The international recognition of Turkey through the Treaty of Lausanne is often seen as the foundational moment of Turkey in international diplomacy. This article approaches diplomatic history from... Show moreThe international recognition of Turkey through the Treaty of Lausanne is often seen as the foundational moment of Turkey in international diplomacy. This article approaches diplomatic history from a decentred perspective. It highlights the activities of various non-state actors and semi-official figures who became engaged in international politics during the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1923). They used citizen diplomacy, public propaganda, as well as other clandestine and public channels of transnational diplomacy to strive against the Allied peace terms. Notwithstanding their divergent political visions and agendas, these unofficial diplomats strengthened—though not always intentionally—the international recognition of the Turkish nation-state formation, only to be absorbed by the Ankara government’s growing monopoly on foreign policy. Informed by the New Diplomatic History approach, this article illustrates the important role of unofficial, transnational dynamics that escapes state-centred accounts of Ottoman-Turkish diplomacy during the aftermath of the First World War. Show less
Studies of conflicts involving the use of surrogates focus largely on states, viewing the relationship between sponsors and proxies primarily as one in which states utilize nonstate actors as... Show moreStudies of conflicts involving the use of surrogates focus largely on states, viewing the relationship between sponsors and proxies primarily as one in which states utilize nonstate actors as proxies. They have devoted far less attention to sponsor-proxy arrangements in which nonstate actors play super-ordinate roles as sponsors in their own right. Why and how do nonstate actors sponsor proxies? Unlike state sponsors, which value proxies primarily for their military utility, nonstate sponsors select and utilize proxies mainly for their perceived political value. Simply put, states tend to sponsor military surrogates, whereas nonstate actors sponsor political ancillaries. Both endogenous actor-based traits and exogenous structural constraints account for these different approaches. An analysis of three case studies of nonstate sponsors that differ in terms of ideology and capacity—al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, the People's Protection Units in Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon—confirms this argument, but also suggests that the ability and desire to control proxies varies with the sponsor's capacity. High-capacity nonstate sponsors such as Hezbollah behave similarly to state sponsors, but remain exceptional. Most nonstate sponsors are less dominant, rendering the relationships to their proxies more transactional and pragmatic, and ultimately less enduring than those of state sponsors and their clients. Show less
