The chapter deals with the meaning of Union citizenship in the EU's external relations and, more specifically, the relations with Turkey and with Switzerland.
Diverse assessments of the EU's role in global governance suggest a great need for dependable and justifiable benchmarks. This chapter argues that constitutional foreign policy objectives are an... Show moreDiverse assessments of the EU's role in global governance suggest a great need for dependable and justifiable benchmarks. This chapter argues that constitutional foreign policy objectives are an important source for such benchmarks — for conceptual, empirical, and normative reasons. Conceptually speaking, global governance is an inherently rule-oriented as well as goal-oriented concept. Empirically, such substantive global governance goals can be found today in many constitutions, including those of the rising powers of the emerging multipolar world. EU primary law post-Lisbon is part of this trend, but also goes further. Next to an extensive collection of substantive objectives, it also puts a distinctive emphasis on law as an essential ingredient of its foreign policy and consequently of its vision for global governance. From a normative point of view, the peculiar features pertaining to constitutional law as a source for global governance guidance, as opposed to policy documents or other law, appear at first sight as problematic. In particular for the EU, facing the challenge of ‘relative decline’ in a multi-polar world, entrenching such an ambitious agenda in its highest laws may appear as audacious wishful thinking. On closer inspection, however, these particular features reveal the true value of the constitutional codification of a global governance agenda. Show less
This article expresses a note of caution regarding the general enthusiasm surrounding the duty of sincere cooperation in the external relations of the European Union. It argues that according to... Show moreThis article expresses a note of caution regarding the general enthusiasm surrounding the duty of sincere cooperation in the external relations of the European Union. It argues that according to the recent case law of the European Court of Justice, the duty is in practise not only first and foremost incumbent upon the Member States, but manifests itself as a strict duty to refrain from acting – a duty to remain silent – rather than a duty of best endeavours. Tracing the Court’s key judgements in this regard (Inland Waterways, IMO and PFOS), the authors conclude that in the presence of Union competence, but in the absence of a (quasi)-authorisation by the Union institutions to act, the Member States are to remain idle. While arguably necessary to safeguard the Union’s unity of international representation, this development is prone to legally favour inaction and hinder the Union’s ambitions for actual “external action”. Show less
