In this paper I first set out the role of common notions in the structure of Alexander’s argument in Mixt. V–VI. Furthermore, I argue that a series of topics discussed in Mixt. V–VI, Mant. XIV and... Show moreIn this paper I first set out the role of common notions in the structure of Alexander’s argument in Mixt. V–VI. Furthermore, I argue that a series of topics discussed in Mixt. V–VI, Mant. XIV and Quaest. II.12 concern the initial stages of Stoic as well as Peripatetic blending rather than the resulting blend. The presence of certain types of (filled) pores and changes in density both facilitate mutual division; mutual divi- sion and coextension go hand in hand until a degree of juxtaposition of ingredients is reached which easily allows for the specific interaction that creates the final blend: interaction of qualities for the Peripatetics, tensional dynamics for the Stoics. In addition, I show that a list of stock examples used by Alexander also raises serious questions concerning changes in density and volume, which Aristotle, Alexander and the Stoics had to deal with. I suggest that the role of pores found in Meteorology IV may have been part of the solution for some of Alexander’s contemporaries. Throughout the arguments in the chapters V–VI, indeed throughout the De mixtione, Alexander consistently tries to replace a comprehensive materialist metaphysics of interacting bodies by his own equally comprehensive brand of hylomorphism—even if not every argument is equally convincing. Show less
In this chapter, I have attempted to reconstruct part of the debate on hylomorph- ism in which Alexander of Aphrodisias participated, insofar as it emerges from Alexander’s Quaestiones and Mantissa... Show moreIn this chapter, I have attempted to reconstruct part of the debate on hylomorph- ism in which Alexander of Aphrodisias participated, insofar as it emerges from Alexander’s Quaestiones and Mantissa 5. The debate addresses Physics I-IL1 and the distinctions in the Categories that Aristotle used in that context. Alexander takes away from the debate that he needs to situate his discussion of the relation between soul and body into a general theory of hylomorphism in which form and matter need each other, both for their existence and their definition. It also needs argument that soul is the form and actuality of the body so as to apply the general theory to this paradigm case, and to further apply hylomorphism to the levels and powers of soul. The story culminates in the application of hylomorphism to the development of dispositional intellect, in which Alexander combines Phys. VII.3, De An. II.5, and APo 11.19 with the view of form as completion (teleiotes). The intellect of accomplished knowers comes out as the sum total of knowable things, This is the pinnacle of hylomorphism as a physical, metaphysical, and epistemo- logical theory. As such it is also a perfect example of how Alexander innovatives by connecting Aristotelian dots in unprecedented ways. Show less
In ancient Greek philosophy the concept of ataraxia (“absence of disturbance,” “freedom from anxiety,” “tranquility”) rapidly gained importance in the third century BCE during and after the... Show moreIn ancient Greek philosophy the concept of ataraxia (“absence of disturbance,” “freedom from anxiety,” “tranquility”) rapidly gained importance in the third century BCE during and after the conquests of Alexander the Great († 321 BCE). In this period most of the so-called Hellenistic philosophers—the Epicureans, Stoics, Academic skeptics, and Pyrrhonists—related tranquility to their concept of happiness as a fulfilled life. In this chapter I briefly discuss views of ataraxia in the work of Epicurus, the Stoics Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, and the Academic skeptic Cicero. I then give more space to the role of ataraxia in the Pyrrhonism defended by Sextus Empiricus because it presents us with an attitude to life that may appear particularly helpful to us in the twenty-first century. Show less
This chapter asks what role limitarianism can play in theorizing justice between generations. Do intergenerational challenges give us additional reasons to embrace limitarianism? Taking economic... Show moreThis chapter asks what role limitarianism can play in theorizing justice between generations. Do intergenerational challenges give us additional reasons to embrace limitarianism? Taking economic limitarianism as a starting point, I argue that both the democratic argument and the argument from basic needs have considerable intergenerational traction, but the latter raises difficult questions for limitarians. I also argue that economic limitarianism cannot offer a full account of intergenerational justice, due to its focus on individual and monetary holdings. We could design a more comprehensive limitarianism in response to these worries, but only at the cost of the appeal and distinctiveness of limitarianism. The last section somewhat speculatively develops a Rawls-inspired account of intergenerational limitarianism which stays true to the focus on monetary wealth, but with clear environmental implications. Show less
This chapter provides an overview of the kind of questions one has to answer to take position on the question of who owes what to future generations in the context of climate change and discusses... Show moreThis chapter provides an overview of the kind of questions one has to answer to take position on the question of who owes what to future generations in the context of climate change and discusses several possible answers as well as their upsides and downsides. It first asks whether we have duties of justice to future at all, raising several challenges to the idea of including future generations under the scope of justice. Second, it asks how much we owe to future people: equality, sufficiency, or just basic human rights. Even if there are theoretical reasons to embrace a more demanding account, there may be political or feasibility reasons to endorse a less demanding view. The third question is what we owe to future people: what kind of world, with what kind of goods and opportunities, do we owe to future people? Before concluding, the chapter discusses the distribution of duties to future people among contemporaries, the idea that we might have to limit the amount of future people, and possible institutional responses to challenges of intergenerational justice. Show less
We gedragen ons soms alsof we maar zeer beperkte morele verplichtingen hebben jegens mensen buiten onze landsgrenzen. Tegelijkertijd maken we ons zorgen over klimaatverandering en toekomstige...Show moreWe gedragen ons soms alsof we maar zeer beperkte morele verplichtingen hebben jegens mensen buiten onze landsgrenzen. Tegelijkertijd maken we ons zorgen over klimaatverandering en toekomstige generaties, misschien in het bijzonder de toekomstige inwoners van ons eigen land. Maar valt die relatieve onverschilligheid ten aanzien van wat elders gebeurt wel te rijmen met het belang dat we hechten aan het welzijn van toekomstige mensen? Onze banden met mensen die nu elders in de wereld leven, zijn immers substantieler en daarom misschien van groter ethisch gewicht dan onze relatie met niet-bestaande toekomstige personen.Show less
