In this paper I first set out the role of common notions in the structure of Alexander’s argument in Mixt. V–VI. Furthermore, I argue that a series of topics discussed in Mixt. V–VI, Mant. XIV and... Show moreIn this paper I first set out the role of common notions in the structure of Alexander’s argument in Mixt. V–VI. Furthermore, I argue that a series of topics discussed in Mixt. V–VI, Mant. XIV and Quaest. II.12 concern the initial stages of Stoic as well as Peripatetic blending rather than the resulting blend. The presence of certain types of (filled) pores and changes in density both facilitate mutual division; mutual divi- sion and coextension go hand in hand until a degree of juxtaposition of ingredients is reached which easily allows for the specific interaction that creates the final blend: interaction of qualities for the Peripatetics, tensional dynamics for the Stoics. In addition, I show that a list of stock examples used by Alexander also raises serious questions concerning changes in density and volume, which Aristotle, Alexander and the Stoics had to deal with. I suggest that the role of pores found in Meteorology IV may have been part of the solution for some of Alexander’s contemporaries. Throughout the arguments in the chapters V–VI, indeed throughout the De mixtione, Alexander consistently tries to replace a comprehensive materialist metaphysics of interacting bodies by his own equally comprehensive brand of hylomorphism—even if not every argument is equally convincing. Show less
In this chapter, I have attempted to reconstruct part of the debate on hylomorph- ism in which Alexander of Aphrodisias participated, insofar as it emerges from Alexander’s Quaestiones and Mantissa... Show moreIn this chapter, I have attempted to reconstruct part of the debate on hylomorph- ism in which Alexander of Aphrodisias participated, insofar as it emerges from Alexander’s Quaestiones and Mantissa 5. The debate addresses Physics I-IL1 and the distinctions in the Categories that Aristotle used in that context. Alexander takes away from the debate that he needs to situate his discussion of the relation between soul and body into a general theory of hylomorphism in which form and matter need each other, both for their existence and their definition. It also needs argument that soul is the form and actuality of the body so as to apply the general theory to this paradigm case, and to further apply hylomorphism to the levels and powers of soul. The story culminates in the application of hylomorphism to the development of dispositional intellect, in which Alexander combines Phys. VII.3, De An. II.5, and APo 11.19 with the view of form as completion (teleiotes). The intellect of accomplished knowers comes out as the sum total of knowable things, This is the pinnacle of hylomorphism as a physical, metaphysical, and epistemo- logical theory. As such it is also a perfect example of how Alexander innovatives by connecting Aristotelian dots in unprecedented ways. Show less
In ancient Greek philosophy the concept of ataraxia (“absence of disturbance,” “freedom from anxiety,” “tranquility”) rapidly gained importance in the third century BCE during and after the... Show moreIn ancient Greek philosophy the concept of ataraxia (“absence of disturbance,” “freedom from anxiety,” “tranquility”) rapidly gained importance in the third century BCE during and after the conquests of Alexander the Great († 321 BCE). In this period most of the so-called Hellenistic philosophers—the Epicureans, Stoics, Academic skeptics, and Pyrrhonists—related tranquility to their concept of happiness as a fulfilled life. In this chapter I briefly discuss views of ataraxia in the work of Epicurus, the Stoics Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, and the Academic skeptic Cicero. I then give more space to the role of ataraxia in the Pyrrhonism defended by Sextus Empiricus because it presents us with an attitude to life that may appear particularly helpful to us in the twenty-first century. Show less
Since Antiquity, “active cognition” has been a problematic notion in Aristotelian scholarship. Part of the problem is the definition of what counts as “active”. In the first part of this paper I... Show moreSince Antiquity, “active cognition” has been a problematic notion in Aristotelian scholarship. Part of the problem is the definition of what counts as “active”. In the first part of this paper I shall offer a short survey on various contenders for “active” perceptual cognition defended in recent interpretations of Aristotle, by way of introduction to the more complicated problems of “active” intellectual cognition. In the second part of the paper I will offer—in outline—my interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of intellectual cognition, which takes the most recent findings in the area of perceptual cognition as a starting point. Here I pursue the analogy that Aristotle sets up between perception and intellection throughout the De anima. In the third part of the paper I shall examine a number of influential accounts of active intellectual cognition found in the corpus of Alexander of Aphrodisias, in particular Mantissa 2–5 (also known as De intellectu). These accounts each develop the analogies offered in Aristotle’s De anima III.5 in their own way. Show less
The chapter provides an novel analysis of the four types of intellect that Themistius finds in Aristotle's De anima III.4-5. It is shown that the relations between these intellects and their... Show moreThe chapter provides an novel analysis of the four types of intellect that Themistius finds in Aristotle's De anima III.4-5. It is shown that the relations between these intellects and their respective substrates are governed by four general principles derived from Aristotle's Physics and Metaphysics. Together they allow Themistius to establish a coherent account of human beings as rational individuals who share in divine knowledge, while being unified compounds of soul and body. Show less
The distinction between potentiality and actuality in Aristotle has its origin in Platonic ethics. In his psychological and ethical works Aristotle’s notion of potentiality is embedded in a causal... Show moreThe distinction between potentiality and actuality in Aristotle has its origin in Platonic ethics. In his psychological and ethical works Aristotle’s notion of potentiality is embedded in a causal framework that is characteristic of life in general. A key theme is the distinction of various meanings of ‘to know’. In his early work the possession of knowledge is distinguished from its use. In De anima Aristotle adds the potentiality for acquiring knowledge as characteristic of the genus human being. He argues that the stages of actualization of knowledge are instances of a more comprehensive biological and ethical development. Life is the fulfillment of soul as formal, efficient and final cause, with the potentiality of body as material cause. The unity of body and soul is derived from the causal nexus of potentiality and actuality, like a power and the instrument in which it resides. In such cases potentiality is complex and depends on numerous conditions. Failure of full realization may occur when any of the necessary conditions of the development and realization of the fulfillment of human life are lacking, whether in the environment (e.g. climate), the body (illness, drunkenness), or the soul (natural virtue, firm character, attention). Show less
![Context and strategy of Plotinus treatise on the genera of being (Enn. VI.1-3 [42-44])](/sites/all/themes/scholarly/img/closed_access.png?solr_nav%5Bid%5D=f693b37a90868bc57ccc&solr_nav%5Bpage%5D=0&solr_nav%5Boffset%5D=8)
