This edited Working Paper addresses three fundamental questions concerning EU External Action after the Lisbon Treaty: the institutional position and allegiance of the newly-established European... Show moreThis edited Working Paper addresses three fundamental questions concerning EU External Action after the Lisbon Treaty: the institutional position and allegiance of the newly-established European External Action Service, the future of the ‘left out’ Directorate-General for Trade and the Common Commercial Policy, and the protection of EU citizens abroad. These enquires are prompted by both an institutional innovation – the launch of the EEAS – as well as by a number of substantive changes to the legal framework of EU External Action. An ambitious agenda has been inserted into the primary law, around which the Union institutions and Member States are to rally. It is in turn the raison d’être of the EEAS to foster the ensuing need for consistency, as well as to provide impetus to the EU’s external action. Structurally, it is in itself a sui generis institution composed of officials from the Commission, the Council and the Member States. This raises a number of fundamental questions that go well beyond those concerning which person is going to be the new EU ambassador in Washington or Beijing. Above all, can these substantive and institutional innovations live up to the grand ambitions of the peculiar entity that is the EU? What old problems does it purport to solve, and what are the new problems it is likely to create? Essentially, to which extent does bundling the external objectives in the Treaties as well as pooling together the institutional resources in Brussels and the delegations actually render the EU an ‘ever-closer’ actor in the world? Show less
This paper argues that the ECJ in its seminal Kadi judgment made the right decision and foreshadowed numerous reforms in the EU’s external action introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. It rightly... Show moreThis paper argues that the ECJ in its seminal Kadi judgment made the right decision and foreshadowed numerous reforms in the EU’s external action introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. It rightly rejected the approach presented by the Court of First Instance, which ultimately turned out to be a false friend of international law. By largely following the Advocate General’s Opinion, the Court maintained the superior human rights standard of the EU legal order. Without, however, jeopardizing the compliance of the Member States with their UN obligations right away, it sent a clear warning signal to the UN Security Council to exhaust the potential for reform of the targeted sanction regime. The Court showed that in the face of such global threats as terrorism as well as the undermining of basic human rights, we are all in the same boat together after all. Show less
