While Germany’s response to the Russo-Ukrainian war continues to be intensely scrutinised, with much attention focusing on the Zeitenwende debate and Berlin’s reluctance to pull its weight in NATO,... Show moreWhile Germany’s response to the Russo-Ukrainian war continues to be intensely scrutinised, with much attention focusing on the Zeitenwende debate and Berlin’s reluctance to pull its weight in NATO, we know little about how Germany anticipated the outbreak of war. The picture that has emerged is one of significant surprise among German policymakers when Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Germany’s foreign intelligence service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND) has been criticised for failing to issue strong warnings, whereas BND officials have argued that their warnings went unheeded. This article contributes to discussions of what intelligence producers and policymakers could have been expected to know by exploring how selected external experts in Germany warned about a Russian attack on Ukraine. By reconstructing open expert assessments of the emerging crisis between 1 November 2021 and 23 February 2022, this article finds that researchers in German think tanks and academia provided a steady flow of timely, accurate and convincing warnings. The findings suggest that external experts are especially well positioned to uncover structural vulnerabilities that threatening actors can exploit, discuss politically inconvenient trends, and offer actionable warnings. This adds to discussions of how external expertise can support intelligence production and crisis decision-making. Show less
How do countries’ strategic narratives (SNs) evolve during conflicts? Are changes in sentiment in diplomatic communication related to kinetic developments? This paper assesses Russian rhetoric... Show moreHow do countries’ strategic narratives (SNs) evolve during conflicts? Are changes in sentiment in diplomatic communication related to kinetic developments? This paper assesses Russian rhetoric toward Ukraine from 2004 to 2019 by qualitatively and quantitively analyzing nearly 3,000 statements by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During this time, Russian identity narratives changed from projecting an identity of a good neighbor and hegemon to an enemy of the Ukrainian regime—while portrayals of Ukraine evolved from that of a strategic partner to a violator of international law and aggressor. Changes in sentiment either follow policy changes, pinpoint important kinetic developments, or indicate political openings. Show less
The Russia-Ukraine war is a multifaceted beast. It ranges from fighting on the ground to high diplomacy, from domestic anti-war protests to international weapon supplies, from justification through... Show moreThe Russia-Ukraine war is a multifaceted beast. It ranges from fighting on the ground to high diplomacy, from domestic anti-war protests to international weapon supplies, from justification through sham referenda to coercion via economic sabotage, and from operational misdirection to covering up war crimes. There are close connections between these facets: the collapse of a front leads to the discovery of mass graves; the delivery of weapon systems depends on Zelensky’s appeal to the international community; sham referenda followed by annexation enable accusations of unwillingly mobilized soldiers who refuse to defend the motherland. The volume sheds light on the Russia-Ukraine war, exploring this multitude of facets and their interconnections. Bringing together the expertise of our colleagues at the Netherlands Defense Academy (NLDA) allows us to adopt a distinctively interdisciplinary approach, offering uniquely comprehensive and timely reflections on this armed conflict. The 27 chapters in this volume are centered around five themes. The first section covers historical and contemporary narratives, intelligence, digital technologies, and communication strategies. The second provides in depth analyses of the operational aspects of the war, including warfighting on land, at sea, in the air, as well as in the space and cyber domains. The third section on international involvement covers topics such as sanctions, burden sharing, arms support and implications of the war on international institutions and the world order. The fourth provides analyses of the normative framework that applies to the Russia-Ukraine war. Finally, the fifth section deals with the way armed forces can transform their organizations and learn from this war, and concludes with questions on how and when the Russia-Ukriane war might end. Show less
In response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Group of Seven (G7) countries and the European Union (EU) adopted a variety of financial sanctions, including the freezing of foreign... Show moreIn response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Group of Seven (G7) countries and the European Union (EU) adopted a variety of financial sanctions, including the freezing of foreign reserve assets of the Central Bank of Russia held by other central banks. Drawing on a Principal-Agent framework and on speeches, newspaper articles and interviews with policy-makers, this study examines what it means for the ECB and the central banks of the Eurosystem to be involved in these sanctions. As a consequence of these actions, these central banks have been enlisted in monetary and financial warfare. Moreover, the three-fold objective of the ECB has de facto effectively been reweighted somewhat, as the focus on ‘price stability’ (primary objective) has become seemingly tem- porarily less prominent. Instead, the secondary and tertiary objectives have moved centre-stage, favouring geopolitical considerations. Show less
Intelligence is generally collected and used in secret to inform internal audiences. Before and after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, the UK and US governments have deployed intelligence... Show moreIntelligence is generally collected and used in secret to inform internal audiences. Before and after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, the UK and US governments have deployed intelligence extensively to influence external audiences, both publicly and privately, regarding Russian intentions, capabilities and practices, and the consequences of Russian actions. While the scale, manner and initially pre-emptive nature of these disclosures represent a significant evolutionary step in how liberal-democratic governments use their intelligence assets, current practice has built upon historical precedents. This article examines why states choose to use intelligence – including fabricated intelligence – for influencing external audiences; the different methods they deploy for doing so; the gains and costs of publicising intelligence; and how the use of intelligence during the Russia–Ukraine conflict should be understood within broader historical and contemporary trends. The authors conclude that while liberal democracies’ use of intelligence in public is to be welcomed for its greater transparency, careful risk management will be needed if this approach is to continue. Show less
Mazepus, H.; Laustsen, L.; Van Leeuwen, F.; Bartusevičius, H.; Vugt, M. van 2022
La guerre en Ukraine a propulsé les services de renseignement occidentaux sur le devant de la scène médiatique et souligné leur importance dans la lutte informationnelle. Lorsque les conditions le... Show moreLa guerre en Ukraine a propulsé les services de renseignement occidentaux sur le devant de la scène médiatique et souligné leur importance dans la lutte informationnelle. Lorsque les conditions le permettent, le renseignement peut être utilisé comme outil de communication publique afin de soutenir les stratégies adoptées par les décideurs politiques. Show less
Waar vanaf 2012 de aandacht voornamelijk uitging naar westerlingen – waarvan ruim driehonderd uit Nederland – die zich en masse aansloten bij jihadistische groeperingen in Syrië en Irak, was er... Show moreWaar vanaf 2012 de aandacht voornamelijk uitging naar westerlingen – waarvan ruim driehonderd uit Nederland – die zich en masse aansloten bij jihadistische groeperingen in Syrië en Irak, was er veel minder aandacht voor de aantrekkingskracht van een ander conflict in de ring rond Europa: de Russisch-Oekraïense oorlog, die volgde op onder meer de annexatie van de Krim in 2014. In dit artikel bekijken de auteurs wat we weten over de Nederlandse strijders die naar Oekraïne gereisd zijn en wat dit voor gevolgen heeft. Show less
This article introduces a special issue that investigates the interplay between domestic socio-political orders and changing external influences – of the EU, Russia, Turkey and other external... Show moreThis article introduces a special issue that investigates the interplay between domestic socio-political orders and changing external influences – of the EU, Russia, Turkey and other external actors in the region. In this introduction, we lay the conceptual framework and propose theoretical mechanisms linking state capacity and the actions of external actors to the likelihood of transformations from limited to open access orders. Previewing the findings, we note a fundamental asymmetry: while external actors have many levers to undermine the establishment of an open access order, they are more limited in how they can support reforms towards liberal democracy and free-market economy. Show less
This article identifies patronage networks in three Ukrainian regions and develops some ideas on the relation between these networks, economic and political openness, and the provision of public... Show moreThis article identifies patronage networks in three Ukrainian regions and develops some ideas on the relation between these networks, economic and political openness, and the provision of public goods. The research represents a rich empirical study linking business and politics in three regions (Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Ivano-Frankivsk) with different levels of openness and democratic reform. Formal and informal ties between politics and business are identified using primary (interview) and secondary data. By focusing on the local rather than national level in Ukraine, the article provides a comparison between different levels of patronage and type of networks. This study relates the empirical exploration of patronage networks in post-communist setting to a broader theoretical framework of limited access orders. Our findings show that although a multiplicity of networks might be a necessary condition for the opening of access to political and economic resources, it is not a sufficient one. We find that a single dominant network achieves a relatively high level of citizen satisfaction with public service provision, while the presence of multiple networks is not necessarily associated with citizen satisfaction with public goods provision. Show less
Dimitrova, A.; Toshkov, D.; Mazepus, H.; Maniokas, K.; Boroda, M.; Chulitskaya, T.; ... ; Wolczuk, K. 2018
This essay analyses convergence with EU rules in Ukraine in two policy areas—foreign and security policy and state aid regulation. Comparing the two, we find different levels of convergence,... Show moreThis essay analyses convergence with EU rules in Ukraine in two policy areas—foreign and security policy and state aid regulation. Comparing the two, we find different levels of convergence, somewhat higher in foreign policy (but slowing down after 2010) than in state aid law regulation. We explain this by analysing the presence and actions of oligarchs as veto players that have had an extensive influence on policy in the Ukrainian political system in recent years. In policy areas where convergence with EU rules negatively affects the interests of oligarchs and their political allies, we see only limited convergence with EU legislation and policies. Show less
It is often believed that under the Soviet regime in Ukraine—in particular after the mass deportation of Crimea Tatars—Islam ceased to be a communal project. New research, however, reveals that the... Show moreIt is often believed that under the Soviet regime in Ukraine—in particular after the mass deportation of Crimea Tatars—Islam ceased to be a communal project. New research, however, reveals that the local reproduction of religious knowledge has continued to date. Moreover, it has shaped to a great extent the religious fabric after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Many younger Muslims consider this traditional knowledge too inadequate to address the challenges of today. They turn increasingly to alternative knowledge supplied by a variety of organizations and individuals from the Middle East and elsewhere. Show less
