The main aim of this chapter is to conceptualise the conflict between states and non-state armed groups in the Middle East. It begins by tracing the colonial origin of the distinction between state... Show moreThe main aim of this chapter is to conceptualise the conflict between states and non-state armed groups in the Middle East. It begins by tracing the colonial origin of the distinction between state and non-state violence, the emergence of counterinsurgency and its reincarnation in liberal interventions. It then considers the politics of demarcation of legitimate and illegitimate violence and its centrality in the scramble among local and international state and non-state actors to control the Middle East. The chapter analyses the effects of both physical violence and ideological confrontation in the origins and consequences of political violence in the Middle East. It finally illustrates these dynamics by analysing the concerted international and Lebanese campaign to destroy Hezbollah and the resilience of Hezbollah to withstand such enormous pressure and become stronger as a result. Show less
Studies of conflicts involving the use of surrogates focus largely on states, viewing the relationship between sponsors and proxies primarily as one in which states utilize nonstate actors as... Show moreStudies of conflicts involving the use of surrogates focus largely on states, viewing the relationship between sponsors and proxies primarily as one in which states utilize nonstate actors as proxies. They have devoted far less attention to sponsor-proxy arrangements in which nonstate actors play super-ordinate roles as sponsors in their own right. Why and how do nonstate actors sponsor proxies? Unlike state sponsors, which value proxies primarily for their military utility, nonstate sponsors select and utilize proxies mainly for their perceived political value. Simply put, states tend to sponsor military surrogates, whereas nonstate actors sponsor political ancillaries. Both endogenous actor-based traits and exogenous structural constraints account for these different approaches. An analysis of three case studies of nonstate sponsors that differ in terms of ideology and capacity—al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, the People's Protection Units in Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon—confirms this argument, but also suggests that the ability and desire to control proxies varies with the sponsor's capacity. High-capacity nonstate sponsors such as Hezbollah behave similarly to state sponsors, but remain exceptional. Most nonstate sponsors are less dominant, rendering the relationships to their proxies more transactional and pragmatic, and ultimately less enduring than those of state sponsors and their clients. Show less
