Security is something that people tend to care about. But is it also something that they should care about? To explore this question, this dissertation first develops a new conceptual framework of... Show moreSecurity is something that people tend to care about. But is it also something that they should care about? To explore this question, this dissertation first develops a new conceptual framework of security. Next, it analyses how security relates to some key values for liberal democratic societies. The first of these is well-being. It is argued that there are important ways in which security can contribute to somebody’s well-being – but there are also ways in which security may hamper a person’s flourishing. The second value is freedom. It is shown that in public decision-making freedom and security may come at each other’s cost – yet there are also ways in which the two can work to each other’s benefit. The third value is equality. It is demonstrated that in order for a society to meet the demands of equality it must provide its members with a particular set of securities – while at the same time the pursuit of equality puts another set of securities out of reach. Ultimately, this dissertation finds no reason for considering security to be good for its own sake, but it argues that security can be good for the sake of well-being, freedom, and equality. Show less
The chapter focuses on the role of the European Union’s general principles of equal treatment in the field of non-discrimination law in the context of EU-Directives 2000/43 and 2000/78.
In this blog the author presents the main conclusions from his fully revised and updated article ‘Same-Sex Partnership, International Protection’ in the online Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public...Show moreIn this blog the author presents the main conclusions from his fully revised and updated article ‘Same-Sex Partnership, International Protection’ in the online Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Earlier versions of that article were published in 2009, 2012 and 2014. This July 2021 update of his article discusses all 50 rulings on the topic given by international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, plus various decisions of other bodies of UN, EU and other international organizations. The article covers human rights law and international staff law, and touches on rules of free movement and private international law). His analysis of this growing body of international law, led the author to conclude that by 2021 six international legal norms that have emerged on the protection and recognition of same-sex partners. The article 'Same-Sex Partnership, International Protection' is available online (to subscribers only, but sometimes also to others) at: https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1739. Show less
This online article discusses all (almost 50) rulings given by international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies on the topic of same-sex partnership, plus relevant written and soft law from other... Show moreThis online article discusses all (almost 50) rulings given by international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies on the topic of same-sex partnership, plus relevant written and soft law from other bodies of international organisations such as the UN and the EU. The article covers human rights law and international staff law, and touches on rules of free movement and private international law. It includes paragraphs on state practice, parenting issues, same-sex marriage, informal cohabitation, registered partnership, international recognition of existing same-sex marriages, and international recognition of existing registered partnerships. Earlier versions of this article appeared online in 2009 and 2014 and in print in 2012. In light of the considerable legal developments since then, it now concludes as follows (in paragraphs 38-40): “International protection for same-sex partnership is a topic that has seen important developments recently (…). At least two ‘global’ norms have emerged:(1) a prohibition of discrimination between unmarried different-sex cohabitants and unmarried same-sex cohabitants; and(2) an obligation to recognize existing same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions (at least for some purposes).Two related ‘global’ norms seem to be emerging (…):(3) an obligation to respect existing marriages that are becoming ‘same-sex’ because one of the spouses is having a change of sex/gender; and(4) an obligation to recognize existing registered partnerships from other jurisdictions (at least for some purposes). (…)Authority for these four ‘global’ norms can be found in decisions of bodies of the UN, in decisions of European and Inter-American bodies, and also in the domestic law of countries in different parts of the world. (…)In two regions of the world (Europe and the Americas) two further norms are emerging. One of these regionally emerging norms is:(5) an obligation to give same-sex couples access to a legal framework for their relationship. In the Americas this emerging obligation ultimately requires the opening up of marriage, while in Europe it still leaves it to the countries themselves to decide whether this legal framework will be marriage or only a form of registered partnership (…). The other regionally emerging norm is:(6) an obligation to give same-sex couples access to rights and benefits derived from marriage. In the Americas this obligation seems to concern all rights that flow from marriage, while in Europe it so far seems limited to core or essential rights, such as the right to live in the same country as your partner (…). For these emerging regional norms there is not yet much authority in decisions of bodies of the UN, and even less from regional bodies outside Europe and the Americas. However, these norms do reflect developments in domestic law that have at least started on all continents. It seems likely that in both regions the international case law will crystalize further, and there seems scope for some convergence between the approaches of ECtHR and IACtHR. (…) (Also because) both courts have acknowledged both the controversial character and the dynamic nature of developments in the national and international protection of same-sex partnership. (…)”This article is available (to subscribers - and sometimes also to others) at: https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1739. A summary by Kees Waaldijk ('Six international legal norms on the protection of same-sex partnership have emerged') was published in the International and Comparative SOGIESC LawBlog (edited by Andreas R. Ziegler, University of Lausanne): https://sogiesc.law.blog/2021/12/20/six-international-legal-norms-on-the-protection-of-same-sex-partnership-have-emerged. Show less
OBJECTIVE: Historically, women have been underrepresented in medicine but nowadays the underrepresentation is more applicable to surgical disciplines. Many efforts have been made to decrease the... Show moreOBJECTIVE: Historically, women have been underrepresented in medicine but nowadays the underrepresentation is more applicable to surgical disciplines. Many efforts have been made to decrease the attrition rate of women in neurosurgery and to even career opportunities to be comparable to those of male colleagues. However, it is unclear if gender disparities occur between female and male neurosurgeons. Therefore, the aim of the current study is to identify gender differences in the professional and private life of neurosurgeons.METHODS: A survey consisting of 38 questions was sent to members of the Congress of Neurological Surgeons regarding demographics, career fulfillment, private life, and parenting. Comparison between female and male respondents was made.RESULTS: A total of 870 members filled in surveys, which were analyzed. Working full time, days worked weekly, and gross salary did not differ between male and female neurosurgeons. However, female neurosurgeons rated their career fulfillment worse than did male neurosurgeons (P < 0.001) and were less likely to choose a career as a neurosurgeon again (P < 0.001). Furthermore, female neurosurgeons were less likely to be married or to have children than were male colleagues (P < 0.001).CONCLUSIONS: Despite efforts to increase the amount of women enrolling into neurosurgery and despite efforts to strive for equality, the results of the current study show gender disparities in professional and private careers among neurosurgeons. Practice patterns did not differ between male and female neurosurgeons, but perceptions of career and characteristics of private life did. Program directors and chairs should focus on measures to decrease gender differences and to strive for equal career satisfaction among female and male neurosurgeons. Show less
De uitdrukkelijke toevoeging van de categorieën geslachtskenmerken, genderidentiteit en genderexpressie aan de AWGB betekent volgens de initiatiefnemers een forse stap in het terugdringen van de... Show moreDe uitdrukkelijke toevoeging van de categorieën geslachtskenmerken, genderidentiteit en genderexpressie aan de AWGB betekent volgens de initiatiefnemers een forse stap in het terugdringen van de structurele achterstand van transgender en intersekse personen. Als we deze wetswijziging in een breder perspectief plaatsen, kunnen we ons echter afvragen of zij de gewenste emancipatie dichterbij brengt en of het in die zin verstandig is dat de wetgever – ook na de suggestie van de Raad van State – de strafrechtelijke optie van het uitbreiden van de gronden voor strafbare groepsbelediging links liet liggen. Show less
This Dutch version of this article is online at www.wodc.nl/images/jv1504-volledige-tekst_tcm44-604470.pdf/#page=67 and the English version at www.articolo29.it/genius. This article gives a... Show moreThis Dutch version of this article is online at www.wodc.nl/images/jv1504-volledige-tekst_tcm44-604470.pdf/#page=67 and the English version at www.articolo29.it/genius. This article gives a compact overview of developments in national and European law regarding same-sex partners. Over the last decades, new legal family formats (such as registered partnership and de facto union) have been made available in a growing number of countries. The number of countries that have opened up marriage to same-sex couples is also growing. Authors of comparative family law have proposed various classifications of the new legal family formats. Meanwhile, an increasing number of EU laws now acknowledge non-marital partners. The European Courts have been asked several times to rule on controversial differentiations between different legal family formats or between same-sex and different-sex partners. In the case law of the European Court of Human Rights one can find examples of affirmative eloquence which suggest that more steps towards full legal recognition of same-sex families could be expected. This is an edited and updated version of the article 'Great diversity and some equality: non-marital legal family formats for same-sex couples in Europe', that appeared in the book: M. van den Brink et al. (eds.), Equality and human rights: nothing but trouble? – Liber amicorum Titia Loenen, Utrecht, Netherlands Institute of Human Rights 2015 (SIM Special 38, p. 223-245 & 414) and in the journal: GenIUS – Rivista di studi giuridici sull’orientamento sessuale e l’identità di genere 2014 (p. 42-56). Show less
This article (also online at www.articolo29.it/genius) gives a compact overview of developments in national and European law regarding same-sex partners. Over the last decades, new legal family...Show moreThis article (also online at www.articolo29.it/genius) gives a compact overview of developments in national and European law regarding same-sex partners. Over the last decades, new legal family formats (such as registered partnership and de facto union) have been made available in a growing number of countries. The number of countries that have opened up marriage to same-sex couples is also growing. Authors of comparative family law have proposed various classifications of the new legal family formats. Meanwhile, an increasing number of EU laws now acknowledge non-marital partners. The European Courts have been asked several times to rule on controversial differentiations between different legal family formats or between same-sex and different-sex partners. In the case law of the European Court of Human Rights one can find examples of affirmative eloquence which suggest that more steps towards full legal recognition of same-sex families could be expected. This article also appeared in GenIUS – Rivista di studi giuridici sull’orientamento sessuale e l’identità di genere 2014/2, p. 42-56. An earlier version of this text appeared as chapter 4 of the report: O. Thevenon & G. Neyer (eds), Family Policies and Diversity in Europe: The state-of-the-art regarding fertility, work, care, leave, laws and self-sufficiency, Stockholm: Stockholm University 2014 (FamiliesAndSocieties Working Paper Series, nr. 7, p 42-55), and in C. Casonato & A. Schuster (eds.), Rights On The Move – Rainbow Families in Europe (Proceedings of the Conference, Trento, 16-17 October 2014), Trento: University of Trento 2014, p. 121-134. Show less
This article (online at www.articolo29.it/genius) gives a compact overview of developments in national and European law regarding same-sex partners. Over the last decades, new legal family formats... Show moreThis article (online at www.articolo29.it/genius) gives a compact overview of developments in national and European law regarding same-sex partners. Over the last decades, new legal family formats (such as registered partnership and de facto union) have been made available in a growing number of countries. The number of countries that have opened up marriage to same-sex couples is also growing. Authors of comparative family law have proposed various classifications of the new legal family formats. Meanwhile, an increasing number of EU laws now acknowledge non-marital partners. The European Courts have been asked several times to rule on controversial differentiations between different legal family formats or between same-sex and different-sex partners. In the case law of the European Court of Human Rights one can find examples of affirmative eloquence which suggest that more steps towards full legal recognition of same-sex families could be expected. This article also appeared in the book: M. van den Brink et al. (eds.), Equality and human rights: nothing but trouble? – Liber amicorum Titia Loenen, Utrecht, Netherlands Institute of Human Rights 2015 (SIM Special 38, p. 223-245 & 414). An earlier version of this text appeared as chapter 4 of the report: O. Thevenon & G. Neyer (eds), Family Policies and Diversity in Europe: The state-of-the-art regarding fertility, work, care, leave, laws and self-sufficiency, Stockholm: Stockholm University 2014 (FamiliesAndSocieties Working Paper Series, nr. 7, p 42-55), and in C. Casonato & A. Schuster (eds.), Rights On The Move – Rainbow Families in Europe (Proceedings of the Conference, Trento, 16-17 October 2014), Trento: University of Trento 2014, p. 121-134. Show less
This article is available online at http://opil.ouplaw.com. International protection for same-sex partnership is a topic that has seen important developments recently, reflecting more extensive... Show moreThis article is available online at http://opil.ouplaw.com. International protection for same-sex partnership is a topic that has seen important developments recently, reflecting more extensive national developments in a growing number of countries. These national and international developments are likely to continue and to reinforce each other. The current state of international law seems to be quite clear on two points: discrimination between unmarried different-sex cohabitants and unmarried same-sex cohabitants is prohibited, and exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is (probably) still permissible. In between those two points the field is less clear. There is growing support for the proposition that a registered partnership or same-sex marriage validly contracted in one country should be recognized by international organizations and — for certain purposes — also by other countries. And there are reasons to expect that international bodies will apply the prohibition of indirect discrimination to situations where same-sex partners are being excluded from certain legal benefits, because these are only available to married partners. This indirect discrimination argument, which focuses on providing specific benefits, rather than on obtaining status, has been accepted already in several domestic courts. In the short run, persuading international human rights courts and bodies to apply it will probably be the most effective way of increasing the international protection of same-sex partnership. Several countries have, in response to claims that marriage should be opened up to same-sex couples, introduced a form of registered partnership. Assuming that international human rights law will not soon require all countries in the world to open up marriage to same-sex couples, and assuming that many legislatures will be reluctant to attach all rights and obligations of marriage to non-registered cohabitation, it seems possible that some day international human rights courts and bodies will start to require that countries should introduce some alternative to marriage. Any claims in this field deserve serious attention, because, as the European Court of Human Rights has consistently put it, the right to respect for private life encompasses ‘the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings’. Show less
This inquiry seeks to determine to what extent equality and freedom are constituents of a liberal democratic state; part 1 deals with equality, part 2 with freedom. Since the concept of the liberal... Show moreThis inquiry seeks to determine to what extent equality and freedom are constituents of a liberal democratic state; part 1 deals with equality, part 2 with freedom. Since the concept of the liberal democratic state is the subject matter at hand, it seems obvious that freedom is not absent, but that does not answer the question to what extent it should be allowed to citizens, which is what is inquired in detail. As for equality: equal rights, such as the right for every (adult) citizen to vote, are generally accepted to be an integral part of a liberal democratic state, but this raises the question on what foundation such rights are based. Equal rights have widely been defended on the basis of various moral viewpoints. After dealing with some preliminary matters in chapter 1, the tenability of some important and representative theories are examined in chapters 2 to 5. Rawls’s theory focuses on rationality as the pivotal feature to consider beings as equals and to treat them equally, but fails to indicate the import of this feature in that it remains unclear whether rationality is a moral characteristic. The problem with Dworkin’s position, on the other hand, is its abstract nature: Dworkin does not base his account on rationality as a special characteristic, but instead speaks of some beings being ‘intrinsically valuable’. In Kateb’s account, ‘human dignity’ is the focal concept. When it comes to providing the basis for human dignity, this position appears to be difficult to uphold, primarily because it remains unclear precisely which characteristic of human beings is supposed to account for their alleged dignity. In Kant’s alternative, this problem is absent, as reason – in a special sense – is the crucial feature for him. The main problem in this case is that it is difficult to see how dignity should follow from being reasonable or acting on the basis of reason. Starting from a moral outlook is problematic for these reasons and others, so in chapter 6, a position that does not use such a basis is defended. ‘Basic equality’ is the crucial notion here. Simply put, the actual (approximate) equality, which I call factual equality, is the starting point, to be specified by basic equality. Factual equality is observed in many ways, and basic equality is the sort of factual equality between two or more beings that is considered relevant to them (and simultaneously by them, as they are, in a liberal democratic state, also the ones who establish this). Basic equality must in turn be specified. Rationality, I argue, is the most viable characteristic to realize this specification in a liberal democratic state; this has no moral connotation. The upshot of this stance is that a realistic alternative to the theories discussed above is offered, the benefits of which are twofold. On the one hand, vague and problematic terms are shunned, which adds to the position’s consistency and tenability, while it provides, on the other hand, a solid basis for a liberal democratic state to recognize one of its essential features. This means that formal equality, manifested in political equality (exhibited by political liberties, such as the right to vote and the freedom of speech) and legal equality, resulting in equal treatment (e.g. of employees by their employers), can be upheld without the need to resort to moral premises that not only fail to constitute a consistent account but are in addition not universally acknowledged. Part 2 of the inquiry deals with freedom. After some general remarks are made in chapter 7, the import of freedom is indicated in chapter 8. This makes it clear why granting citizens as much freedom as possible is beneficial for both the liberal democratic state as a whole and for citizens themselves. However, as the phrase ‘as much as possible’ indicates, it is important to define the limits (if any) of freedom carefully. Since part 1 of the inquiry emphasizes the importance of (basic) equality, it would seem appealing to connect it with freedom. The merits and difficulties of such a position – Dworkin’s ideas are examined here – are expounded in chapter 9. An alternative for it is offered in chapters 10 and 11, where a demarcation line to limit freedom is defended. Mill’s harm principle provides a useful frame of reference here; the ignore principle, as it is called, seeks to find the optimal outcome in balancing the various interests that are involved. The foregoing prompts the question of whether the liberal democratic state can adopt a neutral stance, and how it should respond to those who deny certain principles of a liberal democratic state, notably those defended in part 1 of this study. In other words: what should the state’s position be towards those who deny that people are equal, e.g. on the basis of racial differences? This is the central issue that is examined in chapters 12 to 15. I argue that it is not the task of a liberal democratic state to decide what people should think, but that, in line with what is maintained in chapters 10 and 11, only equal treatment should be guaranteed, meaning that the outward acts of citizens may legitimately be regulated but nothing else. In this light, Rawls’s and Habermas’s positions are examined critically. Finally, some attention is devoted to the subject matter of militant democracy. The question is pertinent whether the liberal democratic state might be undermined by its own principles. After all, a majority is able to radically change this form of government to one that is ultimately incompatible with those very principles. I try to approach this issue as consistently as the others that present themselves throughout this inquiry. Show less
The article resulting from this paper is online at www.articolo29.it/genius. This paper gives a compact overview of developments in national and European law regarding same-sex partners. Over the... Show moreThe article resulting from this paper is online at www.articolo29.it/genius. This paper gives a compact overview of developments in national and European law regarding same-sex partners. Over the last decades, new legal family formats (such as registered partnership and de facto union) have been made available in a growing number of countries. The number of countries that have opened up marriage to same-sex couples is also growing. Authors of comparative family law have proposed various classifications of the new legal family formats. Meanwhile, an increasing number of EU laws now acknowledge non-marital partners. The European Courts have been asked several times to rule on controversial differentiations between different legal family formats or between same-sex and different-sex partners. In the case law of the European Court of Human Rights one can find examples of affirmative eloquence which suggest that more steps towards full legal recognition of same-sex families could be expected. An earlier version of this paper appeared as chapter 4 of the report: O. Thevenon & G. Neyer (eds.), Family Policies and Diversity in Europe: The state-of-the-art regarding fertility, work, care, leave, laws and self-sufficiency, Stockholm: Stockholm University 2014 (FamiliesAndSocieties Working Paper Series, nr. 7, p 42-55). An updated and expanded version of this that chapter appeared as 'Great diversity and some equality: non-marital legal family formats for same-sex couples in Europe' in the book the book: M. van den Brink et al. (eds.), Equality and human rights: nothing but trouble? – Liber amicorum Titia Loenen, Utrecht, Netherlands Institute of Human Rights 2015 (SIM Special 38, p. 223-245 & 414) and in the journal: GenIUS – Rivista di studi giuridici sull’orientamento sessuale e l’identità di genere 2014, p. 42-56. Show less
The perennial competition and rivalry between individuals and the continuing redefinition of the social category of collectivity have resulted in a cultural transformation in contexts of spatial... Show moreThe perennial competition and rivalry between individuals and the continuing redefinition of the social category of collectivity have resulted in a cultural transformation in contexts of spatial and social relationships, but not in fundamental orientations for principles. Both contradictory principles ('Matuari' and 'Tona'as') have preserved Minahasan culture and society and will continue to govern the dynamics of cultural transformations into the future. Show less
