The Art of War (or Sun Tzu) abounds with practical strategic and tactical advice which, while intended for use in warfare, can be applied to almost any professional or personal crisis or conflict.... Show moreThe Art of War (or Sun Tzu) abounds with practical strategic and tactical advice which, while intended for use in warfare, can be applied to almost any professional or personal crisis or conflict. In recent decades this ancient Chinese military classic has been adapted for a variety of non-military purposes in fields as diverse as trade, law, sports, and love. Intrigued by the text’s seemingly limitless applicability, this article analyzes when, where, why, and how present-day adapters applied the ancient military text to modern non-military issues. The article also reflects on the value of Art of War adaptations, especially vis-à-vis translations, as it highlights the diverse ways in which an age-old Chinese text is made relevant to modern readers worldwide. Show less
At the time of the first missed opportunity under Gorbachev in 1986-88, the Cold War rigidity in relations still deeply affected how Japan and the Soviet Union dealt with one another. The relations... Show moreAt the time of the first missed opportunity under Gorbachev in 1986-88, the Cold War rigidity in relations still deeply affected how Japan and the Soviet Union dealt with one another. The relations may been manipulated by Russian political forces not desiring an improvement, but there was corresponding structural weakness on the Japanese side as well. At the second missed opportunity under Gorbachev in 1989, some structural rigidity on the part of Japanese policy makers hampered faster development of the relationship. At the time, the author felt that he made the right decision, but retrospectively he questions whether, had he or the Japanese leadership been more emancipated from Cold War thinking, they might not have been able to produce a different outcome: a more content-rich Gorbachev visit earlier 1991. Concerning the third missed opportunity under Yeltsin in 1992, the author, who did not take part in it, contends very seriously that there was a failure in policy choices on the Japanese side, and that policy makers did not fulfill their responsibility at that point. There is no evidence that other policy makers learned from the experience under Gorbachev and tried to adopt a more realistic policy for Japan to achieve its goal. At the fourth missed opportunity under Yeltsin in 1997-98, the Japanese side learned lessons from past mistakes and did not hesitate to propose a courageous proposal to break the impasse. President Yeltsin was impressed by this proposal, but the Russian side as a whole did not accept it as a basis for negotiations. Nevertheless, recognition on both sides of the need for some mutual concession soared in those years. Before the fifth missed opportunity, awareness of past failures was very much at the forefront of the author__s mind. The negotiations with President Putin began, and the author very consciously tried to fulfill the responsibility of grasping the opportunity as it opened out in front of him in 2000-01. The negotiations proceeded unexpectedly fast and effectively, and then were suddenly crushed because of Japan__s domestic issue. The author did not expect the fifth window of opportunity to close in this way. Individual responsibility was fulfilled in negotiating with the Russians, but it failed to overcome domestic constraint. Show less
