I investigate the intersection of two of the most important areas governing how modern society is organized: the law governing religion. I investigate whether the purportedly (or presumptively)... Show moreI investigate the intersection of two of the most important areas governing how modern society is organized: the law governing religion. I investigate whether the purportedly (or presumptively) secular Western legal understanding of the idea of “religion,” as it is understood in court judgments, reflects any religious presuppositions or bias. In other words, to what extent is the idea of “religion,” as it is understood by courts, sectarian rather than secular? If a bias exists, what should be done about it in order to bring our understanding, our definitions, and our approach to legal issues involving religion into conformity with broader legal norms concerning formal equality? To investigate whether such a bias exists I begin by examining two sets of court decisions: one from the United Kingdom and one from Israel, discussing the question “who is a Jew?” in a legal context. I then discuss what the implications of those findings are, with particular regard to how “religion” as a legal term of art should be interpreted by courts. How should judicial interpretation of fundamental guarantees of religious freedom take account of the Christian provenance of the criteria governing what it means to be a religion in the first place? Show less
Psychologists have shown that reference-point reasoning is a ubiquitous cognitive phenomenon intrinsic to perception, categorisation, spatial orientation, social, organisational and marketing... Show morePsychologists have shown that reference-point reasoning is a ubiquitous cognitive phenomenon intrinsic to perception, categorisation, spatial orientation, social, organisational and marketing behaviour of human beings. Various cognitive tasks involve evoking a salient entity – called cognitive reference point – for establishing mental contact with less salient items. It is then reasonable to assume that language use also involves a lot of reference-point reasoning. However, linguistic aspects of this phenomenon have hardly been investigated. A welcome exception is Langacker’s reference-point model dealing with grammatical constructions and metonymy. This thesis elaborates the reference-point model by applying it to lexical semantics. The only reference point that has been quite intensely studied in lexical semantics is a prototype. By focusing on two adjectival groups (colour and size), the author demonstrates that a whole panoply of cognitive reference points are used to anchor conceptual specifications of lexical items, prototypes being only a special case of the reference-point mechanism. An important finding is that a word may trigger more than one reference point at a time. For example, dimensional adjectives may be interpreted vis-à-vis an average value, endpoints of the scale, prototypes and dimensions of the human body. Contextual variability is claimed to be related to various combinations of reference points, their relative salience and patterns of interaction. Show less
