Differentiation has evolved into a systematic feature of European integration. Still, EU member states have been eager to maintain unity and not let differentiated integration (DI) be reflected in... Show moreDifferentiation has evolved into a systematic feature of European integration. Still, EU member states have been eager to maintain unity and not let differentiated integration (DI) be reflected in institutions and processes of EU governance. The sovereign debt crisis was a turning point, triggering an unprecedented reinforcement of euro area specific institutions and policies. So far, few contributions have studied the institutional implications of DI in the EU. This dissertation examines whether and, if so, how and with what implications DI has been institutionalised in EMU governance. It analyses the organisational inclusiveness of crisis management structures, the evolution of the Eurogroup and Eurogroup Working Group, procedural norms and elite ideas. The findings suggest that the distinction between euro area insiders and outsiders has become embedded in how member state representatives perceive political reality, determine mutual role expectations and organise governance processes. While this institutionalisation of DI in EMU was facilitated by particular circumstances of the sovereign debt crisis, its implications are evident in EMU governance and reform processes until today. The dissertation makes theoretical and empirical contributions to account for DI in institutional and political developments in EMU and, thus, aims to enrich institutionalist debates in EU studies. Show less
This article analyses the United Kingdom’s (UK) ‘trade continuity programme’. The promise that, once outside the European Union (EU), the UK would strike new, lucrative trade deals continues to be... Show moreThis article analyses the United Kingdom’s (UK) ‘trade continuity programme’. The promise that, once outside the European Union (EU), the UK would strike new, lucrative trade deals continues to be an important part of the Brexiteers’ narrative. What the UK was compelled to do first, however, was to conclude ‘roll-over’ agreements to replace the trade agreements already made by the EU. This article posits that, contrary to expectations, the UK’s continuity programme should be regarded as a success – for both the UK and the EU. In most cases, the UK managed to replicate to a very large extent the terms originally granted to the EU, despite being a smaller market and despite challenging circumstances. From the EU’s perspective, the UK’s continuity programme can be regarded as a case of successful norm internalization and export. This first chapter of post-Brexit UK trade policy shows that even a country that has left the EU still legally commits itself and its partners to the EU’s norms and values. Hence, the EU should welcome the UK’s imitation as a shared normative basis to expand cooperation with its former member state in a challenging geopolitical environment. Show less
There has been much recent debate over whether the European Union is or should be a ‘militant democratic’ actor in order to respond to democratic backsliding in EU member states. This article... Show moreThere has been much recent debate over whether the European Union is or should be a ‘militant democratic’ actor in order to respond to democratic backsliding in EU member states. This article argues that the EU is a militant democracy in a specific and limited sense, but that this may be normatively undesirable from a democratic perspective. I first develop a definition of militant democracy that focuses on the militant democratic paradox. I argue that the strongest justifications for militant democracy require that two conditions are met: an ‘existential threat condition’ and a ‘necessity condition’. Next, I analyse four ways in which the European Union has been said to be empowered to act in a militant democratic fashion to combat democratic backsliding in EU member states. I show how some, though not all, of these warrant the label ‘militant democracy’. Moving from the descriptive to the normative analysis, I then consider whether the necessity condition can ever be met since there is always the possibility of non-militant responses through forms of EU disintegration. If we accept this argument, EU actors should prioritize robust non-militant measures where possible while pro-democratic member states should disassociate from frankly autocratic member states where non-militant measures fail. Show less
On 31 January 2020 the United Kingdom (UK) left the European Union (EU). In the European Parliament (EP), Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) cried together and folded flags. It marked the... Show moreOn 31 January 2020 the United Kingdom (UK) left the European Union (EU). In the European Parliament (EP), Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) cried together and folded flags. It marked the end of an era. At the end of that year, after much agony, the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) was signed on 24 December 2020 and the ratification was completed in April 2021. The TCA allows both entities tariff-free, quota-free access to markets for goods. Services are not part of the TCA. Part of the agreement are also fishing rights as well as cooperation in the area of security (e.g., in the area of information sharing security related to matters of internal security), but no mention of security and defence collaboration. There are still many unresolved issues. Some of these issues involve fishing matters (Reuters, 2021). But collaboration in security and defence matters is also crucial as demonstrated by the need to deal with the war in Ukraine that erupted following the Russian invasion on 24 February. Show less
This chapter charts the position of the European Union (EU) in the global political economy (GPE), identifies key dimensions of change and development, and evaluates the EU’s impact on the... Show moreThis chapter charts the position of the European Union (EU) in the global political economy (GPE), identifies key dimensions of change and development, and evaluates the EU’s impact on the operation of the contemporary GPE. It does so by outlining key ideas in international political economy (IPE), by relating these to the growth of the EU, and by assessing the EU’s role in the GPE in three areas: European integration itself, the EU’s engagement in the GPE, and the EU’s claims to be a major economic power. The final part of the chapter brings these together an examination of global economic governance—in particular, the EU’s role in the financial, multilateral state system with its principles of global governance, and pays some attention to recent crises (such as the Covid-19 pandemic) and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Show less
The study of why and when governments are caught out by strategic surprise has been a major occupation of intelligence studies, international relations, public administration and crisis management... Show moreThe study of why and when governments are caught out by strategic surprise has been a major occupation of intelligence studies, international relations, public administration and crisis management studies. Still little is known, however, about the structural vulnerabilities to such surprises in international organisations such as the European Union (EU). EU institutions themselves have not undertaken rigorous investigations or public inquiries of recent strategic surprises, instead relying on internal review processes. In order to understand the most common underlying problems causing surprise in the EU context, this paper adapts and tests insights from the strategic surprise literature. It elaborates a theoretical framework with five hypotheses about why the leadership of EU institutions has been prone to being caught by surprises in foreign affairs: limitations in collection capacity, institutional fragmentation of policymaking, organisational culture, member state politicisation, and cognitive biases arising from collective ideas and norms. These hypotheses are tested using a post-mortem approach investigating two significant strategic surprises: the start and spread of the Arab uprisings of 2010/11 and Ukraine–Russia crisis of 2013/14. Show less
There is no clear view on how accountability is organised in the context of transgovernmental networks. In literature there is predominant view that accountability is threatened by the existence of... Show moreThere is no clear view on how accountability is organised in the context of transgovernmental networks. In literature there is predominant view that accountability is threatened by the existence of transgovernmental networks. This dissertation takes a micro-level approach by focusing on participants of transgovernmental networks, to understand the dynamics of accountability in this setting. This dissertation makes use of theory building and testing. A theoretical model links the function and governance style of a transgovernmental network to the type of accountability that can be expected. Four distinct empirical cases show that there is a link between the level of formalisation of a governance style and the extent of control. Moreover, this research shows that the function of a transgovernmental network is indicative for the source of control. Show less
While consumers in the European Union (EU) are generally afforded a high level of protection, the law on air passenger rights, by example, draws debate over the cost of such protection. In the... Show moreWhile consumers in the European Union (EU) are generally afforded a high level of protection, the law on air passenger rights, by example, draws debate over the cost of such protection. In the absence of a clear definition of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ in Regulation (EC) 261/2004, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has not always balanced consumer interests with business realities in its many preliminary rulings on interpretation of these words. Workers joined this picture in the case of Airhelp/SAS [2021], in which the CJEU held that a lawful strike by an air carrier’s own pilot unions does not amount to ‘extraordinary circumstances’. This article explores this ruling in the light of EU air passenger rights and social dialogue objectives. Show less
The Protocol on Ireland/Northern has the questionable honour of having its dispute settlement mechanisms being activated first under the new post-Brexit agreements between the EU and UK. This... Show moreThe Protocol on Ireland/Northern has the questionable honour of having its dispute settlement mechanisms being activated first under the new post-Brexit agreements between the EU and UK. This chapter highlights the two main hallmarks of the Protocol: on the one hand, being an integral part of the Withdrawal Agreement and the post-Brexit legal framework more broadly, and, on the other, being one of the last and most enduring holdouts of EU institutions applying EU law in a part of the UK. These characteristics, coupled with the high political stakes in the context of North-South relations in Ireland and the peace process, merit close scrutiny of the Protocol’s governance and dispute settlement provisions. Based on an analysis of the relevant provisions and informed by leading theories on compliance in international law, this chapter argues that due to fundamentally different views and strategies of the EU institutions and the UK government, the design and use of the Protocol’s mechanisms have the potential to exacerbate rather than mend EU-UK relations. Show less
Interest groups are often described as transmission belts that connect the preferences of their members with public officials in policymaking processes. Through this linkage, public officials can... Show moreInterest groups are often described as transmission belts that connect the preferences of their members with public officials in policymaking processes. Through this linkage, public officials can obtain relevant information and gain legitimacy from those affected by public policies. However, this important intermediary function is not a straightforward endeavor as interest groups often struggle to reconcile their dual function of representing their members while being politically active. This dissertation unpacks interest groups mobilized at the European Union level and examines how they are organized so as to function as transmission belts. Subsequently, it analyzes the effects of this transmissive role for the level of access and influence obtained by groups in policymaking processes. The findings shed light on the difficult task of groups in balancing member involvement while being politically active and the implications for the legitimacy of our governance systems. Show less
China is the second-biggest trading partner of the European Union, and the EU is the biggest trading partner of China. Hence, China adds EU have a close relationship. In this sense, it is vital to... Show moreChina is the second-biggest trading partner of the European Union, and the EU is the biggest trading partner of China. Hence, China adds EU have a close relationship. In this sense, it is vital to find the media perception of the EU and the political ideology behind their relationship. However, most of the existed studies explore China-EU relationship through their trade information, while ignore the role of Chinese media frame of EU. This study believe that China’s official media frame offer a strong evidence to understand China-EU relation- ship. This article aims to examine China’s official media perception of the EU by systematically examine the previous study. This study finds that Chinese media frame EU as an economic and political partner in a positive way but try to avoid mentioning the contradiction and friction, the selective negative is-sues are mainly for propaganda and conform to Chinese government atti- tude. Hence, this study discusses that Chinese official media follow the narra- tive of the Chinese government and reflect the EU-China relationship from the Chinese government perspective. Show less
Summary: Global media discussion and policy responses to the armed conflict in Tigray Region, Ethiopia, that started op 4 November 2020 by the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front) party-led... Show moreSummary: Global media discussion and policy responses to the armed conflict in Tigray Region, Ethiopia, that started op 4 November 2020 by the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front) party-led Tigray Regional government, are marked by bias, incompleteness, lack of context understanding, credulity and an anti-federal goverment attitude. The conflict, provoked by an unannounced and treacherous nightly attack by TPLF forces on federal army troups stationed in Tigray to protect the Region, was the result of misplaced power-mongering by the TPLF, and its building up of tension with the federal Ethiopian goverment. The 4 November attack led to a major federal army response. Five days after the attack by TPLF, on 9 November 2021, over 800 Amharic-speaking civilian inhabitants of the town of Mai Kadra in Western Tigray were killed by TPLF-affiliated forces and militias in a gruesome manner – a classic case of ‘ethnic cleansing’. Perpetrators mostly fled to Sudanese refugee camps. These two events - the 4 November attack and the ‘ethnic cleansing’ - were defining dramatic moments in the war. While the conflict unfolded, leading to defeat of the TPLF forces on 28 November 2020 with the taking over of the regional capital Meqele and the flight of the TPLF leadership, many leading Western media and news websites focused on the aftermath and the effects of the fighting in Tigray Region and its population, easily shifting sympathy twards the perceived ‘underdog’ (TPLF). This was followed by hastily written statements by foreign policy makers in EU, USA and UN circles, leading to an emerging policy narrative whereby essential details of the context, the nature of the adversaries, the reasons of the conflict were sidelined. These Atlantic community spokespersons shifted to ‘blaming’ the federal Ethiopian government and ‘demanding’ all kinds of measures from it. Notable was the international community clamouring for ‘unlimited and full access’ for humanitarian aid to ‘prevent famine’, and demand a halt to all hostilities. But meanwhile it did not deliver much aid itself and did as if making it conditional on the federal government following their orders. Part of the international media, several academic associates and researchers who saw acces to their research sites blocked, and diverse TPLF associates in various international organizations continued to fuel the flames of this approach, next to the ‘digital activism’and the production of fake news reports by pro-TPLF persons in Ethiopa and especially in the Tigrayan ‘diaspora’ in the West.All this led to serious misperceptions and unfair bias on the part of the Atlantic countries and the UN vis-à-vis Ethiopia, which endangered integrity, balance, and a proper perspective on causes and consequences, as well as to policies that seemed akin to ‘development aid blackmail’ and sanctimonious lecturing of a fragile, low-income African developing country. In the exercise, the detailed press statements, reports and explanations by Ethiopian parties, including the government and reformist Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, are routinely neglected or doubted. In contrast, the statements and international messages by TPLF remnants and advocates, marked by a high degree of unreliability, exaggeration and very often lacking truth content, are used uncritically. On the basis of a number of telling examples, this paper describes the above process, analyses the emerging Atlantic discourse and some of its mistakes and wrong assumptions. It thereby pleads for a more balanced, critical approach to the incomplete reporting and wilfull misinformation from questionable sources so as to have the media and Atlantic policy makers develop a more responsible approach.Résumé: parti TPLF (Tigray Peoples Liberation Front), sont marquées par des préjugés, des incomplétudes, un manque de compréhension du contexte, la crédulité et une attitude contre le gouvernement fédéral. Le conflit, provoqué par une attaque nocturne inopinée et perfide par les forces tigréennes contre les troupes de l'armée fédérale stationnées au Tigré pour protéger la région, était le résultat d'une politique de la force mal jugée par le TPLF et sa montée des tensions avec le gouvernement fédéral éthiopien. L'attaque du 4 novembre a évoquée à une réponse directe de l'armée fédérale. Cinq jours après l'attaque du TPLF, plus de 800 habitants civils de langue amharique de la ville de Mai Kadra dans le Tigray occidental ont été tués, le 9 novembre 2021, par des forces et des milices affiliées au TPLF d'une manière horrible - un cas classique de «nettoyage ethnique», et les auteurs ont pour la plupart fui vers les camps de réfugiés soudanais. Ces deux événements - l’attaque du 4 novembre et ce «nettoyage ethnique» - étaient des moments dramatiques cruciales de la guerre. Alors que le conflit se déroulait, conduisant à la défaite des forces du TPLF le 28 novembre 2020 avec la prise de contrôle de la capitale régionale Meqele et la fuite des dirigeants du TPL, de nombreux médias et sites Internet occidentaux de premier plan se sont concentrés sur les conséquences et les effets des combats dans la région du Tigray et sa population, la sympathie se déplaçant facilement vers le «perdant» perçu (TPLF). Cela a été suivi par des déclarations écrites à la hâte par des décideurs politiques étrangers aux cercles de l'UE, des États-Unis et de l'ONU, menant à un récit politique émergent dans lequel les détails essentiels du contexte, de la nature des adversaires et des raisons du conflit ont été mis de côté. Ces portes-parole de la communauté atlantique sont passés à toujours «blâmer» le gouvernement fédéral éthiopien et à «exiger» toutes sortes de mesures de sa part. Il convient de noter que la communauté internationale toujours réclamait un «accès illimité et complet pour l’aide humanitaire» pour «prévenir la famine» et exigeait «‘l’arrêt de toutes les hostilités, mais entre-temps, elle n'a pas fourni beaucoup d'aide et semble la conditionner à ce que le gouvernement fédéral suive ses ordres. Une partie de la presse mondiale, plusieurs universitaires qui ont vu l'accès à leurs sites de recherche bloqué, et divers associés du TPLF dans diverses organisations internationales ont continué à alimenter les flammes de cette approche, à côté de «l'activisme digitale» et de la production de «fake news» et rapports douteux de personnes pro-TPLF en Ethiopie et en particulier dans la «diaspora» tigréenne en Occident. Tout cela a conduit à de graves perceptions erronées et à des préjugés injustes de la part des pays atlantiques et de l'ONU vis-à-vis de l'Éthiopie qui ont mis en danger l'intégrité, l'équilibre et une bonne perspective des causes et des conséquences, ainsi qu’a des politiques qui semblent s'apparenter à une approche sur base de «development aid blackmail» et des discours moralisateurs envers un pays africain pauvre et en développement fragile. Dans l'exercice, les déclarations de presse détaillées et les explications de la part de l’Éthiopie, y compris le gouvernement et le Premier Ministre réformiste Abiy Ahmed, sont régulièrement négligés ou mis en doute. En revanche, les déclarations et les messages internationaux des défenseurs du TPLF, marqués par un degré élevé de manque de fiabilité, d'exagération et souvent dépourvus de contenu véridique, sont utilisés sans critique. Sur la base d'un certain nombre d'exemples révélateurs, cet article décrit le processus ci-dessus et analyse le discours atlantique émergent et certaines de ses erreurs et hypothèses erronées. Il plaide ainsi pour une approche plus équilibrée et critique du reportage incomplet et de la désinformation afin que les médias et la politique atlantique développent une politique plus responsable. Show less
This paper offers a political analysis of the development of the TPLF-induced armed conflict in northern Ethiopia and considers the international responses in media and international policy circles... Show moreThis paper offers a political analysis of the development of the TPLF-induced armed conflict in northern Ethiopia and considers the international responses in media and international policy circles. The extension of the conflict by the TPLF after the unilateral ceasefire proclaimed by the federal government on 28 June 2021 (followed by its retreat from Tigray) did not lead to an easing of the fighting. On the contrary, the TPLF used scorched-earth tactics, perpetrated substantial abuse of civilians (mass killings, burning down villages, destroying and looting hospitals, health centres and other economic infrastructure), and created food scarcity, hundreds of thousands of IDPs and hugely aggravated humanitarian problems in the Amhara and Afar regions. In spite of this unilateral TPLF extension of the armed conflict, the responses of international policy circles, notably from the Western ‘donor countries’ and the UN, have been negative towards the federal government and mild on the TPLF.This paper explores aspects of this paradoxical and problematic approach and argues that it will not lead to a political or other solution of the conflict, especially not in view of the undiminished belligerent strategy of the TPLF. The Ethiopian federal government and its leader PM Abiy Ahmed, having been confirmed in power after a relatively successful and credible parliamentary election on 21 June 2021, are pressurized by much of the global media and Western policy makers for the problems in Tigray – including the ‘famine’ declared by TPLF - and urged to negotiate. The TPLF, incorrectly identified with the people of Tigray as a whole, is not held to account. But an overbearing Western approach based on the threat of sanctions (by the US government) and on what often seem ‘neo-imperialist’ demands, as evident from serious interference in the conflict - even by a number of UN individuals (expelled from the country on 30 September 2021) - will not contribute to political negotiations or dialogue, restoration of peace, or rehabilitation of the war-torn regions, neither to stability in Ethiopia. Not only improved media reporting, based on solid local (Ethiopian) information and checking sources, but also a fundamental reset of certain UN and Western donor country policies on Ethiopia, are needed.RésuméCette étude propose une analyse politique du développement du conflit armé induit par les TPLF dans le nord de l'Éthiopie et examine les réponses internationales dans les médias et les cercles politiques internationaux. L'extension du conflit par le TPLF après le cessez-le-feu unilatéral proclamé par le gouvernement fédéral le 28 juin 2021 (suivi de son retrait du Tigré) n'a pas conduit à un apaisement des combats ; au contraire. Les tactiques de la terre brûlée, les abus sérieux contre les civils (meurtres en masse, incendies de villages, pillage et destruction des hôpitaux et autres infrastructures économiques), la pénurie alimentaire, des centaines de milliers de déplacés internes et des problèmes humanitaires extrêmement aggravés dans les régions d'Amhara et d'Afar en ont été le résultat. Malgré cette extension unilatérale du conflit par le TPLF, les réponses des cercles politiques internationaux, notamment des pays « bailleurs-de-fonds » occidentaux et de l'ONU, ont été négatives envers le gouvernement fédéral mais modérées envers le TPLF. Show less
This article introduces a special issue that investigates the interplay between domestic socio-political orders and changing external influences – of the EU, Russia, Turkey and other external... Show moreThis article introduces a special issue that investigates the interplay between domestic socio-political orders and changing external influences – of the EU, Russia, Turkey and other external actors in the region. In this introduction, we lay the conceptual framework and propose theoretical mechanisms linking state capacity and the actions of external actors to the likelihood of transformations from limited to open access orders. Previewing the findings, we note a fundamental asymmetry: while external actors have many levers to undermine the establishment of an open access order, they are more limited in how they can support reforms towards liberal democracy and free-market economy. Show less
The main purpose of this book is twofold. First, it takes stock of integration theories and of more recent approaches to European integration. A wide range of theoretical perspectives were... Show moreThe main purpose of this book is twofold. First, it takes stock of integration theories and of more recent approaches to European integration. A wide range of theoretical perspectives were scrutinized to achieve this goal. The chapters in this book seek to define the “crisis” (or a sister concept) from different conceptual angles, discuss the added-value of at least one theory or concept in the analysis of European integration, and apply these concepts to the crisis the EU has faced in the last decade. Second, while individual chapters discuss a wide range of crises or different phases of the same crisis, the underlying purpose of the book is to understand whether the past decade is an exception for the EU, and in what ways the successive waves of crises point to a more profound crisis of the integration process. The main contribution of the volume, besides its attempt to revisit the theorization of European integration, lies in its questioning of the changing dynamics of the integration process and, in this way, in its attempt to grasp the nexus between “crisis” and the EU’s integration process. The main point here was to understand whether the different crises since 2009 have triggered a more profound crisis in the process of European political integration, or if inherent problems related to the functioning of the EU have driven these various crises by aggravating their impact on the integration process. Show less
Wijk, R.P.J. van; Dijck, J.T.J.M. van; Timmers, M.; Veen, E. van; Citerio, G.; Lingsma, H.F.; ... ; CENTER-TB1 Investigators 2020
Purpose: Enrolling traumatic brain injury (731) patients with an inability to provide informed consent in research is challenging. Alternatives to patient consent are not sufficiently embedded in... Show morePurpose: Enrolling traumatic brain injury (731) patients with an inability to provide informed consent in research is challenging. Alternatives to patient consent are not sufficiently embedded in European and national legislation, which allows procedural variation and bias. We aimed to quantify variations in informed consent policy and practice.Methods: Variation was explored in the CENTER-TBI study. Policies were reported by using a questionnaire and national legislation. Data on used informed consent procedures were available for 4498 patients from 57 centres across 17 European countries.Results: Variation in the use of informed consent procedures was found between and within EU member states. Proxy informed consent (N = 1377;64%) was the most frequently used type of consent in the ICU, followed by patient informed consent (N 426;20%) and deferred consent (N 334;16%). Deferred consent was only actively used in 15 centres (26%), although it was considered valid in 47 centres (82%).Conclusions: Alternatives to patient consent are essential for TBI research. While there seems to be concordance amongst national legislations, there is regional variability in institutional practices with respect to the use of different informed consent procedures. Variation could be caused by several reasons, including inconsistencies in clear legislation or knowledge of such legislation amongst researchers. (C) 2020 Published by Elsevier Inc. Show less
Leiser, M.R.; Harbinja, E.; Blakely, M.; Romero, F.R.; Barker, K.; Coozigou, I. 2020
Co-authored response from BILETA to the EU's consultation on the Digital Services Act package with two main pillars: announced first, a proposal of new and revised rules to deepen the Single Market... Show moreCo-authored response from BILETA to the EU's consultation on the Digital Services Act package with two main pillars: announced first, a proposal of new and revised rules to deepen the Single Market for Digital Services, by increasing and harmonising the responsibilities of online platforms and information service providers and reinforce the oversight over platforms’ content policies in the EU; second, ex ante rules to ensure that markets characterised by large platforms with significant network effects acting as gatekeepers, remain fair and contestable for innovators, businesses, and new market entrants. Show less
The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union has prompted a global recalibration of treaty relations. Due to the Withdrawal Agreement and its transition period, the UK is expanding... Show moreThe withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union has prompted a global recalibration of treaty relations. Due to the Withdrawal Agreement and its transition period, the UK is expanding its international treaty-making powers as it is gradually released from the constraints of EU law. Practice to date shows the creation of many new international legal instruments through which governments have sought to address the novel questions that Brexit raises for the international law of treaties. Show less
Contemporary governance is increasingly characterized by the consultation of different types of stakeholders, such as interest groups representing economic and citizen interests, as well as public... Show moreContemporary governance is increasingly characterized by the consultation of different types of stakeholders, such as interest groups representing economic and citizen interests, as well as public and private institutions, such as public authorities and firms. Previous research has demonstrated that public officials use a variety of tools to involve these actors in policymaking. Yet, we have limited knowledge on how particular consultation approaches relate to stakeholder participation. To what extent do open, closed and hybrid consultation approaches, with the first two, respectively, referring to the use of public and targeted tools, and the third one implying a combination of both of them, relate to the policy engagement of a different set of stakeholders? In this paper, we identify the different tools used by the European Commission to engage stakeholders in policymaking and assess how variation in consultation approaches relates to stakeholder participation via a descriptive and multivariate analysis. We rely on two datasets: a regulatory database that contains detailed information on 41 EU regulations and a stakeholder database that comprises 2617 stakeholders that were involved in these regulations through different consultation tools. Our main finding is that implementing different consultation approaches affects stakeholder diversity. Specifically, closed consultation approaches lead to a lower level of business dominance than hybrid approaches that combine open and targeted consultation tools. Show less
