The Eurocrisis forcefully exposed the Euro’s structural deficiencies, which are back in the limelight due to COVID-19. It is widely acknowledged that EU fiscal integration is required to adequately... Show moreThe Eurocrisis forcefully exposed the Euro’s structural deficiencies, which are back in the limelight due to COVID-19. It is widely acknowledged that EU fiscal integration is required to adequately remedy the remaining deficiencies. However, national constitutional authorities limit the scope for EU fiscal integration based on national sovereignty, democracy and parliamentary prerogatives. The result is a fundamental dilemma: effective EU fiscal integration appears necessary to stabilize the Euro and legally impossible due to national constitutional limits.Confronted with this dilemma, this thesis determines the national constitutional space available for EU fiscal integration. Part I includes a comparative assessment of national constitutional limits to determine how constitutional systems react or could react to EU fiscal integration. Part II tests current EMU reform proposals against the charted national constitutional to evaluate their attainability. Overall, the thesis demonstrates that even rigid national constitutional limits can accommodate EU fiscal integration. To rebut the outlined dilemma the thesis proposes: First, to comprehensively include EU fiscal integration benefits into the national constitutional appraisal thereby replacing the prevailing competence-centric interpretation of national sovereignty and democracy. And second, to design EU fiscal integration in light of national constitutional concerns. Both propositions facilitate the attainment of EU fiscal integration by equally respecting national constitutional concerns. Show less
The primacy of EU law continues to be challenged by domestic courts relying on the notion of constitutional identity. These challenges are no longer limited to the Solange case law of the German Bu...Show moreThe primacy of EU law continues to be challenged by domestic courts relying on the notion of constitutional identity. These challenges are no longer limited to the Solange case law of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) and the controlimiti doctrine of the Italian Corte Costituzionale. More recently, the Hungarian Constitutional Court introduced the notion of ‘historical constitutional identity’ – at a time when the rule of law and independence of the judiciary are in retreat in several parts of the EU. Against this backdrop, this article argues that the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) missed a formidable opportunity to clarify the outer limits of constitutional identity under Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union in Taricco II. Given prudential considerations as well as parallel legislative developments, it can be explained why the CJEU chose to side-step the issue. However, in the Corte Costituzionale, the CJEU found a cooperative and EU law friendly interlocutor which would have allowed it to clarify these limits on its own terms. The CJEU cannot and should not hide from this issue forever. The next domestic court to raise this issue may be less interested in judicial dialogue and more in undermining the primacy of EU law in ever more extensive ways. Show less