From its academic beginnings the theory of human action control has distinguished between endogenously driven, intentional action and exogenously driven, habitual, or automatic action. We challenge... Show moreFrom its academic beginnings the theory of human action control has distinguished between endogenously driven, intentional action and exogenously driven, habitual, or automatic action. We challenge this dual-route model and argue that attempts to provide clear-cut and straightforward criteria to distinguish between intentional and automatic action have systematically failed. Specifically, we show that there is no evidence for intention-independent action, and that attempts to use the criterion of reward sensitivity and rationality to differentiate between intentional and automatic action are conceptually unsound. As a more parsimonious, and more feasible, alternative we suggest a unitary approach to action control, according to which actions are (i) represented by codes of their perceptual effects, (ii) selected by matching intention-sensitive selection criteria, and (ii) moderated by metacontrol states. Show less
Hommel, B.; Moors, A.; Sander, D.; Deonna, J. 2017
According to ideomotor theory, goal-directed action involves the active perceptual anticipation of actions and their associated effects. We used multivariate analysis of fMRI data to test if... Show moreAccording to ideomotor theory, goal-directed action involves the active perceptual anticipation of actions and their associated effects. We used multivariate analysis of fMRI data to test if preparation of an action promotes precision in the perceptual representation of the action. In addition, we tested how reward magnitude modulates this effect. Finally, we examined how expectation and uncertainty impact neural precision in the motor cortex. In line with our predictions, preparation of a hand or face action increased the precision of neural activation patterns in the extrastriate body area (EBA) and fusiform face area (FFA), respectively. The size of this effect of anticipation predicted individuals' efficiency at performing the prepared action. In addition, increasing reward magnitude increased the precision of perceptual representations in both EBA and FFA although this effect was limited to the group of participants that learned to associate face actions with high reward. Surprisingly, examination of representations in the hand motor cortex and face motor cortex yielded effects in the opposite direction. Our findings demonstrate that the precision of representations in visual and motor areas provides an important neural signature of the sensorimotor representations involved in goal-directed action. Show less
Camus, T.; Hommel, B.; Brunel, L.; Brouillet, T. 2017
A central issue in the study of joint task performance has been one of whether co-acting individuals perform their partner’s part of the task as if it were their own. The present study addressed... Show moreA central issue in the study of joint task performance has been one of whether co-acting individuals perform their partner’s part of the task as if it were their own. The present study addressed this issue by using joint task switching. A pair of actors shared two tasks that were presented in a random order, whereby the relevant task and actor were cued on each trial. Responses produced action effects that were either shared or separate between co-actors. When co-actors produced separate action effects, switch costs were obtained within the same actor (i.e., when the same actor performed consecutive trials) but not between co-actors (when different actors performed consecutive trials), implying that actors did not perform their co-actor’s part. When the same action effects were shared between co-actors, however, switch costs were also obtained between co-actors, implying that actors did perform their co-actor’s part. The results indicated that shared action effects induce task-set sharing between co-acting individuals. Show less
Colzato, L.; Sellaro, R.; Barone, H.W.; Hommel, B. 2017
Humans often face binary cognitive-control dilemmas, with the choice between persistence and flexibility being a crucial one. Tackling these dilemmas requires metacontrol, i.e., the control of the... Show moreHumans often face binary cognitive-control dilemmas, with the choice between persistence and flexibility being a crucial one. Tackling these dilemmas requires metacontrol, i.e., the control of the current cognitive-control policy. As predicted from functional, psychometric, neuroscientific, and modeling approaches, interindividual variability in metacontrol biases towards persistence or flexibility could be demonstrated in metacontrol-sensitive tasks. These biases covary systematically with genetic predispositions regarding mesofrontal and nigrostriatal dopaminergic functioning and the individualistic or collectivistic nature of the cultural background. However, there is also evidence for mood- and meditation-induced intraindividual variability (with negative mood and focused-attention meditation being associated with a bias towards persistence, and positive mood and open-monitoring meditation being associated with a bias towards flexibility), suggesting that genetic and cultural factors do not determine metacontrol settings entirely. We suggest a theoretical framework that explains how genetic predisposition and cultural learning can lead to the implementation of metacontrol defaults, which however can be shifted towards persistence or flexibility by situational factors. Show less
