The Ethiopian-Eritrean 'border war' of 1998-2000 was about much more than a stretch of relatively useless borderland, but in the subsequent negotiations this issue has come to dominate the agenda.... Show moreThe Ethiopian-Eritrean 'border war' of 1998-2000 was about much more than a stretch of relatively useless borderland, but in the subsequent negotiations this issue has come to dominate the agenda. The focus of the controversy is the village of Badme. Despite the border decision prepared by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC) under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in 2002, no one knew for sure which country had been accorded Badme until the EEBC issued a statement on 21 March 2003, declaring that the place would be in Eritrea. However, with this statement the case is not yet closed. Ethiopia remains unconvinced and has called for a 'proper' interpretation of the issue in the spirit of the December 2000 Algiers agreement. This article discusses the background to the conflict and explains why Badme has become such a highly symbolic prize. Bibliogr., notes, ref. [ASC Leiden abstract] Show less
Accounts of South Africa's transition from apartheid differ markedly in the role they attribute to violence. The most influential narratives of negotiations tend to portray the violence of the... Show moreAccounts of South Africa's transition from apartheid differ markedly in the role they attribute to violence. The most influential narratives of negotiations tend to portray the violence of the transition period, including that perpetrated by those networks within and without the security forces which have become known collectively as the Third Force, as a reaction to events, doomed to failure and rather disconnected from the main narrative of history. Newly available evidence shows the degree to which the Third Force was integrated into the policy of the National Party (NP) over a long period (from the 1960s onwards), and played a crucial role in determining the nature and outcome of constitutional negotiations in the period 1990-1994. Concentration on the narrative of negotiations, or any account which fails to give due weight to the perpetrators of organized violence including those who constituted the Third Force, implicitly assigns the violence of 1990-1994 to a position somewhat divorced from, or even antithetical to, the pursuit of negotiations. This has deflected attention from the important question of ascertaining the extent to which the agenda and pace of negotiations, and thus the shape of the eventual political and constitutional outcome, were actually driven by proponents of violence who were able to make their influence felt from outside the conference chamber. Ref., sum Show less
