Differentiation has evolved into a systematic feature of European integration. Still, EU member states have been eager to maintain unity and not let differentiated integration (DI) be reflected in... Show moreDifferentiation has evolved into a systematic feature of European integration. Still, EU member states have been eager to maintain unity and not let differentiated integration (DI) be reflected in institutions and processes of EU governance. The sovereign debt crisis was a turning point, triggering an unprecedented reinforcement of euro area specific institutions and policies. So far, few contributions have studied the institutional implications of DI in the EU. This dissertation examines whether and, if so, how and with what implications DI has been institutionalised in EMU governance. It analyses the organisational inclusiveness of crisis management structures, the evolution of the Eurogroup and Eurogroup Working Group, procedural norms and elite ideas. The findings suggest that the distinction between euro area insiders and outsiders has become embedded in how member state representatives perceive political reality, determine mutual role expectations and organise governance processes. While this institutionalisation of DI in EMU was facilitated by particular circumstances of the sovereign debt crisis, its implications are evident in EMU governance and reform processes until today. The dissertation makes theoretical and empirical contributions to account for DI in institutional and political developments in EMU and, thus, aims to enrich institutionalist debates in EU studies. Show less
Reflections on the sovereign debt crisis often portray the Eurogroup and the Eurogroup Working Group (EWG) as inaccessible for euro area outsiders. Yet, common wisdom suggests that Council... Show moreReflections on the sovereign debt crisis often portray the Eurogroup and the Eurogroup Working Group (EWG) as inaccessible for euro area outsiders. Yet, common wisdom suggests that Council representatives can circumvent exclusion due to differentiated integration (DI) by complying with insider norms. This article studies whether and how compliance with procedural norms socialised amongst representatives from euro area member states (EAMS) determined patterns of non-EAMS involvement in Eurogroup and EWG interaction during the sovereign debt crisis. The argument highlights the role of deliberation and consensus-building norms, suggesting that they gained particular robustness amongst EAMS representatives. Those non-EAMS representatives who consistently complied with these insider norms could secure involvement in intergovernmental debates amongst EAMS. Exclusion was mostly relevant to norm violators. This article sheds light on the institutional consequences of DI in Economic and Monetary Union, highlighting its structural effects on governance and decision-making processes during the sovereign debt crisis. Show less
