al-Qaeda against the Mujahideen-Northern Alliance forces; and most recently by the US-led international coalition against the Taliban and al-Qaeda - have proven that achieving victory in the battlefield is easier than translating that victory into desired political objectives. The persistence of political failures following military victories in Afghanistan calls for a reasoned explanation of this major gap between means and ends, and a way out of the painful cycle of violence in the country. Show less
If the process by which we arrive at today's institutions is relevant and constrains future choices, then not only does history matter but persistent poor performance and long-run divergent... Show moreIf the process by which we arrive at today's institutions is relevant and constrains future choices, then not only does history matter but persistent poor performance and long-run divergent patterns of (socio-political and economic) development stem from a common source. The meteoric rise of the Taliban (1994-1995) as an extremist Muslim militia movement in post-Soviet Afghanistan remains an enigma to the Afghans as well as to outside observers. What is enigmatic is not so much where they come from, or what internal and external forces might be propping them up, or even the brand of Islam they are brandishing. Rather what remain puzzling are questions such as: What in the Afghan history and political culture provides space and a place for the rise of such an extremely harsh and violent militant movement at the dawn of the 21st century in this beleaguered nation? Is this an expected manifestation of recognizable historical patterns in the country? Or is it an aberration and a product of novel circumstances of post-jihad Afghanistan? If it is not a novelty, as will be argued here, then how can it be explained within the parameters of Afghanistan's social history and political culture? Show less
