This document presents the findings from quantitative and qualitative data generation and analysisconducted as part of the project “Financial decision-making, gender and social normsin Zambia”.... Show moreThis document presents the findings from quantitative and qualitative data generation and analysisconducted as part of the project “Financial decision-making, gender and social normsin Zambia”. Using a series of specially designed behavioural experiments and focus groupdiscussions, we generated an extensive set of insights into the normative environment withinwhich spouses in Eastern Province, Zambia, decide on individual money holding and saving.Here are some of those insights. Spouses in Eastern Province, Zambia, are willing to compromise household-level income to maintain individual control over money. Wives, but not husbands, are more likely to compromise household-level earnings to maintain individual control over money when theycan keep that money and their actions hidden from their spouses. Individually-held behaviouralprescriptions, i.e., the “shoulds” and “oughts” that individuals have in mind and reference asguides for their behaviour and benchmarks against which to evaluate others’ behaviour, informdecision-making about maintaining individual control over money at a cost to the household.Further, when individuals know that their spouses will find out about their decisions regardingmaintaining individual control over money (or not) at a cost to the household, the individualstake their spouses’ opinions about what they should do into account, i.e., they compromise. Inthe Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), wastefulness on the part of spouses was consistentlygiven as a reason for endeavouring to maintain individual control over money.There is strong but not unequivocal evidence pointing to the existence of a social norm, i.e., a“should” or “ought” that is collectively held and enforced by members of a community,forbidding saving in secret from one’s spouse, with the secrecy, not the saving being theproblem. Assuming it exists, this social norm forbidding saving in secret from one’s spouseapplies to both husbands and wives, and both husbands and wives acknowledge this. However,the extent to which violations of this norm are tolerated depends on who is doing the violatingand evaluating. In patrilineal communities (as compared to matrilineal communities), bothhusbands and wives are especially intolerant of secret saving by husbands, and in bothpatrilineal and matrilineal communities, wives are less tolerant than husbands of secret savingby husbands and more tolerant than husbands of secret saving by wives. This relative toleranceof secret saving by wives notwithstanding, just under one in three wives and one in sixhusbands think that a man is justified in beating his wife if he discovers that she is saving in ane-wallet or has joined a savings group without his knowledge and, as grounds for wife-beating,saving in secret is on a par with neglecting the children, visiting friends or family in secret andrefusing to have sex. When exploring the reasons for this strong norm against saving in secretin the FGDs, women express fear about the money going missing if the secret saver diesunexpectedly. Both men and women strongly believe that if a wife saves in secret, it raisessuspicions about where she is getting the money and that saving in secret can lead to maritaltension. Show less
This document presents the preliminary findings from the quantitative data generation and analysisconducted as part of the project “Financial decision-making, gender and social norms in Zambia”... Show moreThis document presents the preliminary findings from the quantitative data generation and analysisconducted as part of the project “Financial decision-making, gender and social norms in Zambia”.Using a series of specially designed behavioural experiments,we generated an extensive set of insightsinto the normative environment within which spouses in Eastern Province, Zambia, make decisionsabout individual money holding and saving. Here are some of those insights. Spouses in EasternProvince, Zambia, are willing to compromise household-level earnings in order to maintain individualcontrol over money. Wives, but not husbands, are more likely to compromise household-levelearnings in order tomaintain individual control overmoney, when they can keep thatmoney and theiractions hidden from their spouses. Individually-held behavioural prescriptions, i.e., the “shoulds” and“oughts” that individuals have in mind and reference as guides for their own behaviour and asbenchmarks against which to evaluate others’ behaviour, inform decision-making about maintainingindividual control over money at a cost to the household. Further, when individuals know that theirspouses will find out about their descisions regarding maintaining individual control over money (ornot) at a cost to the household, the individuals take their spouses’ opinions about what they shoulddo into account, i.e., they compromise. There is strong but not unequivocal evidence pointing to theexistence of a social norm, i.e., a “should” or “ought” that is collectively held and enforced bymembers of a community, forbidding saving in secret from one’s spouse, with the secrecy not thesaving being the problem. Assuming it exists, this social norm forbidding saving in secret from one’sspouse applies to both husbands and wives, and this is acknowledged by both husbands and wives.However, the extent to which violations of this norm are tolerated depends on who is doing theviolating and who the evaluating. In patrilineal communities (as compared to matrilinealcommunities), both husbands and wives are especially intolerant of secret saving by husbands and inboth patrilineal and matrilineal communities, wives are less tolerant than husbands of secret savingby husbands and more tolerant than husbands of secret saving by wives. This relative tolerance ofsecret saving by wives notwithstanding, just under one in three wives and one in six husbands thinkthat a man is justified in beating his wife if he discovers that she is saving in an e-wallet or has joineda savings group without his knowledge and, as grounds for wife beating, saving in secret is on a parwith neglecting the children, visiting friends or family in secret and refusing to have sex. For furtherinsights, see the main text of the report. Show less
This document presents the preliminary findings from the quantitative data generation and analysis conducted as part of the project “Financial decision-making, gender and social norms in Zambia”.... Show moreThis document presents the preliminary findings from the quantitative data generation and analysis conducted as part of the project “Financial decision-making, gender and social norms in Zambia”. Using a series of specially designed behavioural experiments, we generated an extensive set of insights into the normative environment within which spouses in Eastern Province, Zambia, make decisions about individual money holding and saving. Here are some of those insights. Spouses in Eastern Province, Zambia, are willing to compromise household-level earnings in order to maintain individual control over money. Wives, but not husbands, are more likely to compromise household-level earnings in order to maintain individual control over money, when they can keep that money and their actions hidden from their spouses. Individually-held behavioural prescriptions, i.e., the “shoulds” and “oughts” that individuals have in mind and reference as guides for their own behaviour and as benchmarks against which to evaluate others’ behaviour, inform decision-making about maintaining individual control over money at a cost to the household. Further, when individuals know that their spouses will find out about their descisions regarding maintaining individual control over money (or not) at a cost to the household, the individuals take their spouses’ opinions about what they should do into account, i.e., they compromise. There is strong but not unequivocal evidence pointing to the existence of a social norm, i.e., a “should” or “ought” that is collectively held and enforced by members of a community, forbidding saving in secret from one’s spouse, with the secrecy not the saving being the problem. Assuming it exists, this social norm forbidding saving in secret from one’s spouse applies to both husbands and wives, and this is acknowledged by both husbands and wives. However, the extent to which violations of this norm are tolerated depends on who is doing the violating and who the evaluating. In patrilineal communities (as compared to matrilineal communities), both husbands and wives are especially intolerant of secret saving by husbands and in both patrilineal and matrilineal communities, wives are less tolerant than husbands of secret saving by husbands and more tolerant than husbands of secret saving by wives. This relative tolerance of secret saving by wives notwithstanding, just under one in three wives and one in six husbands think that a man is justified in beating his wife if he discovers that she is saving in an e-wallet or has joined a savings group without his knowledge and, as grounds for wife beating, saving in secret is on a par with neglecting the children, visiting friends or family in secret and refusing to have sex. For further insights, see the main text of the report. Show less
Barr, A.; Dekker, M.; Janssens, W.; Kebede, B.; Kramer, B. 2019
Using a carefully designed series of public goods games, we compare, across monogamous and polygynous households, the willingness of husbands and wives to cooperate to maximize household gains.... Show moreUsing a carefully designed series of public goods games, we compare, across monogamous and polygynous households, the willingness of husbands and wives to cooperate to maximize household gains. Compared to monogamous husbands and wives, polygynous husbands and wives are less cooperative, one with another, and co-wives are least cooperative, one with another. The husbands' and wives' behavior in a corresponding series of inter-household games indicates that these differences cannot be attributed to selection of less cooperative people into polygyny. Finally, behavior in polygynous households is more reciprocal and less apparently altruistic. Show less
Previous analyses of the formation and composition of community-based organizations (CBOs) have used cross section data. So, causal inference has been compromised. We obviate this problem by using... Show morePrevious analyses of the formation and composition of community-based organizations (CBOs) have used cross section data. So, causal inference has been compromised. We obviate this problem by using data from a quasi-experiment in which villages were formed by government officials selecting and clustering households. Our findings are as follows: CBO co-memberships are more likely between geographically proximate households and less likely between early and late settlers, members of female-headed households are not excluded, in poorer villages CBO co-membership networks are denser and, while wealthier households may have been instrumental in setting up CBOs, poorer households engage shortly afterward. Show less
Assortative matching occurs in many social contexts. We experimentally investigate gender assorting in sub-Saharan villages. In the experiment, co-villagers could form groups to share winnings in... Show moreAssortative matching occurs in many social contexts. We experimentally investigate gender assorting in sub-Saharan villages. In the experiment, co-villagers could form groups to share winnings in a gamble choice game. The extent to which grouping arrangements were or could be enforced and, hence, the distribution of interaction costs were exogenously varied. Thus, we can distinguish between the effects of homophily and interaction costs on the extent of observed gender assorting. We find that interaction costs matter - there is less gender assorting when grouping depends on trust. In part, this is due to trust based on co-memberships in gender-mixed religions Show less
We investigate whether the set of available enforcement mechanisms affects the formation of risk sharing relations by applying dyadic regression analysis to data from a specifically designed... Show moreWe investigate whether the set of available enforcement mechanisms affects the formation of risk sharing relations by applying dyadic regression analysis to data from a specifically designed behavioural experiment, two surveys and a genealogical mapping exercise. During the experiment participants are invited to form risk sharing relations under three institutional environments, each associated with different enforcement mechanisms: external, intrinsic and endogenous extrinsic, i.e., the threat of (partial) social exclusion. Dyads who are similar in age and gender, genetically related, or who belong to the same organizations with an economic purpose are more likely to share risk. However, the latter are associated with less risk sharing when endogenous extrinsic incentives can be applied, while co-membership in religious congregations and being related by marriage support enforcement through such incentives. We find no evidence of assortative grouping on risk preferences but, ex post, co-groups members' risk-taking behavior converges. Show less
We investigate whether the set of available enforcement mechanisms affects the formation of risk sharing relations by applying dyadic regression analysis to data from a specifically designed... Show moreWe investigate whether the set of available enforcement mechanisms affects the formation of risk sharing relations by applying dyadic regression analysis to data from a specifically designed behavioural experiment, two surveys and a genealogical mapping exercise. During the experiment participants are invited to form risk sharing relations under three institutional environments, each associated with different enforcement mechanisms: external, intrinsic and endogenous extrinsic, i.e., the threat of (partial) social exclusion. Dyads who are similar in age and gender, genetically related, or who belong to the same organizations with an economic purpose are more likely to share risk. However, the latter are associated with less risk sharing when endogenous extrinsic incentives can be applied, while co-membership in religious congregations and being related by marriage support enforcement through such incentives. We find no evidence of assortative grouping on risk preferences but, ex post, co-groups members' risk-taking behavior converges. Show less
