This essay analyses the evolving character of Russia’s energy relationships in the post-Soviet space by looking at the Caucasus and Central Asia. In the past, due to the historic legacy of Russia... Show moreThis essay analyses the evolving character of Russia’s energy relationships in the post-Soviet space by looking at the Caucasus and Central Asia. In the past, due to the historic legacy of Russia-controlled pipelines, Moscow was able to exert influence by manipulating structural asymmetries in regional natural gas value chains. This has changed with China’s entry as the region’s major market alternative and the breakthroughs of the global energy transition. The initial phase of Russia’s declining ‘energy power’ vis-à-vis China in Central Asia came to an end as the Crimea crisis was unfolding, an event that has drastically changed the risk perception of Russian gas in Europe, setting off a chain of consequences that led to a re-evaluation of Russia’s energy power in post-Soviet Eurasia. The essay also shows, however, that Russia maintains influence in post-Soviet Eurasia through inter-elite networks and shared concerns among hydrocarbon-exporting countries about the energy transition. Show less
Countries routinely translate official statements and state media articles from native languages to English. Over time, these articles provide a window into what each government is trying to... Show moreCountries routinely translate official statements and state media articles from native languages to English. Over time, these articles provide a window into what each government is trying to portray to the world. The FOCUSdata Project provides years’ worth of text and language sentiment ratings for hundreds of thousands of articles from state media and ministry of foreign affairs’ websites from North Korea, China, Russia, and Iran. Information is an important foreign policy tool and national security strategists analyze how it influences the attitudes and behaviors of foreign audiences. This article introduces the FOCUSdata Project and shows how the sentiment data provide unique abilities to analyze Russia's and Iran's reactions to US policies and events and NGO human rights campaigns. Evaluating countries’ official narratives improves understanding of government signals to outside actors, reactions to crises and foreign policy tools, and interests regarding (un)favorable developments. Governments’ sentiment provides unique explanatory power. Show less
BACKGROUND: A clear understanding of the differences in the epidemiology of food allergy between rural and urban populations may provide insights into the causes of increasing prevalence of food... Show moreBACKGROUND: A clear understanding of the differences in the epidemiology of food allergy between rural and urban populations may provide insights into the causes of increasing prevalence of food allergy in the developed world.OBJECTIVE: We used a standardized methodology to determine the prevalence and types of food-specific allergic sensitization and food allergies in schoolchildren from urban and rural regions of China, Russia, and India.METHODS: The current study is a multicenter epidemiological survey of children recruited from 5 cities in China (Hong Kong and Guangzhou), Russia (Tomsk), and India (Bengaluru and Mysore) and 1 rural county in Southern China (Shaoguan). A total of 35,549 children aged 6 to 11 years from 3 countries participated in this survey. Random samples of children from 3 countries were first screened by the EuroPrevall screening questionnaire. Children with and without a history of adverse reactions to foods were then recruited for the subsequent case-control comparative studies. We determined the prevalence rates of food-specific IgE sensitization and food allergies using the predefined criteria.RESULTS: The prevalence rates of food-specific IgE sensitization (>= 0.7 kU/L) to at least 1 food were 16.6% in Hong Kong, 7.0% in Guangzhou, 16.8% in rural Shaoguan, 8.0% in Tomsk, and 19.1% in India. Using a definition of probable food allergy as reporting allergic symptoms within 2 hours of ingestion of a specific food plus the presence of allergic sensitization to the specific food (positive IgE and/or positive skin prick test result), the prevalence of food allergy was highest in Hong Kong (1.50%), intermediate in Russia (0.87%), and lowest in Guangzhou (0.21%), Shaoguan (0.69%), and India (0.14%). For children recruited from Hong Kong, both sensitization and food allergy were significantly higher in children who were born and raised in Hong Kong when compared with those who were born in mainland China and migrated to Hong Kong, highlighting the importance of early-life exposures in affecting the subsequent development of food sensitization and food allergy.CONCLUSIONS: There are wide variations in the prevalence of food-specific IgE sensitization and food allergy in the 3 participating countries. Food allergy appears to be less common when compared with developed countries. The variations in the prevalence of food allergen sensitization cannot be explained by the differences in the degree of urbanization. Despite the high prevalence of food-specific IgE sensitization in India and rural China, food allergy is still extremely uncommon. In addition to IgE sensitization, other factors must play important roles resulting in the clinical manifestations of food allergies. (C) 2019 American Academy of Allergy, Asthma & Immunology Show less
China’s displacement of Russian economic influence in Central Asia is generating great interest in Western academic and policy circles, but this research has, as yet, yielded few analytical... Show moreChina’s displacement of Russian economic influence in Central Asia is generating great interest in Western academic and policy circles, but this research has, as yet, yielded few analytical nuances. This article attempts to shed light on the under-researched question of what explains Central Asian governments’ failure to more effectively capitalize on the growing Central-Asian rivalry between Russia, China, the United States, Turkey, Iran, South Korea, Japan and other regional powers that, since the early 1990s, have been overwhelmingly directed towards strategic energy considerations and hydrocarbon interests. Show less
What explains the differences in the Sino-Russian oil and gas cooperation? Overall, I suggest, the several trajectories are explained by the dissimilarities of oil and gas as commodities and... Show moreWhat explains the differences in the Sino-Russian oil and gas cooperation? Overall, I suggest, the several trajectories are explained by the dissimilarities of oil and gas as commodities and potential foreign policy tools. These differences, along with other factors, such as corporate culture and individual personalities, shed light on the strategies of Russia’s gas conglomerates, Gazprom and Rosneft. Yet, if a more nuanced understanding of variation within these energy markets illuminates the reasons behind the sequencing of oil and gas cross-border pipeline projects, what explains the particular timing of the landmark 2014 gas deal? Why after 15 years of stalemate in the Sino-Russian gas cooperation did breakthroughs occur in 2014? And what explains the modesty of the record in gas cooperation to date? Many factors are undoubtedly involved, both economic and political; however, I contend that the conclusive factor can be found in underlying domestic politics.The article outlines the role of national narratives in driving both Russia and China’s energy foreign policy and goes on to argue that the Sino-Russian gas breakthrough in 2014 was due to the peculiar way in which domestic factors paired with international circumstances to produce the outcome at that particular moment. Show less
The SCO is a political, economic, and security organization that started its security policy in arms control and subsequently developed war games. Conversely, the CSTO is a military alliance with... Show moreThe SCO is a political, economic, and security organization that started its security policy in arms control and subsequently developed war games. Conversely, the CSTO is a military alliance with collective armed forces. The military exercises of the CSTO are focused on conventional warfare, peacekeeping, antinarcotics, counterterrorism, and disaster relief. The SCO conducts counterinsurgency drills, as well as large-scale conventional warfare games. The dominating role of Russia and China in CSTO and SCO is also reflected in the military exercises of these bodies. The views that Central Asian countries put forward in SCO and CSTO are not coordinated on a Central Asian regional level but usually only serve national interests. There is no such thing as a common Central Asian approach to security. Show less
This article examines the security policy of the Central Asian (CA) states, by comparing theory (security documents) with practice (the actual security challenges). The lack of CA regional ... Show moreThis article examines the security policy of the Central Asian (CA) states, by comparing theory (security documents) with practice (the actual security challenges). The lack of CA regional (security) cooperation and authoritarian rule puts political and economic stability at stake. The internal and external threats are partly caused by the CA regimes themselves: Political opposition groups are often described as terrorists and/or blamed to be connected to Islamic State (IS). There is hardly any effort toward improving social-economic circumstances, which would take away grounds for (Islamic) radicalization. Moreover, the CA governments are themselves responsible for regional border, water, and energy disputes. Political unrest and radicalization, IS, as well as terrorism and drugs from Afghanistan could become serious threats to the survival of CA governments. Show less
Obvious partners for NATO in the (Far) East are Russia and China. With Russia the Alliancecooperates through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). China, as a rising international power, canalso no longer... Show moreObvious partners for NATO in the (Far) East are Russia and China. With Russia the Alliancecooperates through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). China, as a rising international power, canalso no longer be neglected by NATO. But so far only mutual high-level visits have been conducted.Furthermore, as strategic partners, China and Russia share a negative attitude towards the West. Theyhave issued joint statements against the U.S.–Japanese initiative to develop a theatre anti-missilesystem in Asia, NATO enlargement, NATO’s ‘interventionist’ Strategic Concept of 1999 (justifying itsmilitary action in Kosovo), President Bush’s 2002 decision to annul the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treatywith Russia, and against the US/NATO missile defense shield. Furthermore, Moscow and Beijing takethe lead in international (security) organizations in the Far East region: the Collective Security TreatyOrganization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Show less
