Farming as a primary source of income has failed to guarantee sufficient livelihood for most farming households in developing countries, and agricultural development policies have largely produced... Show moreFarming as a primary source of income has failed to guarantee sufficient livelihood for most farming households in developing countries, and agricultural development policies have largely produced little improvement, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Diversification into off-farm activities has become the norm. While the poverty and inequality effects of off-farm income have been analyzed in different developing countries, much less empirical studies have been conducted on the impact of off-farm income on agricultural production and efficiency. Using survey data from rural Nigeria, this article examines the effect of off-farm income on farm output, expenditure on purchased inputs and technical efficiency among farm households. The results indicate that off-farm income has a positive and significant effect on farm output and demand for purchased inputs. Though the result does not establish that off-farm income improves technical efficiency, there is a slight efficiency gains in households with off-farm income. The findings of this study challenge the notion that participation in off-farm activities may lead to a decline in own-farm agricultural production, due to competition for family labour between farm and off-farm works. Rather, they tend to suggest that there are indeed elements of complementarities and positive spill-over effects between the farm and off-farm sectors of rural the economy. Removing credit market imperfections and upgrading rural infrastructure could enhance the development of both sectors simultaneously. Show less
Even if 'good governance' goals have dominated public policy in postcolonial polities in the last decades, their politics and public administration often continue to be marked by authoritarianism,... Show moreEven if 'good governance' goals have dominated public policy in postcolonial polities in the last decades, their politics and public administration often continue to be marked by authoritarianism, nepotism and corruption - the very practices good governance policy was to eradicate. In this article, we try to account for this apparent intractability of 'poor' and, occasionally, outright 'bad' governance. First, we argue that what appears as 'bad' governance to those embracing conventional, essentially Weberian, 'good governance' conceptions, may in fact be 'good' governance after all. Practices of political clientelism or patronage may reflect and accord with widely shared cultural beliefs about good and legitimate governance. Second, we show that the predominance of personalism and unofficial relationships that characterizes political clientelism may combine with modern bureaucracy in ways that drastically subvert the type of 'good governance' embodied by traditional moral economies of patronage. We dissect the logics of neopatrimonialism, a type of regime in which ruling elites use the state for personal enrichment and profit from a public administration that is patently unstable, inefficient, nontransparent and that fails to distribute public resources to large segments of the population. Third, we argue that the pragmatic survival strategies to which 'ordinary' citizens resort in response to such neopatrimonial neglect often, and ironically, entail the direct engagement with - rather than an outright distancing from -neopatrimonial politics. Show less
