This article analyses the United Kingdom’s (UK) ‘trade continuity programme’. The promise that, once outside the European Union (EU), the UK would strike new, lucrative trade deals continues to be... Show moreThis article analyses the United Kingdom’s (UK) ‘trade continuity programme’. The promise that, once outside the European Union (EU), the UK would strike new, lucrative trade deals continues to be an important part of the Brexiteers’ narrative. What the UK was compelled to do first, however, was to conclude ‘roll-over’ agreements to replace the trade agreements already made by the EU. This article posits that, contrary to expectations, the UK’s continuity programme should be regarded as a success – for both the UK and the EU. In most cases, the UK managed to replicate to a very large extent the terms originally granted to the EU, despite being a smaller market and despite challenging circumstances. From the EU’s perspective, the UK’s continuity programme can be regarded as a case of successful norm internalization and export. This first chapter of post-Brexit UK trade policy shows that even a country that has left the EU still legally commits itself and its partners to the EU’s norms and values. Hence, the EU should welcome the UK’s imitation as a shared normative basis to expand cooperation with its former member state in a challenging geopolitical environment. Show less
There has been much recent debate over whether the European Union is or should be a ‘militant democratic’ actor in order to respond to democratic backsliding in EU member states. This article... Show moreThere has been much recent debate over whether the European Union is or should be a ‘militant democratic’ actor in order to respond to democratic backsliding in EU member states. This article argues that the EU is a militant democracy in a specific and limited sense, but that this may be normatively undesirable from a democratic perspective. I first develop a definition of militant democracy that focuses on the militant democratic paradox. I argue that the strongest justifications for militant democracy require that two conditions are met: an ‘existential threat condition’ and a ‘necessity condition’. Next, I analyse four ways in which the European Union has been said to be empowered to act in a militant democratic fashion to combat democratic backsliding in EU member states. I show how some, though not all, of these warrant the label ‘militant democracy’. Moving from the descriptive to the normative analysis, I then consider whether the necessity condition can ever be met since there is always the possibility of non-militant responses through forms of EU disintegration. If we accept this argument, EU actors should prioritize robust non-militant measures where possible while pro-democratic member states should disassociate from frankly autocratic member states where non-militant measures fail. Show less
The study of why and when governments are caught out by strategic surprise has been a major occupation of intelligence studies, international relations, public administration and crisis management... Show moreThe study of why and when governments are caught out by strategic surprise has been a major occupation of intelligence studies, international relations, public administration and crisis management studies. Still little is known, however, about the structural vulnerabilities to such surprises in international organisations such as the European Union (EU). EU institutions themselves have not undertaken rigorous investigations or public inquiries of recent strategic surprises, instead relying on internal review processes. In order to understand the most common underlying problems causing surprise in the EU context, this paper adapts and tests insights from the strategic surprise literature. It elaborates a theoretical framework with five hypotheses about why the leadership of EU institutions has been prone to being caught by surprises in foreign affairs: limitations in collection capacity, institutional fragmentation of policymaking, organisational culture, member state politicisation, and cognitive biases arising from collective ideas and norms. These hypotheses are tested using a post-mortem approach investigating two significant strategic surprises: the start and spread of the Arab uprisings of 2010/11 and Ukraine–Russia crisis of 2013/14. Show less
While consumers in the European Union (EU) are generally afforded a high level of protection, the law on air passenger rights, by example, draws debate over the cost of such protection. In the... Show moreWhile consumers in the European Union (EU) are generally afforded a high level of protection, the law on air passenger rights, by example, draws debate over the cost of such protection. In the absence of a clear definition of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ in Regulation (EC) 261/2004, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has not always balanced consumer interests with business realities in its many preliminary rulings on interpretation of these words. Workers joined this picture in the case of Airhelp/SAS [2021], in which the CJEU held that a lawful strike by an air carrier’s own pilot unions does not amount to ‘extraordinary circumstances’. This article explores this ruling in the light of EU air passenger rights and social dialogue objectives. Show less
China is the second-biggest trading partner of the European Union, and the EU is the biggest trading partner of China. Hence, China adds EU have a close relationship. In this sense, it is vital to... Show moreChina is the second-biggest trading partner of the European Union, and the EU is the biggest trading partner of China. Hence, China adds EU have a close relationship. In this sense, it is vital to find the media perception of the EU and the political ideology behind their relationship. However, most of the existed studies explore China-EU relationship through their trade information, while ignore the role of Chinese media frame of EU. This study believe that China’s official media frame offer a strong evidence to understand China-EU relation- ship. This article aims to examine China’s official media perception of the EU by systematically examine the previous study. This study finds that Chinese media frame EU as an economic and political partner in a positive way but try to avoid mentioning the contradiction and friction, the selective negative is-sues are mainly for propaganda and conform to Chinese government atti- tude. Hence, this study discusses that Chinese official media follow the narra- tive of the Chinese government and reflect the EU-China relationship from the Chinese government perspective. Show less
This article introduces a special issue that investigates the interplay between domestic socio-political orders and changing external influences – of the EU, Russia, Turkey and other external... Show moreThis article introduces a special issue that investigates the interplay between domestic socio-political orders and changing external influences – of the EU, Russia, Turkey and other external actors in the region. In this introduction, we lay the conceptual framework and propose theoretical mechanisms linking state capacity and the actions of external actors to the likelihood of transformations from limited to open access orders. Previewing the findings, we note a fundamental asymmetry: while external actors have many levers to undermine the establishment of an open access order, they are more limited in how they can support reforms towards liberal democracy and free-market economy. Show less
Wijk, R.P.J. van; Dijck, J.T.J.M. van; Timmers, M.; Veen, E. van; Citerio, G.; Lingsma, H.F.; ... ; CENTER-TB1 Investigators 2020
Purpose: Enrolling traumatic brain injury (731) patients with an inability to provide informed consent in research is challenging. Alternatives to patient consent are not sufficiently embedded in... Show morePurpose: Enrolling traumatic brain injury (731) patients with an inability to provide informed consent in research is challenging. Alternatives to patient consent are not sufficiently embedded in European and national legislation, which allows procedural variation and bias. We aimed to quantify variations in informed consent policy and practice.Methods: Variation was explored in the CENTER-TBI study. Policies were reported by using a questionnaire and national legislation. Data on used informed consent procedures were available for 4498 patients from 57 centres across 17 European countries.Results: Variation in the use of informed consent procedures was found between and within EU member states. Proxy informed consent (N = 1377;64%) was the most frequently used type of consent in the ICU, followed by patient informed consent (N 426;20%) and deferred consent (N 334;16%). Deferred consent was only actively used in 15 centres (26%), although it was considered valid in 47 centres (82%).Conclusions: Alternatives to patient consent are essential for TBI research. While there seems to be concordance amongst national legislations, there is regional variability in institutional practices with respect to the use of different informed consent procedures. Variation could be caused by several reasons, including inconsistencies in clear legislation or knowledge of such legislation amongst researchers. (C) 2020 Published by Elsevier Inc. Show less
The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union has prompted a global recalibration of treaty relations. Due to the Withdrawal Agreement and its transition period, the UK is expanding... Show moreThe withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union has prompted a global recalibration of treaty relations. Due to the Withdrawal Agreement and its transition period, the UK is expanding its international treaty-making powers as it is gradually released from the constraints of EU law. Practice to date shows the creation of many new international legal instruments through which governments have sought to address the novel questions that Brexit raises for the international law of treaties. Show less
Contemporary governance is increasingly characterized by the consultation of different types of stakeholders, such as interest groups representing economic and citizen interests, as well as public... Show moreContemporary governance is increasingly characterized by the consultation of different types of stakeholders, such as interest groups representing economic and citizen interests, as well as public and private institutions, such as public authorities and firms. Previous research has demonstrated that public officials use a variety of tools to involve these actors in policymaking. Yet, we have limited knowledge on how particular consultation approaches relate to stakeholder participation. To what extent do open, closed and hybrid consultation approaches, with the first two, respectively, referring to the use of public and targeted tools, and the third one implying a combination of both of them, relate to the policy engagement of a different set of stakeholders? In this paper, we identify the different tools used by the European Commission to engage stakeholders in policymaking and assess how variation in consultation approaches relates to stakeholder participation via a descriptive and multivariate analysis. We rely on two datasets: a regulatory database that contains detailed information on 41 EU regulations and a stakeholder database that comprises 2617 stakeholders that were involved in these regulations through different consultation tools. Our main finding is that implementing different consultation approaches affects stakeholder diversity. Specifically, closed consultation approaches lead to a lower level of business dominance than hybrid approaches that combine open and targeted consultation tools. Show less
Summary.This article examines the changing forms of African agency in the context of contestations over natural resource governance with the European Union. The authors argue that EU policy is... Show moreSummary.This article examines the changing forms of African agency in the context of contestations over natural resource governance with the European Union. The authors argue that EU policy is motivated by material self-interest but that it has not been able to successfully implement these policies. The way these policies have been challenged by African states has changed, however. The authors argue that a crucial context for this is the failure of the New International Economic Order in the 1970s. The failure of these initiatives helps to explain why the impetus for natural resource governance continues to come from outside the African continent.Résumé. Cet article examine l’évolution des formes du pouvoir d’action autonome de l’Afrique dans le contexte des contestations avec l’Union européenne quant à la gouvernance des ressources naturelles. Les auteurs soutiennent que la politique de l’UE est motivée par des intérêts matériels personnels mais qu’elle n’a pas réussi à mettre en oeuvre ces politiques avec succès. La façon dont ces politiques ont été contestées par les États africains a cependant changé. Les auteurs affirment que l’échec du Nouvel ordre économique international dans les années 1970 constitue un contexte crucial à cet égard. L’échec de ces initiatives contribue à expliquer pourquoi l’élan en faveur de la gouvernance des ressources naturelles continue de venir de l’extérieur du continent africain. Show less
Background: While the European Union is striving to become the 'Innovation Union', there remains a lack of quantifiable indicators to compare and benchmark regional innovation clusters. To address... Show moreBackground: While the European Union is striving to become the 'Innovation Union', there remains a lack of quantifiable indicators to compare and benchmark regional innovation clusters. To address this issue, a HealthTIES (Healthcare, Technology and Innovation for Economic Success) consortium was funded by the European Union's Regions of Knowledge initiative, research and innovation funding programme FP7. HealthTIES examined whether the health technology innovation cycle was functioning differently in five European regional innovation clusters and proposed regional and joint actions to improve their performance. The clusters included BioCat (Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain), Medical Delta (Leiden, Rotterdam and Delft, South Holland, Netherlands), Oxford and Thames Valley (United Kingdom), Life Science Zurich (Switzerland), and Innova Eszak-Alfold (Debrecen, Hungary).Methods: Appreciation of the 'triple helix' of university-industry-government innovation provided the impetus for the development of two quantifiable innovation indexes and related indicators. The HealthTIES H-index is calculated for disease and technology platforms based on the h-index proposed by Hirsch. The HealthTIES Innovation Index is calculated for regions based on 32 relevant quantitative and discriminative indicators grouped into 12 categories and 3 innovation phases, namely 'Input' (n = 12), 'Innovation System' (n = 9) and 'Output' (n = 11).Results: The HealthTIES regions had developed relatively similar disease and technology platform profiles, yet with distinctive strengths and weaknesses. The regional profiles of the innovation cycle in each of the three phases were surprisingly divergent. Comparative assessments based on the indicators and indexes helped identify and share best practice and inform regional and joint action plans to strengthen the competitiveness of the HealthTIES regions.Conclusion: The HealthTIES indicators and indexes provide useful practical tools for the measurement and benchmarking of university-industry-government innovation in European medical and life science clusters. They are validated internally within the HealthTIES consortium and appear to have a degree of external prima facie validity. Potentially, the tools and accompanying analyses can be used beyond the HealthTIES consortium to inform other regional governments, researchers and, possibly, large companies searching for their next location, analyse and benchmark 'triple helix' dynamics within their own networks over time, and to develop integrated public-private and cross-regional research and innovation strategies in Europe and beyond. Show less
In less unusual times, the European Union’s Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy would have been received as merely the latest iteration of the main tenets and ambitions of EU external... Show moreIn less unusual times, the European Union’s Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy would have been received as merely the latest iteration of the main tenets and ambitions of EU external action – this time with an enhanced dose of pragmatism to respond to a more challenging international environment. However, with ‘Brexit’ looming large and one and a half years into the Trump Presidency in the United States, the Global Strategy has acquired a new level of significance. This article argues that while meant to express a largely uncontroversial ‘Western’ consensus, it now needs to be re-contextualized as a distinctive vision in the face of trends of antiglobalism and Euroscepticism. This concerns in particular the Strategy’s emphasis on rules-based global governance. Challenged by both President Trump’s ‘America First’ policy and the British government’s course for a ‘hard Brexit’, the Global Strategy now represents a contested blueprint and rallying point for a continued pursuit of a liberal world order based on the rule of law. Show less
Wonka, A.; De Bruycker, I.; De Bievre, D.; Beyers, J.; Braun, C. 2018
Contemporary studies on interest group politics have mainly used single interest organizations as their central objects of study. This has led to a rich body of knowledge on the motivations of... Show moreContemporary studies on interest group politics have mainly used single interest organizations as their central objects of study. This has led to a rich body of knowledge on the motivations of interest group mobilization, strategy development and even policy access and influence. The focus on single interest groups, however, has resulted in limited knowledge on aggregate patterns of interest groups’ activity. This article seeks to address this lacuna, by examining patterns of mobilization and conflict of interest groups’ activity in EU legislative policymaking. To do so, it adopts a unique policy-centred research design and an empirical assessment of policy mobilization for a sample of 125 EU legislative proposals based on extensive media coding as well as structured elite interviews. We find that levels of policy mobilization vary substantively across different legislative proposals and that political conflict between interest groups is remarkably low. This suggests that interest group conflict and mobilization contribute little to EU politicization and that in cases where interest groups voice opposing positions, conflicts do not occur between business and non-business groups. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of interest groups in EU legislative policymaking. Show less
Deetman, S.; Oers, L. van; Voet, E. van der; Tukker, A. 2018
Since signing the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the European Union (EU) has been working on increasing its renewable energy supply. However, the progress has been uneven across member states. A vibrant... Show moreSince signing the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the European Union (EU) has been working on increasing its renewable energy supply. However, the progress has been uneven across member states. A vibrant literature advances several explanations for this variation, but pays insufficient attention to a critical structural factor – varying levels of natural resource wealth across the EU – and provides an incomplete account by focusing on consumption indicators. Reconciling divergent views in the literature in a single framework, we hold that while overall natural resource abundance can be conducive to renewable energy production within a country, specific natural resources, such as petroleum, are likely to be harmful. These hypotheses find empirical support in a mixed-methods study that combines a fixed-effects statistical analysis of comprehensive panel data between 1997 and 2015 with a comparative qualitative case study of the Netherlands and Belgium. The findings suggest that to achieve the ambitious goals on renewable energy deployment, the EU needs additional policies that explicitly tackle pernicious effects of specific natural resources, including rent-capturing by politicians, rent-seeking by corporate vested interests, and lack of economic incentives to diversify. Show less
The article elaborates on the significance of the duty of sincere cooperation as a legal principle in the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) of the European Union (EU), in particular as regards the... Show moreThe article elaborates on the significance of the duty of sincere cooperation as a legal principle in the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) of the European Union (EU), in particular as regards the relationship between the Union and its Member States. It argues that while the duty of sincere cooperation is a judicially enforceable duty vis-a-vis the Member States, it is losing some of its relevance in the context of the CCP. This is due to the fact that the Lisbon Treaty, as confirmed by the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU, expanded the scope of the CCP and clearly identifies it as an exclusive competence of the Union. Loyalty in the CCP, therefore, is mainly covered by the obligation to respect the exclusivity of the Union’s international powers in this area. While this does not equate to the disappearance of the Member States as actors in international economic governance, it does seriously constrain their leeway for autonomous action. In addition, the article applies this finding to a number of current developments surrounding the CCP. These include, firstly, the new Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy, which promotes the idea of a “joined-up” approach between different actors and policies; secondly, “Brexit” and the prospect of the United Kingdom negotiating new trade agreements of its own; thirdly, the position of the Member States in the WTO; and fourthly, the nature of the wave of new free trade agreements that the EU is negotiating and concluding. Show less
Berkhout, J.; Beyers, J.; Braun, C.; Hanegraaff, M.; Lowery, D. 2017
Scholars of mobilisation and policy influence employ two quite different approaches to mapping interest group systems. Those interested in research questions on mobilisation typically rely on a... Show moreScholars of mobilisation and policy influence employ two quite different approaches to mapping interest group systems. Those interested in research questions on mobilisation typically rely on a bottom-up mapping strategy in order to characterise the total size and composition of interest group communities. Researchers with an interest in policy influence usually rely on a top-down strategy in which the mapping of politically active organisations depends on samples of specific policies. But some scholars also use top-down data gathered for other research questions on mobilisation (and vice versa). However, it is currently unclear how valid such large-N data for different types of research questions are. We illustrate our argument by addressing these questions using unique data sets drawn from the INTEREURO project on lobbying in the European Union and the European Union’s Transparency Register. Our findings suggest that top-down and bottom-up mapping strategies lead to profoundly different maps of interest group communities. Show less
The European Union interest group population is often characterised as being biased towards business and detached from its constituency base. Many scholars attribute this to institutional factors... Show moreThe European Union interest group population is often characterised as being biased towards business and detached from its constituency base. Many scholars attribute this to institutional factors unique to the EU. Yet, assessing whether or not the EU is indeed unique in this regard requires a comparative research design. We compare the EU interest group population with those in four member states: France, Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands. We differentiate system, policy domain and organisational factors and examine their effects on interest group diversity. Our results show that the EU interest system is not more biased towards the representation of business interests than the other systems. Moreover, EU interest organisations are not more detached from their constituents than those in the studied countries. Everywhere, business interest associations seem to be better capable of representing their members’ interests than civil society groups. These findings suggest that the EU is less of a sui generis system than commonly assumed and imply the need for more fine-grained analyses of interest group diversity. Show less
