‘International Relations (IR) is a state-centric discipline as well as a power-centered discipline’ mention Neumann and Gstöhl in their introduction to the edited work on Small States in... Show more‘International Relations (IR) is a state-centric discipline as well as a power-centered discipline’ mention Neumann and Gstöhl in their introduction to the edited work on Small States in International Relations (2006). Small states have long faced resistance within the field of international relations as they defy the second part of this quotation, their relative lack of capabilities questions the usefulness or relevance of studying them. Unrecognised states defy the first part of Neumann and Gstöhl’s quotation, as these constitute ‘places that do not exist in international relations’ (Caspersen, 2012), and have, therefore, often been excluded from relevant studies. While the study of small states has proliferated, it has largely neglected unrecognised small states. The aim of this paper is to establish the foreign policy goals of unrecognised states, and explore whether small states employ similar means as their unrecognised counterparts. This paper will examine the foreign policy of Somaliland and will argue that, often, the means used by unrecognised small states converge, more than usually thought so, with these of their recognised counterparts. Show less
Somalië zit nog steeds in de frontlijn van 'jihadisme', politieke instabiliteit en humanitaire crisis. In het proces naar politieke stabilisering is Al-Shabaab een enorme stoorzender. Deze... Show moreSomalië zit nog steeds in de frontlijn van 'jihadisme', politieke instabiliteit en humanitaire crisis. In het proces naar politieke stabilisering is Al-Shabaab een enorme stoorzender. Deze beweging, eind 2005 ontstaan, heeft een overwegend criminele agenda, 'gelegitimeerd' door de Islam. Militaire maatregelen om de excessen van Al Shabaab te elimineren zijn een noodzakelijke maar niet voldoende voorwaarde om politieke, economische en educatieve oplossingen voor de Somalische crisis te ontwikkelen. Show less
This paper critically assesses the EU’s anti-piracy operation Atalanta in the light of the protection of Union citizens. The main question is to which extent a Union citizen threatened by pirates... Show moreThis paper critically assesses the EU’s anti-piracy operation Atalanta in the light of the protection of Union citizens. The main question is to which extent a Union citizen threatened by pirates off the coast of Somalia could rely on the promise of civis europaeus sum. The paper discusses the various legal aspects pertaining to the forceful protection of EU citizens in international law, EU constitutional law and the operational parameters of Atalanta. It argues that within the particular framework of the international effort to combat piracy, the protection of citizens by military force could be legal. Moreover, the protection of citizens outside the EU forms now one of the legally-binding general objectives of the Union. Yet, this objective is not reiterated in the operational mandate, which creates tension and confusion between the general objective and the CSDP instrument. The paper concludes that the mandate of Atalanta, by focussing entirely on universal objectives, is constitutionally incomplete and shows that the external dimension of Union citizenship is still underdeveloped. Show less
This paper presents an updated genealogy of all Somali 'clans'. Somali kinship is based on patrilineal descent or 'tol', but there are no equivalents in the Somali language for the words 'clan'... Show moreThis paper presents an updated genealogy of all Somali 'clans'. Somali kinship is based on patrilineal descent or 'tol', but there are no equivalents in the Somali language for the words 'clan' and 'lineage'. The Somali terminology for the levels of social segmentation is complex, amongst others because of processes of territorial dispersion and social change. The author distinguishes the following levels of descent: clan-families, clan moieties or territorial divisions, clans, subclans, lineages, and sublineages. A separate section deals with groups 'outside' the clan framework. An appendix lists the main political organizations and/or 'warrior' or 'warlord' groups and their dominant (sub)clan since the 1991 central State collapse. Show less
A reformist brand of Islam emerged and consolidated during the decades of the Somali civil war, which began in the early 1980s—leading up to outright state collapse in 1991. Initially, its socio... Show moreA reformist brand of Islam emerged and consolidated during the decades of the Somali civil war, which began in the early 1980s—leading up to outright state collapse in 1991. Initially, its socio-political position was rather marginal. Proponents of the new brand denounced the dominant local Sufi Islam as well as the Somali clan system, to which it was traditionally closely associated. Soon however, lack of political and military success seems to have forced the Islamists back into the organically grown interaction between Somali Islam and the ubiquitous clan system, its politics, and institutions. At least for the time being. Show less
There has been a state of near-permanent revolt in Somali society since 1991. This chapter offers a cultural analysis of patterns of political and military activity from the precolonial era... Show moreThere has been a state of near-permanent revolt in Somali society since 1991. This chapter offers a cultural analysis of patterns of political and military activity from the precolonial era through the Italian and British colonial period, and State independence (1960-1991), to the present period of Statelessness. The focus is on a comparison of elements in the campaigns of revolt against the colonial States between 1900 and 1920 with those in the late Siyad Barre period (1988-1991) and the era of Statelessness (1991 onwards). A transformation of ideas of revolt and violent action has occurred in which Somali notions of egalitarian social order, kinship and local leadership have taken on a different shape. This prevented the institutionalization of crosscutting alliances and the emergence of a wider political arena - except in certain regions such as Somaliland and Puntland. The cultural and social unity of Somali society has always been overestimated. Somali political culture is by nature centrifugal, preventing the institutionalization of a legitimate leadership at State level but not at a regional clan level. Notes, ref., sum. [Book abstract] Show less
When a Somali woman is about to give birth, older women often arrange a ceremony to call blessings on the mother-to-be, in which they sing sittaat - songs of praise for the leading women of early... Show moreWhen a Somali woman is about to give birth, older women often arrange a ceremony to call blessings on the mother-to-be, in which they sing sittaat - songs of praise for the leading women of early Islam, especially Faduumo (Fatima), daughter of the Prophet. Although there is no doubt that this genre of songs is old - it may even have a relationship to non-Islamic Oromo songs for the goddess of fertility - scholarly references date back only to the late nineteenth century and do not include song texts. Show less
