This article analyses the United Kingdom’s (UK) ‘trade continuity programme’. The promise that, once outside the European Union (EU), the UK would strike new, lucrative trade deals continues to be... Show moreThis article analyses the United Kingdom’s (UK) ‘trade continuity programme’. The promise that, once outside the European Union (EU), the UK would strike new, lucrative trade deals continues to be an important part of the Brexiteers’ narrative. What the UK was compelled to do first, however, was to conclude ‘roll-over’ agreements to replace the trade agreements already made by the EU. This article posits that, contrary to expectations, the UK’s continuity programme should be regarded as a success – for both the UK and the EU. In most cases, the UK managed to replicate to a very large extent the terms originally granted to the EU, despite being a smaller market and despite challenging circumstances. From the EU’s perspective, the UK’s continuity programme can be regarded as a case of successful norm internalization and export. This first chapter of post-Brexit UK trade policy shows that even a country that has left the EU still legally commits itself and its partners to the EU’s norms and values. Hence, the EU should welcome the UK’s imitation as a shared normative basis to expand cooperation with its former member state in a challenging geopolitical environment. Show less
The United Kingdom has left the European Union. While both sides continue to shape their future relationship, Brexit also reveals a distinctly global dimension. The UK government is negotiating ... Show moreThe United Kingdom has left the European Union. While both sides continue to shape their future relationship, Brexit also reveals a distinctly global dimension. The UK government is negotiating “continuity agreements” with countries around the world to replace agreements concluded by the EU, while also aiming to strike new agreements where the EU has failed to do so thus far. At the same time, the EU as a global treaty-maker is not standing still either. This setting provides a fertile ground for a comparative analysis of the performance of both the UK and EU as international treaty negotiators, especially in the area of trade. This chapter argues that such a comparison serves as an unprecedented opportunity for testing some of the core assumptions of both Eurosceptics and proponents of European integration. The assumptions can be grouped under two opposing narratives designated here as “Global Britain” and “Market Power Europe”, respectively. While the former suggests that the UK will be better off “unshackled” from the EU by becoming a more agile and effective international actor, the latter argues that the benefits of being able to rely on the collective economic power of the EU outweigh the costs of heterogeneity of interests and more burdensome decision-making. Comparing the ability of both the EU and UK to conclude trade agreements with partners around the world, and comparing the respective terms accorded to them, will enable researchers to provide insights into the costs and benefits of “non-Europe” on the international stage. However, in order to produce meaningful findings, numerical, normative, relative and cumulative methodological challenges will have to be overcome. Therefore, a new interdisciplinary approach is required that combines rigorous legal analysis with empirical-legal, qualitative, and economic methods to answer a fundamental question: was striking out on its own in the world “worth it” for the first country that left the EU? Show less