There has been a state of near-permanent revolt in Somali society since 1991. This chapter offers a cultural analysis of patterns of political and military activity from the precolonial era... Show moreThere has been a state of near-permanent revolt in Somali society since 1991. This chapter offers a cultural analysis of patterns of political and military activity from the precolonial era through the Italian and British colonial period, and State independence (1960-1991), to the present period of Statelessness. The focus is on a comparison of elements in the campaigns of revolt against the colonial States between 1900 and 1920 with those in the late Siyad Barre period (1988-1991) and the era of Statelessness (1991 onwards). A transformation of ideas of revolt and violent action has occurred in which Somali notions of egalitarian social order, kinship and local leadership have taken on a different shape. This prevented the institutionalization of crosscutting alliances and the emergence of a wider political arena - except in certain regions such as Somaliland and Puntland. The cultural and social unity of Somali society has always been overestimated. Somali political culture is by nature centrifugal, preventing the institutionalization of a legitimate leadership at State level but not at a regional clan level. Notes, ref., sum. [Book abstract] Show less
One of the least-studied revolts in postcolonial Africa, the invasion of Niger in 1964 by guerrillas of the outlawed Sawaba party, was a dismal failure and culminated in a failed attempt on the... Show moreOne of the least-studied revolts in postcolonial Africa, the invasion of Niger in 1964 by guerrillas of the outlawed Sawaba party, was a dismal failure and culminated in a failed attempt on the life of President Diori in the spring of 1965. Personal aspirations for higher education, access to jobs and social advancement, probably constituted the driving force of Sawaba's rank and file. Lured by the party leader, Djibo Bakary, with promises of scholarships abroad, they went to the far corners of the world, for what turned out to be guerrilla training. The leadership's motivations were grounded in a personal desire for political power, justified by a cocktail of militant nationalism, Marxism-Leninism and Maoist beliefs. Sawaba, however, failed to grasp the weakness of its domestic support base. The mystifying dimensions of revolutionary ideologies may have encouraged Djibo to ignore the facts on the ground and order his foot soldiers to march to their deaths. Notes, ref., sum. [Book abstract] Show less
One of the least-studied revolts in postcolonial Africa, the invasion of Niger in 1964 by guerrillas of the outlawed Sawaba party, was a dismal failure and culminated in a failed attempt on the... Show moreOne of the least-studied revolts in postcolonial Africa, the invasion of Niger in 1964 by guerrillas of the outlawed Sawaba party, was a dismal failure and culminated in a failed attempt on the life of President Diori in the spring of 1965. Personal aspirations for higher education, access to jobs and social advancement, probably constituted the driving force of Sawaba's rank and file. Lured by the party leader, Djibo Bakary, with promises of scholarships abroad, they went to the far corners of the world, for what turned out to be guerrilla training. The leadership's motivations were grounded in a personal desire for political power, justified by a cocktail of militant nationalism, Marxism-Leninism and Maoist beliefs. Sawaba, however, failed to grasp the weakness of its domestic support base. The mystifying dimensions of revolutionary ideologies may have encouraged Djibo to ignore the facts on the ground and order his foot soldiers to march to their deaths. Includes bibliographical references, notes, and summary. Show less
Between 1831 and 1872, the Dutch government recruited 3,000 Africans from the Gold Coast and Ashanti (Ghana) for service in the colonial army in the Netherlands East Indies. The majority of them... Show moreBetween 1831 and 1872, the Dutch government recruited 3,000 Africans from the Gold Coast and Ashanti (Ghana) for service in the colonial army in the Netherlands East Indies. The majority of them were ex-slaves but were promised that their conditions of service would be the same as those of Europeans. With the 'equal treatment' clause, the Dutch government defended itself against British accusations that the recruitment operation amounted to a covert form of slave trading. While this policy made sense in the context of the precolonial relations prevailing in the Gold Coast, its merits were less obvious in the East Indies. The colonial army here was the instrument of empire building but mutinies among African troops stationed on Java and Sumatra caused it to rethink its policy concerning African soldiers. This chapter explores the background to these rebellions. Ref., sum. [Book abstract] Show less
African history of the Sahel and Sudan zone appears to have been marked by political instability. Resistance to Fulbe empires was more common than the main literature suggests. The Fulbe are... Show moreAfrican history of the Sahel and Sudan zone appears to have been marked by political instability. Resistance to Fulbe empires was more common than the main literature suggests. The Fulbe are pastoralists and the empires of nomadic pastoralists are inherently unstable. The Fulbe emirates are often described as having been born out of the revolts of religiously inspired nomadic pastoralists against oppressive sedentary regimes. However, the resistance movements against Fulbe hegemony itself can partly be explained as revolts of the originally nomadic population who felt their cause was not well defended by the elite of these emirates. Opposition to the ideology of Islam inspired revolts of non-Islamic groups. These resistance movements were also fed by the oppressive nature of the new emirates, whose most prominent characteristic was slavery. Resistance is expressed in contemporary ritual and oral traditions, challenging the official historiography of these emirates. Three examples are taken in this chapter to illustrate resistance against Fulbe hegemony: the Timbo Emirate in the Fuuta Jallon, the Diina Emirate in central Mali and the Futanke Emirate which followed Diina in the second half of the 19th century. Notes, ref., sum. [Book abstract] Show less
