Previous studies have identified individual and organizational factors that influence the turnover intentions of bureaucrats. However, they have overlooked how the type of national bureaucracy... Show morePrevious studies have identified individual and organizational factors that influence the turnover intentions of bureaucrats. However, they have overlooked how the type of national bureaucracy influences turnover intention. Combining data sets on macro-level bureaucratic structures and individual civil servants, we examine how bureaucratic politicization and closedness are associated with the turnover intentions of bureaucrats in 36 countries. Our analysis indicates that there is large cross-national variation in turnover intention, and that bureaucratic structures matter as one of the predictors of turnover intention. Public servants working in more closed and regulated bureaucracies exhibit lower turnover intention. We also find that public servants working in more politicized bureaucracies (in which personnel decisions are made via political connections) have lower turnover intention than those working in more merit-based systems. Such low turnover intention in politicized bureaucracies may be explained by the characteristics of patronage appointments in which public jobs are distributed based on personal or political loyalty. Show less
In October 2020, President Donald Trump sought to convert many US federal civil servants to at-will employees by executive order. Trump's initiative, referred to as Schedule F, has stimulated a... Show moreIn October 2020, President Donald Trump sought to convert many US federal civil servants to at-will employees by executive order. Trump's initiative, referred to as Schedule F, has stimulated a partisan debate about dismantling the merit system in the US federal government. A substantial international body of evidence has developed during the last three decades about the effects of administrative practices associated with meritocracy and the likely consequences of changes to civil service systems, such as those embedded in Schedule F. This article employs guidelines established under the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) to conduct a systematic review of the evidence to address the question: What does the evidence tell us about merit principles and government performance? This systematic review summarizes what empirical research tells us about effects of civil service practices, such as meritocratic appointments, meritocratic advancement, and tenure protection, for government performance and the quality of government. The findings indicate that factors such as meritocratic appointments/recruitment, tenure protection, impartiality, and professionalism are strongly associated with higher government performance and lower corruption. We conclude by discussing implications of our findings for public policy and management and for future research. Show less
This chapter focuses on the evaluation of public policy and administration. Institutionalized for decades in many places worldwide, policy evaluation has become a routinized and professionalized... Show moreThis chapter focuses on the evaluation of public policy and administration. Institutionalized for decades in many places worldwide, policy evaluation has become a routinized and professionalized activity. However, assessing the performance of public agencies and the impact of the policies they implement is a highly political endeavor. As part of the executive branch and directly subordinate to governments, public agencies can be scrutinized and evaluated as an extension of political struggles. On the other hand, public agencies also use evaluation to advance their own objectives. This chapter examines the issues attached to the evaluation of public policies and administrative activity in relation to power games within and across the branches of government. It reveals how politicians and public servants can make strategic use of policy evaluations, as well as how this instrument serves not only reflexive and oversight purposes, but also agenda-setting ambitions. The chapter then presents an overview of the controlling, defensive and proactive functions of evaluation in policy struggles. Drawing upon these developments, the chapter underlines just how far from neutral evaluations can be in the politico-administrative game. Show less
