This essay analyses the evolving character of Russia’s energy relationships in the post-Soviet space by looking at the Caucasus and Central Asia. In the past, due to the historic legacy of Russia... Show moreThis essay analyses the evolving character of Russia’s energy relationships in the post-Soviet space by looking at the Caucasus and Central Asia. In the past, due to the historic legacy of Russia-controlled pipelines, Moscow was able to exert influence by manipulating structural asymmetries in regional natural gas value chains. This has changed with China’s entry as the region’s major market alternative and the breakthroughs of the global energy transition. The initial phase of Russia’s declining ‘energy power’ vis-à-vis China in Central Asia came to an end as the Crimea crisis was unfolding, an event that has drastically changed the risk perception of Russian gas in Europe, setting off a chain of consequences that led to a re-evaluation of Russia’s energy power in post-Soviet Eurasia. The essay also shows, however, that Russia maintains influence in post-Soviet Eurasia through inter-elite networks and shared concerns among hydrocarbon-exporting countries about the energy transition. Show less
The quick rise of commercially viable renewable energy worldwide presents encouraging opportunities for sustainable growth, but it also portends new risks. Hydrocarbon-producing nations of Eurasia... Show moreThe quick rise of commercially viable renewable energy worldwide presents encouraging opportunities for sustainable growth, but it also portends new risks. Hydrocarbon-producing nations of Eurasia have typically strongly relied on geographic proximity to their most lucrative export market: Europe. Yet the revolutionary nature of Europe's ‘Green Deal’ means that their position is under threat. While the demand-side ramifications of the global low-carbon transition are widely discussed, little consideration has been given to the inevitable implications for hydrocarbons producers, particularly in the less-studied central Asian region. This article draws attention to the interconnections between hydrocarbon rents, regime stability and new foreign policy strategies in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in the wake of the global shift away from oil to renewable energy. By so doing, it systematically examines what implications the energy transition has on crucial petrostates in central Asia, and what this, in turn, means for international stability. Show less
Most of Kazakhstan’s wealth hinges on oil rents, and the overall performance of the economy is closely linked to petroleum’s price fluctuations. This study asks (1) why the institution of private... Show moreMost of Kazakhstan’s wealth hinges on oil rents, and the overall performance of the economy is closely linked to petroleum’s price fluctuations. This study asks (1) why the institution of private ownership of oil proceeds has not led to a positive transformation of patron–client relations embedded in the country’s energy sector, thus challenging the relevance of the ‘private ownership’ narrative, and (2) why the collapse in the price of oil did not affect the stability and essential character of the regime in power. To answer these questions, the article examines two case studies: the privatization of the oil sector in the 1990s, and the post-2014 oil crisis. Thus the article problematizes important theories on oil-sector privatization and contributes to recent work on regime stability as it pertains to the resource curse. The analysis of the constitutive impact of oil wealth on Kazakh politics generates wider insights on the links between the power of informal networks and regime stability in petrostates through boom and bust cycles. Show less
This paper focuses on shifts in foreign energy policy in key Central Asian petrostates in the context of the global energy transition. It draws attention to the interconnections between hydrocarbon... Show moreThis paper focuses on shifts in foreign energy policy in key Central Asian petrostates in the context of the global energy transition. It draws attention to the interconnections between hydrocarbon rents, regime stability, and new foreign policy strategies in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The paper advances the argument that, instead of reducing economic overdependence on hydrocarbons for Central Asian petrostates, the global energy transition has spurred the desperate search for new hydrocarbon customers. This is due to the continued, and often unchecked, power of hydrocarbon elites, and leads to structural and economic distortionsthat are not easily undone, even by the current oil crash. Show less
China’s displacement of Russian economic influence in Central Asia is generating great interest in Western academic and policy circles, but this research has, as yet, yielded few analytical... Show moreChina’s displacement of Russian economic influence in Central Asia is generating great interest in Western academic and policy circles, but this research has, as yet, yielded few analytical nuances. This article attempts to shed light on the under-researched question of what explains Central Asian governments’ failure to more effectively capitalize on the growing Central-Asian rivalry between Russia, China, the United States, Turkey, Iran, South Korea, Japan and other regional powers that, since the early 1990s, have been overwhelmingly directed towards strategic energy considerations and hydrocarbon interests. Show less
China and Russia are forging closer ties to build a “multipolar world” and challenge what they lament as U.S. unilateralism. Energy ties are the backbone of this evolving economic partnership:... Show moreChina and Russia are forging closer ties to build a “multipolar world” and challenge what they lament as U.S. unilateralism. Energy ties are the backbone of this evolving economic partnership: China has become Russia’s main source of funds and its single biggest energy customer. Yet this essay argues that recent developments do not indicate the formation of a true strategic partnership that is based on a common set of values or a developed worldview that encompasses both powers. China is interested in purchasing Russian oil and gas, but still privileges economic relations with the U.S. Russia, meanwhile, feels uncomfortable about the growing power asymmetry with China, which highlights a shortcoming in the Kremlin’s claim of resurgent Russian greatness. Russia also displays a state-led mercantilist economic policy that seeks to augment its prowess at the expense of China. While a status-concerned Russia might in principle welcome a rm alliance meant to discom t the U.S., there is limited value in advancing a strategic alignment (let alone an alliance) for China. Beijing has the upper hand, and keeping its options open will continue to deliver maximum benefits. Show less
What explains the differences in the Sino-Russian oil and gas cooperation? Overall, I suggest, the several trajectories are explained by the dissimilarities of oil and gas as commodities and... Show moreWhat explains the differences in the Sino-Russian oil and gas cooperation? Overall, I suggest, the several trajectories are explained by the dissimilarities of oil and gas as commodities and potential foreign policy tools. These differences, along with other factors, such as corporate culture and individual personalities, shed light on the strategies of Russia’s gas conglomerates, Gazprom and Rosneft. Yet, if a more nuanced understanding of variation within these energy markets illuminates the reasons behind the sequencing of oil and gas cross-border pipeline projects, what explains the particular timing of the landmark 2014 gas deal? Why after 15 years of stalemate in the Sino-Russian gas cooperation did breakthroughs occur in 2014? And what explains the modesty of the record in gas cooperation to date? Many factors are undoubtedly involved, both economic and political; however, I contend that the conclusive factor can be found in underlying domestic politics.The article outlines the role of national narratives in driving both Russia and China’s energy foreign policy and goes on to argue that the Sino-Russian gas breakthrough in 2014 was due to the peculiar way in which domestic factors paired with international circumstances to produce the outcome at that particular moment. Show less
