Differentiation has evolved into a systematic feature of European integration. Still, EU member states have been eager to maintain unity and not let differentiated integration (DI) be reflected in... Show moreDifferentiation has evolved into a systematic feature of European integration. Still, EU member states have been eager to maintain unity and not let differentiated integration (DI) be reflected in institutions and processes of EU governance. The sovereign debt crisis was a turning point, triggering an unprecedented reinforcement of euro area specific institutions and policies. So far, few contributions have studied the institutional implications of DI in the EU. This dissertation examines whether and, if so, how and with what implications DI has been institutionalised in EMU governance. It analyses the organisational inclusiveness of crisis management structures, the evolution of the Eurogroup and Eurogroup Working Group, procedural norms and elite ideas. The findings suggest that the distinction between euro area insiders and outsiders has become embedded in how member state representatives perceive political reality, determine mutual role expectations and organise governance processes. While this institutionalisation of DI in EMU was facilitated by particular circumstances of the sovereign debt crisis, its implications are evident in EMU governance and reform processes until today. The dissertation makes theoretical and empirical contributions to account for DI in institutional and political developments in EMU and, thus, aims to enrich institutionalist debates in EU studies. Show less
On 26 July 2012, Mario Draghi declared in front of a group of about 200 London business people that he would do ‘whatever it takes to save the euro’.1 These seven words have been analysed to have... Show moreOn 26 July 2012, Mario Draghi declared in front of a group of about 200 London business people that he would do ‘whatever it takes to save the euro’.1 These seven words have been analysed to have made all the difference.2 By doing so, the European Central Bank (ECB) effectively ended a long period of uncertainty and indecisiveness. The markets needed a strong signal so that they knew that the young European currency would be supported politically and economically. After summer 2012, the euro area did not experience the same level of crisis, although the sovereign debt crisis was truly resolved only in 2015 and there were still challenging times until then. Show less
Reflections on the sovereign debt crisis often portray the Eurogroup and the Eurogroup Working Group (EWG) as inaccessible for euro area outsiders. Yet, common wisdom suggests that Council... Show moreReflections on the sovereign debt crisis often portray the Eurogroup and the Eurogroup Working Group (EWG) as inaccessible for euro area outsiders. Yet, common wisdom suggests that Council representatives can circumvent exclusion due to differentiated integration (DI) by complying with insider norms. This article studies whether and how compliance with procedural norms socialised amongst representatives from euro area member states (EAMS) determined patterns of non-EAMS involvement in Eurogroup and EWG interaction during the sovereign debt crisis. The argument highlights the role of deliberation and consensus-building norms, suggesting that they gained particular robustness amongst EAMS representatives. Those non-EAMS representatives who consistently complied with these insider norms could secure involvement in intergovernmental debates amongst EAMS. Exclusion was mostly relevant to norm violators. This article sheds light on the institutional consequences of DI in Economic and Monetary Union, highlighting its structural effects on governance and decision-making processes during the sovereign debt crisis. Show less
In summer 2020, in an unprecedented move, the EU offered its Member States help vto cope with the fall-out of the Covid-19 pandemic. To do so, it drew on the EU longterm budget (2021-2027) and... Show moreIn summer 2020, in an unprecedented move, the EU offered its Member States help vto cope with the fall-out of the Covid-19 pandemic. To do so, it drew on the EU longterm budget (2021-2027) and created a new temporary support system referred to as ‘NextGenerationEU’ (NGEU). Formally established in February 2021, the socalled ‘Recovery and Resilience Facility’ (RRF) at the core of the NGEU provides financial support to Member States, notably through a combination of grants and loans (European Parliament and Council of the EU 2021). The EU has issued debt to finance this expenditure, the size and scope of which are unparalleled and break with longstanding taboos). Yet even so, not all scholars agree that this situation represents a sea change.The European Commission insisted on attaching strings to these funds, i.e., that they be spent on the digital transition, the energy transition and on stimulating social and inclusive growth benefi ting the next generation. Member States need to submit detailed national Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) to access the funds.While some reporting templates are new, others draw on the European Semester the EU macro-economic policy coordination framework. Examining how and why the Semester became part of RRF governance, this chapter asks, to what extent did this new set-up change the power balance among key players (e.g., fi nancial and economic players versus social aff airs players)? The chapter distinguishes between ‘EU institutional social players’ and ‘social stakeholders’. The former consist of the DG Employment, Social Aff airs & Inclusion (DG EMPL) of the European Commission, the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs (EPSCO) Council formation and the EU Employment and Social Protection Committees (EMCO and the SPC).2 ‘Social stakeholders’ comprise both EU and national social partners (representatives of worker and employer organisations) and civil society organisations (CSOs). Wherever relevant, we distinguish between players’ involvement at EU and domestic level. Show less
