The expert competences of the public bureaucracy are often seen as crucial for the quality and legitimacy of public policies. Yet, the role of expertise in the state varies greatly across countries... Show moreThe expert competences of the public bureaucracy are often seen as crucial for the quality and legitimacy of public policies. Yet, the role of expertise in the state varies greatly across countries. How can we explain the position of expert competences in the bureaucracy? The paper examines this question through a historical-institutional analysis of the Italian ministerial bureaucracy. Extending the ‘public service bargains’ framework, it argues that the role of expertise in the state is the result of a bargaining process between civil servants and the politicians that they serve. The paper shows how the peculiar position of expertise in the Italian state – the paucity of technical expertise in the permanent administration, the role of ministerial cabinets as politicized providers of expertise, and the dominance of legal training among civil servants – was the result of a chain of political and bureaucratic strategies and responses. Show less
In summer 2020, in an unprecedented move, the EU offered its Member States help vto cope with the fall-out of the Covid-19 pandemic. To do so, it drew on the EU longterm budget (2021-2027) and... Show moreIn summer 2020, in an unprecedented move, the EU offered its Member States help vto cope with the fall-out of the Covid-19 pandemic. To do so, it drew on the EU longterm budget (2021-2027) and created a new temporary support system referred to as ‘NextGenerationEU’ (NGEU). Formally established in February 2021, the socalled ‘Recovery and Resilience Facility’ (RRF) at the core of the NGEU provides financial support to Member States, notably through a combination of grants and loans (European Parliament and Council of the EU 2021). The EU has issued debt to finance this expenditure, the size and scope of which are unparalleled and break with longstanding taboos). Yet even so, not all scholars agree that this situation represents a sea change.The European Commission insisted on attaching strings to these funds, i.e., that they be spent on the digital transition, the energy transition and on stimulating social and inclusive growth benefi ting the next generation. Member States need to submit detailed national Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) to access the funds.While some reporting templates are new, others draw on the European Semester the EU macro-economic policy coordination framework. Examining how and why the Semester became part of RRF governance, this chapter asks, to what extent did this new set-up change the power balance among key players (e.g., fi nancial and economic players versus social aff airs players)? The chapter distinguishes between ‘EU institutional social players’ and ‘social stakeholders’. The former consist of the DG Employment, Social Aff airs & Inclusion (DG EMPL) of the European Commission, the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs (EPSCO) Council formation and the EU Employment and Social Protection Committees (EMCO and the SPC).2 ‘Social stakeholders’ comprise both EU and national social partners (representatives of worker and employer organisations) and civil society organisations (CSOs). Wherever relevant, we distinguish between players’ involvement at EU and domestic level. Show less
This dissertation studies the process of electoral reform in Chile (1989-2015) through a novel and comprehensive approach which challenges traditional conceptualizations of electoral reforms with... Show moreThis dissertation studies the process of electoral reform in Chile (1989-2015) through a novel and comprehensive approach which challenges traditional conceptualizations of electoral reforms with the objetive of broadening the scope of what constitutes an electoral reform and the theoretical tools scholars use to identify and analyze them. Show less
