Using the case of Nigeria's Dangote Group and an exploratory research technique, we critique CSR practices in a developing country context based on a three‐pillar model—traditional CSR, strategic... Show moreUsing the case of Nigeria's Dangote Group and an exploratory research technique, we critique CSR practices in a developing country context based on a three‐pillar model—traditional CSR, strategic CSR and strategic business engagements. Our paper makes a unique contribution by revealing how a company can transform its strategic CSR into strategic business engagements that permit it to circumvent public procurement laws and secure public contracts at non‐competitive terms. We show how, in weak institutional and regulatory contexts, strategic CSR could be turned to a tool for rent extraction and profit maximization. We advocate for regulatory measures that impose ex ante and ex post limits on the extent to which firms can go in integrating CSR into their normal business operations. Based on the outcomes from this important African case study, we illustrate and propose the strategic business engagement model as a new framework for analysing the social benefits of strategic CSR practices in developing countries. Show less
This paper critiques the emergence of Dangote Cement as the dominant player in cement manufacturing in Nigeria. It argues that the changed economic environment General Obasanjo met when he became... Show moreThis paper critiques the emergence of Dangote Cement as the dominant player in cement manufacturing in Nigeria. It argues that the changed economic environment General Obasanjo met when he became president of Nigeria for a second time in 1999 made it difficult for him to continue the nationalisation policies and the expansion of government involvement in several spheres of economic activity that he helped to promote in the 1970s. The realisation that this strategy, which created numerous crony capitalists, was unsustainable resulted in Obasanjo allying with Dangote and promulgating the Backward Integration Programme (BIP) for the local cement industry. This made it possible for Dangote to risk aggressive investment in the capital-intensive cement production business. This strategy achieved public good by rapidly making Nigeria, an oil rent- and import-dependent economy with enormous limestone reserves, self-sufficient in cement production. Show less
This paper critiques the emergence of Dangote Cement as the dominant player in cement manufacturing in Nigeria. It argues that the changed economic environment General Obasanjo met when he became... Show moreThis paper critiques the emergence of Dangote Cement as the dominant player in cement manufacturing in Nigeria. It argues that the changed economic environment General Obasanjo met when he became president of Nigeria for a second time in 1999 made it difficult for him to continue the nationalisation policies and the expansion of government involvement in several spheres of economic activity that he helped to promote in the 1970s. The realisation that this strategy, which created numerous crony capitalists, was unsustainable resulted in Obasanjo allying with Dangote and promulgating the Backward Integration Programme (BIP) for the local cement industry. This made it possible for Dangote to risk aggressive investment in the capital-intensive cement production business. This strategy achieved public good by rapidly making Nigeria, an oil rent- and import-dependent economy with enormous limestone reserves, self-sufficient in cement production. Show less
Why would the citizens of an oil-producing state continually resist reform-induced petrol price increases, even when subsidy payments are proved to be a serious threat to the capacity of the state... Show moreWhy would the citizens of an oil-producing state continually resist reform-induced petrol price increases, even when subsidy payments are proved to be a serious threat to the capacity of the state to deliver its core constitutional mandates? In this paper, we tackle this question by contending that the difficulty in petrol subsidy implementation in a country like Nigeria has more to do with the clear lack of state legitimacy and public trust, and the recorded cases of political instability entrenched by forced attempts at reforms. By contextualizing the reform efforts in Nigeria within the framework of the relationship between state legitimacy and reforms, we are able to provide valid insights to a broader understanding of the “whys” of public resistance to the authority of the state to enforce reform. The Nigerian case, as revealed in this article, provides evidence of a shift in paradigm from the conventional and dominant Weberian emphasis of state legitimacy around the nature and sources of state authorities to a more functional context of citizens’ perception of the governance process as a source of legitimacy. Show less
This paper traces the origins of the Petroleum Equalization Fund (PEF) in Nigeria and describes the environment in which it has operated. The paper argues that the PEF has failed to live up to its... Show moreThis paper traces the origins of the Petroleum Equalization Fund (PEF) in Nigeria and describes the environment in which it has operated. The paper argues that the PEF has failed to live up to its mandate of equalizing the prices of petroleum products across the country. This is in part because such equalization schemes create arbitrage opportunities which are always prone to exploitation. The rentier nature of the Nigerian state and the prevalence of corruption in the country have added fodder to such exploitations. The consequence of the above is that PEF has simply become one of the inefficient channels of subsidizing the price of petroleum products in Nigeria. This paper therefore recommends that the starting point in the efforts by the Nigerian government to undertake petrol subsidy reform in the country should be to abolish the PEF. Show less
