Ten years ago, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) was created, centralizing European banking supervision. In the SSM, the European Central Bank (ECB) cooperates closely with the National... Show moreTen years ago, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) was created, centralizing European banking supervision. In the SSM, the European Central Bank (ECB) cooperates closely with the National Competent Authorities (NCAs). The unprecedented degree of integration between NCAs and the ECB leads to supervision often being a joint exercise. SSM composite procedures are a specific type of such a joint exercise.Composite procedures culminate in a final ECB or NCA decision, yet are based on input from both. This integrated decision-making forms a paradox with the European system of judicial protection, which to an important extent remains to be organised dualistically. In short, national courts still review only national acts while the EU Courts, in principle, review only EU acts.This paradox raises concerns regarding effective judicial protection. This dissertation aims to investigate whether the EU principle of effective judicial protection is currently safeguarded within the SSM, particularly where it concerns composite procedures. It examines both the action for annulment and the action for damages, addressing the interplay between the EU and Dutch national legal framework. It is concluded that effective judicial protection is not always achieved. The dissertation therefore proposes several recommendations aimed at enhancing effective judicial protection within SSM composite procedures. Show less
Is the European Central Bank (ECB) increasingly acting on political – rather than technocratic – considerations? This question is of a central concern to students of European Union (EU) political... Show moreIs the European Central Bank (ECB) increasingly acting on political – rather than technocratic – considerations? This question is of a central concern to students of European Union (EU) political economy. This article contributes to this debate by studying the ECB’s credit lines to the central banks of EU member states outside the Euro Area during the Global Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 crisis. Both times the ECB accorded selectively better borrowing conditions to some central banks. The article finds that its selection of who gets favourable borrowing terms has indeed become more political. In 2008, the ECB decided the credit terms based on technocratic criteria, but twelve years later, it granted better lending conditions to countries that were close to adopting the euro. How the ECB balances its mandate for price stability in the Euro Area and its role as a supranational EU institution decides whether it will become more politicised. Show less
Credit lines between central banks can be a powerful instrument to restore international financial stability during a crisis. Yet, so far, few political scientists have ventured to study central... Show moreCredit lines between central banks can be a powerful instrument to restore international financial stability during a crisis. Yet, so far, few political scientists have ventured to study central bank cooperation in the context of European macroeconomic governance and the implications for the international role of the euro. This paper closes this gap in our knowledge by looking at the European Central Bank’s (ECB) cooperation with non-Euro Area central banks during the Global Financial Crisis 2008/09 and the COVID-19-crisis 2020. Based on recently declassified policy documents and eight insider interviews I find that the ECB’s handling of the international role of the euro has changed over time. In 2008, the ECB had decided the credit terms largely based on perceived sovereign credit risk. In 2020, the ECB granted better lending conditions to countries that were institutionally closer to the Euro Area. Based on this I argue that the ECB has redefined its interests during international crises from limiting financial risks to promoting the institutional objectives of the Euro Area. This indicates not just that the ECB has in 2020 acted more proactively as international lender of last resort, but also that it has done so largely in line with political considerations. Show less
Credit lines between central banks can be a powerful instrument to restore international financial stability during a crisis. Yet, so far, few political scientists have ventured to study central... Show moreCredit lines between central banks can be a powerful instrument to restore international financial stability during a crisis. Yet, so far, few political scientists have ventured to study central bank cooperation in the context of European macroeconomic governance and the implications for the international role of the euro. This paper closes this gap in our knowledge by looking at the European Central Bank’s (ECB) cooperation with non-Euro Area central banks during the Global Financial Crisis 2008/09 and the COVID-19-crisis 2020. Based on recently declassified policy documents and eight insider interviews I find that the ECB’s handling of the international role of the euro has changed over time. In 2008, the ECB had decided the credit terms largely based on perceived sovereign credit risk. In 2020, the ECB granted better lending conditions to countries that were institutionally closer to the Euro Area. Based on this I argue that the ECB has redefined its interests during international crises from limiting financial risks to promoting the institutional objectives of the Euro Area. This indicates not just that the ECB has in 2020 acted more proactively as international lender of last resort, but also that it has done so largely in line with political considerations. Show less
The European Central Bank (ECB) has been in existence for almost 20 years and more if one considers its immediate predecessor the European Monetary Institute (1994–1997). During these two decades... Show moreThe European Central Bank (ECB) has been in existence for almost 20 years and more if one considers its immediate predecessor the European Monetary Institute (1994–1997). During these two decades the ECB has become an established institution. It secures price stability and further increased its reputation as a lender of last resort during the financial crisis and its aftermath. In the 2010s, in response to the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis, the ECB has also taken on the role of supervisor of the financial system and monitors developments in the Euro Area financial sector.Political science literature on the ECB can be subdivided into different strands. One strand looks at the ECB as just another central bank and hence examines its role as a central bank with the usual instruments. Another strand of literature examines the role of the ECB as an institution that is insufficiently embedded into democratic checks and balances. This perennial criticism of the ECB was born when the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) was created to be independent from political influence. A third strand of the literature is newer and examines the unorthodox steps that the ECB (and other central banks) took, and have taken, to offset the financial crisis and the ensuing economic crisis. An analysis of European integration and the political economy of the Euro Area can contribute to a better understanding of why the ECB has taken a proactive role. The political science research of the ECB is discussed here as well as the various dimensions of research conducted on the ECB. Show less
The widespread presence of foreign banks in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) was seen as a potential source of instability during the financial crisis of 2008/09. However, foreign banks acted... Show moreThe widespread presence of foreign banks in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) was seen as a potential source of instability during the financial crisis of 2008/09. However, foreign banks acted primarily as a stabilizing force by supporting their subsidiaries and forwarding liquidity, rather than cutting and running. In doing so they closed a significant gap in the EU’s financial stability framework and prevented both a worse financial crisis and currency crises in the new member states. In this paper, I argue that the expectation that foreign banks would step in as private lenders-of-last-resort was exactly the reason why CEE policymakers had encouraged foreign bank entry around the year 2000. Their policy frameworks looked unsuitable for withstanding a financial crisis, but this was the result of rule and policy transfers from the EU which did not take these unique market structures into account. Indeed, already by 2004 it was clear that foreign banks would manage liquidity conditions in CEE and that monetary policy would, at best, accommodate that. The theoretical contribution based on this is that financial market structures developed to be a pillar of the regional financial system in their own right. Although they emerged without central guidance, high levels of foreign bank ownership had the effect of aligning expectations and resulted in material support during the financial crisis. Balance-of-Payments support, it follows, is not just the result of official cooperation; private actors may wield more control over liquidity conditions than central banks. Show less
