The Protocol on Ireland/Northern has the questionable honour of having its dispute settlement mechanisms being activated first under the new post-Brexit agreements between the EU and UK. This... Show moreThe Protocol on Ireland/Northern has the questionable honour of having its dispute settlement mechanisms being activated first under the new post-Brexit agreements between the EU and UK. This chapter highlights the two main hallmarks of the Protocol: on the one hand, being an integral part of the Withdrawal Agreement and the post-Brexit legal framework more broadly, and, on the other, being one of the last and most enduring holdouts of EU institutions applying EU law in a part of the UK. These characteristics, coupled with the high political stakes in the context of North-South relations in Ireland and the peace process, merit close scrutiny of the Protocol’s governance and dispute settlement provisions. Based on an analysis of the relevant provisions and informed by leading theories on compliance in international law, this chapter argues that due to fundamentally different views and strategies of the EU institutions and the UK government, the design and use of the Protocol’s mechanisms have the potential to exacerbate rather than mend EU-UK relations. Show less
Summary: Global media discussion and policy responses to the armed conflict in Tigray Region, Ethiopia, that started op 4 November 2020 by the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front) party-led... Show moreSummary: Global media discussion and policy responses to the armed conflict in Tigray Region, Ethiopia, that started op 4 November 2020 by the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front) party-led Tigray Regional government, are marked by bias, incompleteness, lack of context understanding, credulity and an anti-federal goverment attitude. The conflict, provoked by an unannounced and treacherous nightly attack by TPLF forces on federal army troups stationed in Tigray to protect the Region, was the result of misplaced power-mongering by the TPLF, and its building up of tension with the federal Ethiopian goverment. The 4 November attack led to a major federal army response. Five days after the attack by TPLF, on 9 November 2021, over 800 Amharic-speaking civilian inhabitants of the town of Mai Kadra in Western Tigray were killed by TPLF-affiliated forces and militias in a gruesome manner – a classic case of ‘ethnic cleansing’. Perpetrators mostly fled to Sudanese refugee camps. These two events - the 4 November attack and the ‘ethnic cleansing’ - were defining dramatic moments in the war. While the conflict unfolded, leading to defeat of the TPLF forces on 28 November 2020 with the taking over of the regional capital Meqele and the flight of the TPLF leadership, many leading Western media and news websites focused on the aftermath and the effects of the fighting in Tigray Region and its population, easily shifting sympathy twards the perceived ‘underdog’ (TPLF). This was followed by hastily written statements by foreign policy makers in EU, USA and UN circles, leading to an emerging policy narrative whereby essential details of the context, the nature of the adversaries, the reasons of the conflict were sidelined. These Atlantic community spokespersons shifted to ‘blaming’ the federal Ethiopian government and ‘demanding’ all kinds of measures from it. Notable was the international community clamouring for ‘unlimited and full access’ for humanitarian aid to ‘prevent famine’, and demand a halt to all hostilities. But meanwhile it did not deliver much aid itself and did as if making it conditional on the federal government following their orders. Part of the international media, several academic associates and researchers who saw acces to their research sites blocked, and diverse TPLF associates in various international organizations continued to fuel the flames of this approach, next to the ‘digital activism’and the production of fake news reports by pro-TPLF persons in Ethiopa and especially in the Tigrayan ‘diaspora’ in the West.All this led to serious misperceptions and unfair bias on the part of the Atlantic countries and the UN vis-à-vis Ethiopia, which endangered integrity, balance, and a proper perspective on causes and consequences, as well as to policies that seemed akin to ‘development aid blackmail’ and sanctimonious lecturing of a fragile, low-income African developing country. In the exercise, the detailed press statements, reports and explanations by Ethiopian parties, including the government and reformist Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, are routinely neglected or doubted. In contrast, the statements and international messages by TPLF remnants and advocates, marked by a high degree of unreliability, exaggeration and very often lacking truth content, are used uncritically. On the basis of a number of telling examples, this paper describes the above process, analyses the emerging Atlantic discourse and some of its mistakes and wrong assumptions. It thereby pleads for a more balanced, critical approach to the incomplete reporting and wilfull misinformation from questionable sources so as to have the media and Atlantic policy makers develop a more responsible approach.Résumé: parti TPLF (Tigray Peoples Liberation Front), sont marquées par des préjugés, des incomplétudes, un manque de compréhension du contexte, la crédulité et une attitude contre le gouvernement fédéral. Le conflit, provoqué par une attaque nocturne inopinée et perfide par les forces tigréennes contre les troupes de l'armée fédérale stationnées au Tigré pour protéger la région, était le résultat d'une politique de la force mal jugée par le TPLF et sa montée des tensions avec le gouvernement fédéral éthiopien. L'attaque du 4 novembre a évoquée à une réponse directe de l'armée fédérale. Cinq jours après l'attaque du TPLF, plus de 800 habitants civils de langue amharique de la ville de Mai Kadra dans le Tigray occidental ont été tués, le 9 novembre 2021, par des forces et des milices affiliées au TPLF d'une manière horrible - un cas classique de «nettoyage ethnique», et les auteurs ont pour la plupart fui vers les camps de réfugiés soudanais. Ces deux événements - l’attaque du 4 novembre et ce «nettoyage ethnique» - étaient des moments dramatiques cruciales de la guerre. Alors que le conflit se déroulait, conduisant à la défaite des forces du TPLF le 28 novembre 2020 avec la prise de contrôle de la capitale régionale Meqele et la fuite des dirigeants du TPL, de nombreux médias et sites Internet occidentaux de premier plan se sont concentrés sur les conséquences et les effets des combats dans la région du Tigray et sa population, la sympathie se déplaçant facilement vers le «perdant» perçu (TPLF). Cela a été suivi par des déclarations écrites à la hâte par des décideurs politiques étrangers aux cercles de l'UE, des États-Unis et de l'ONU, menant à un récit politique émergent dans lequel les détails essentiels du contexte, de la nature des adversaires et des raisons du conflit ont été mis de côté. Ces portes-parole de la communauté atlantique sont passés à toujours «blâmer» le gouvernement fédéral éthiopien et à «exiger» toutes sortes de mesures de sa part. Il convient de noter que la communauté internationale toujours réclamait un «accès illimité et complet pour l’aide humanitaire» pour «prévenir la famine» et exigeait «‘l’arrêt de toutes les hostilités, mais entre-temps, elle n'a pas fourni beaucoup d'aide et semble la conditionner à ce que le gouvernement fédéral suive ses ordres. Une partie de la presse mondiale, plusieurs universitaires qui ont vu l'accès à leurs sites de recherche bloqué, et divers associés du TPLF dans diverses organisations internationales ont continué à alimenter les flammes de cette approche, à côté de «l'activisme digitale» et de la production de «fake news» et rapports douteux de personnes pro-TPLF en Ethiopie et en particulier dans la «diaspora» tigréenne en Occident. Tout cela a conduit à de graves perceptions erronées et à des préjugés injustes de la part des pays atlantiques et de l'ONU vis-à-vis de l'Éthiopie qui ont mis en danger l'intégrité, l'équilibre et une bonne perspective des causes et des conséquences, ainsi qu’a des politiques qui semblent s'apparenter à une approche sur base de «development aid blackmail» et des discours moralisateurs envers un pays africain pauvre et en développement fragile. Dans l'exercice, les déclarations de presse détaillées et les explications de la part de l’Éthiopie, y compris le gouvernement et le Premier Ministre réformiste Abiy Ahmed, sont régulièrement négligés ou mis en doute. En revanche, les déclarations et les messages internationaux des défenseurs du TPLF, marqués par un degré élevé de manque de fiabilité, d'exagération et souvent dépourvus de contenu véridique, sont utilisés sans critique. Sur la base d'un certain nombre d'exemples révélateurs, cet article décrit le processus ci-dessus et analyse le discours atlantique émergent et certaines de ses erreurs et hypothèses erronées. Il plaide ainsi pour une approche plus équilibrée et critique du reportage incomplet et de la désinformation afin que les médias et la politique atlantique développent une politique plus responsable. Show less
This paper offers a political analysis of the development of the TPLF-induced armed conflict in northern Ethiopia and considers the international responses in media and international policy circles... Show moreThis paper offers a political analysis of the development of the TPLF-induced armed conflict in northern Ethiopia and considers the international responses in media and international policy circles. The extension of the conflict by the TPLF after the unilateral ceasefire proclaimed by the federal government on 28 June 2021 (followed by its retreat from Tigray) did not lead to an easing of the fighting. On the contrary, the TPLF used scorched-earth tactics, perpetrated substantial abuse of civilians (mass killings, burning down villages, destroying and looting hospitals, health centres and other economic infrastructure), and created food scarcity, hundreds of thousands of IDPs and hugely aggravated humanitarian problems in the Amhara and Afar regions. In spite of this unilateral TPLF extension of the armed conflict, the responses of international policy circles, notably from the Western ‘donor countries’ and the UN, have been negative towards the federal government and mild on the TPLF.This paper explores aspects of this paradoxical and problematic approach and argues that it will not lead to a political or other solution of the conflict, especially not in view of the undiminished belligerent strategy of the TPLF. The Ethiopian federal government and its leader PM Abiy Ahmed, having been confirmed in power after a relatively successful and credible parliamentary election on 21 June 2021, are pressurized by much of the global media and Western policy makers for the problems in Tigray – including the ‘famine’ declared by TPLF - and urged to negotiate. The TPLF, incorrectly identified with the people of Tigray as a whole, is not held to account. But an overbearing Western approach based on the threat of sanctions (by the US government) and on what often seem ‘neo-imperialist’ demands, as evident from serious interference in the conflict - even by a number of UN individuals (expelled from the country on 30 September 2021) - will not contribute to political negotiations or dialogue, restoration of peace, or rehabilitation of the war-torn regions, neither to stability in Ethiopia. Not only improved media reporting, based on solid local (Ethiopian) information and checking sources, but also a fundamental reset of certain UN and Western donor country policies on Ethiopia, are needed.RésuméCette étude propose une analyse politique du développement du conflit armé induit par les TPLF dans le nord de l'Éthiopie et examine les réponses internationales dans les médias et les cercles politiques internationaux. L'extension du conflit par le TPLF après le cessez-le-feu unilatéral proclamé par le gouvernement fédéral le 28 juin 2021 (suivi de son retrait du Tigré) n'a pas conduit à un apaisement des combats ; au contraire. Les tactiques de la terre brûlée, les abus sérieux contre les civils (meurtres en masse, incendies de villages, pillage et destruction des hôpitaux et autres infrastructures économiques), la pénurie alimentaire, des centaines de milliers de déplacés internes et des problèmes humanitaires extrêmement aggravés dans les régions d'Amhara et d'Afar en ont été le résultat. Malgré cette extension unilatérale du conflit par le TPLF, les réponses des cercles politiques internationaux, notamment des pays « bailleurs-de-fonds » occidentaux et de l'ONU, ont été négatives envers le gouvernement fédéral mais modérées envers le TPLF. Show less
This paper looks into the increased capacities, tasks and competences of Frontex (the European Border and Coast Guard Agency), brought about by the 2016 legislative reform. We examine whether this... Show moreThis paper looks into the increased capacities, tasks and competences of Frontex (the European Border and Coast Guard Agency), brought about by the 2016 legislative reform. We examine whether this development was accompanied by an accountability regime of equal strength. The existing accountability mechanisms are measured against the standards of European Union (EU) primary and secondary law. The paper assesses the political, administrative, professional and social accountability of Frontex, including parliamentary oversight and the newly introduced individual complaints mechanism. The final part of the paper focuses on legal accountability, a strong, yet highly complex, form of accountability. There, we introduce the concept of systemic accountability and investigate possible courses of legal action against Frontex. In sum, Frontex is subject to moderately increased scrutiny under its renewed founding Regulation and to various EU accountability mechanisms of general application. But several procedural and practical hurdles could render legal accountability difficult to achieve in practice. Show less
