In this paper I explore the ways in which Alexander of Aphrodisias employs and devel- ops so-called ‘common notions’ as reliable starting points of deductive arguments. He combines contemporary... Show moreIn this paper I explore the ways in which Alexander of Aphrodisias employs and devel- ops so-called ‘common notions’ as reliable starting points of deductive arguments. He combines contemporary developments in the Stoic and Epicurean use of common notions with Aristotelian dialectic, and axioms. This more comprehensive concept of common notions can be extracted from Alexander’s commentary on Metaphysics A 1–2.Alexander puts Aristotle’s claim that ‘all human beings by nature desire to know’ in a larger deductive framework, and adds weight to Aristotle’s use of the common under- standing of the notion of ‘wisdom’. Finally I will indicate how these upgraded common notions are meant to play an important role in the general framework of metaphysics as a science. Show less
Politics and law are not in essence about knowledge,good sense and learning, but about wisdom. Good legislation requires wisdom andthe wise judge is also the ideal when it comes to good... Show morePolitics and law are not in essence about knowledge,good sense and learning, but about wisdom. Good legislation requires wisdom andthe wise judge is also the ideal when it comes to good adjudication. But whatis wisdom actually and who is the sage? To answer these important questions,this article departs from the views of the Stoa (of Seneca especially) whichhas been of fundamental significance for the development of law and which stillcontinues to influence it. It shows how the philosophical views of the Stoicsincluded an objective view of law and cultivated a subjective impassibility andapathy that were associated with steadfastness or constancy. Stoic wisdom was(and still is): virtuous obedience to the objective laws of nature. In modernStoics like Spinoza and Justus Lipsius we find these same elements. But inmodern times Stoicism is wrapped in the veil of a Christian vision of life,which (as such) serves as a seductive legitimation of its principles. In thisguise Stoicism has been of enormous significance in the history ofChristianity. However, their historical relationship is based on a major misunderstanding.In fact, Stoicism is Christianity’s most extreme alternative, as Erasmusalready pointed out. For the Stoic sage a theoretical and practical wisdomapplies that is not (in any way) in accordance with the courageousfoolishness of Christianity. It is through the prism of this foolishness thatwe come to appreciate that the eternal Stoic attitude is odious when it comesto law and politics. Stoicism is a recurring crisis phenomenon: a culturalsickness, for which the wisdom of Christianity still offers a very effectivemedicine. Show less
This thesis investigates Nietzsche's reception of Stoicism, and whether there is evidence for Stoicism influencing Nietzsche's conception of amor fati. Although secondary literature has made it... Show moreThis thesis investigates Nietzsche's reception of Stoicism, and whether there is evidence for Stoicism influencing Nietzsche's conception of amor fati. Although secondary literature has made it seem plausible that amor fati carries traces of Stoicism, pointing to the conceptual parallels between the love of fate and the Stoic therapy of a life ‘in accordance with nature’, this historical study shows that this claim is unlikely. In the first and last chapters a thorough textual analysis is presented of amor fati, showing that the concept undergoes a significant development from 1881/1882 to 1888. The amor fati of 1881/1882 should be situated in the context of Nietzsche's growing interest in physiology, I claim. The middle chapters uncover Nietzsche's engagements with Stoicism, based on a study of all explicit (and implicit) references to Stoicism. I conclude that Nietzsche's focus is restricted mostly to the context of the scientific quest for knowledge, thereby putting in perspective the assumption that Nietzsche's interest is mainly therapeutic. Although Nietzsche seems sympathetic to a Stoic attitude in 1870, he unequivocally rejects it in 1881/1882, in the same Book of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft in which, not coincidentally, amor fati for the first time occurs in the published works. Show less
