Mechanisms to control public power have been developed and shaped around human beings as decision-makers at the centre of the public administration. However, technology is radically changing how... Show moreMechanisms to control public power have been developed and shaped around human beings as decision-makers at the centre of the public administration. However, technology is radically changing how public administration is organised and reliance on Artificial Intelligence is on the rise across all sectors. While carrying the promise of an increasingly efficient administration, automating (parts of) administrative decision-making processes also poses a challenge to our human-centred systems of control of public power. This article focuses on one of these control mechanisms: the duty to give reasons under EU law, a pillar of administrative law designed to enable individuals to challenge decisions and courts to exercise their powers of review. First, it analyses whether the duty to give reasons can be meaningfully applied when EU bodies rely on AI systems to inform their decisionmaking. Secondly, it examines the added value of secondary law, in particular the data protection rules applicable to EU institutions and the draft EU Artificial Intelligence Act, in complementing and adapting the duty to give reasons to better fulfil its purpose in a (partially) automated administration. This article concludes that the duty to give reasons provides a useful starting point but leaves a number of aspects unclear. While providing important safeguards, neither EU data protection law nor the draft EU Artificial Intelligence Act currently fill these gaps. Show less
This article expresses a note of caution regarding the general enthusiasm surrounding the duty of sincere cooperation in the external relations of the European Union. It argues that according to... Show moreThis article expresses a note of caution regarding the general enthusiasm surrounding the duty of sincere cooperation in the external relations of the European Union. It argues that according to the recent case law of the European Court of Justice, the duty is in practise not only first and foremost incumbent upon the Member States, but manifests itself as a strict duty to refrain from acting – a duty to remain silent – rather than a duty of best endeavours. Tracing the Court’s key judgements in this regard (Inland Waterways, IMO and PFOS), the authors conclude that in the presence of Union competence, but in the absence of a (quasi)-authorisation by the Union institutions to act, the Member States are to remain idle. While arguably necessary to safeguard the Union’s unity of international representation, this development is prone to legally favour inaction and hinder the Union’s ambitions for actual “external action”. Show less
